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THESES
The role of rail transport in EU-China trade relations
•	 EU-China	rail	 transports	have	experienced	a	hundredfold	 increase	since	
the	beginning	of	the	2010s.	From	2011,	when	the	first	regular	connections	
were	introduced,	6,637	freight	trains	were	launched	in	both	directions,	in-
cluding	3,673	in	the	record-breaking	2017	alone.	The	value	of	goods	shipped	
by	rail	in	2016	can	be	estimated	at	US$	22.9	billion,	which	constituted	about	
4%	of	overall	EU-China	trade.	The	estimated	value	of	goods	transported	by	
train	in	2020	may	reach	US$	76.5	billion.	More	than	two	thirds	of	trains	
are	run	from	China	to	Europe,	reflecting	the	Chinese	general	trade	surplus	
with	the	EU.
•	 Most	forecasts	assume	that	rail	transport	can	only	cover	several	per	cent	of	
the	total	volume	of	goods	transported	from	Asia	to	Europe	and	vice versa.	In	
2017	about	200,000	TEU	(twenty-foot	container	equivalent)	were	shipped	
by	 train	 from	 China	 to	 Europe,	 while	maritime	 container	 flow	 reached	
10	million	TEU.	For	example,	rail	 is	not	a	suitable	means	of	transporting	
raw	materials	and	unprocessed	metals,	as	well	as	most	industrial	products.	
It	is	much	more	favourable	to	use	rail	to	transport	mainly	high-value	goods	
and	capital-intensive	goods.	As	a	consequence,	when	it	comes	to	the	share	
of	goods	transported	by	train	in	the	total	transport	of	goods	between	China	
and	the	EU,	the	market	share	expressed	in	values	exceeds	the	market	share	
expressed	in	volumes.	A	rail	connection	may	enable	China	to	gain	a	com-
petitive	advantage	in	logistics	over	its	Asian	competitors.	It	is	also	an	op-
portunity	for	Europe	to	strengthen	its	position	in	China,	in	particular	in	
the	luxury	goods	and	premium	food	market	segments.
•	 The	biggest	advantage	of	rail	transport	is	the	fact	that	it	is	a	form	of	trans-
porting	goods	in	the	middle	of	the	scale	between	cheap	and	slow	maritime	
transport	and	fast	and	expensive	air	freight.	The	time	it	takes	to	transport	
goods	 from	one	 terminal	 to	another	by	air	 is	5-9	days,	by	rail	 15-19	days	
and	by	sea	37-50	days.	Compared	with	maritime	transport,	rail	transport	
is	 particularly	 attractive	 for	 places	 located	 far	 from	 sea	 ports.	 In	many	
branches	of	commerce,	the	speed	of	market	changes	is	so	fast	that	compa-
nies	are	ready	to	pay	higher	rates	for	transportation	than	what	they	usu-
ally	pay	for	sea	freight	just	to	gain	some	time.	Rail	transport	may	also	prove	
attractive	for	goods	that	have	so	far	been	dispatched	by	air,	provided	that	
the	slightly	longer	delivery	time	is	acceptable.	
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•	 It	is	cost-effective	to	use	rail	transport	for	high	value	goods.	The	maritime	
transport	of	high	value	goods	entails	the	need	to	freeze	capital	for	several	
weeks	and	generates	high	costs	for	companies,	in	particular	those	which	
use	external	funding.	Another	example	of	rail	 freight	 is	 the	transport	of	
goods	which	need	to	be	delivered	quickly.	Rail	transport	can	also	be	used	
to	dispatch	goods	such	as	electronic	devices	for	which	air	transport	always	
seemed	too	expensive	but	was	the	only	available	option.	In	the	case	of	these	
goods	a	slightly	longer	delivery	time	(by	several	days)	is	acceptable.	More-
over,	the	more	frequent	use	of	rail	transport	will	generate	new	trade	flows	
to	transport	fresh	food	which	needs	to	be	delivered	relatively	quickly	and	
the	transport	cost	of	which	cannot	be	excessively	high	due	to	average-level	
profit	margins.	
China’s role and motivation in developing the rail connections
•	 The	development	 of	 rail	 connections	 between	China	 and	Europe	has	 be-
come	one	of	 the	key	elements	of	 the	New	Silk	Road	initiative	announced	
by	China’s	President	Xi	Jinping	in	2013.	The	development	of	transport	cor-
ridors	is	a	component	of	Beijing’s	 long-term	strategy	that	promotes	trade	
with	 Central	 Asia	 and	 the	 EU	 and	 stimulates	 economic	 development	 in	
China’s	inner	provinces.	It	also	aims	to	increase	the	role	of	Chinese	compa-
nies	in	EU-China	trade	as	a	whole	along	the	entire	value	chain	(forwarding,	
transport,	 logistics	 infrastructure)	and	to	facilitate	China’s	economic	ex-
pansion	in	these	countries.	There	are	plans	to	build	industrial	parks	along	
rail	routes	to	attract	Chinese	 investors.	This	 is	expected	to	translate	 into	
increased	 trade,	more	 frequent	 interpersonal	contacts	and	boosted	 tour-
ism.	Moreover,	Beijing	began	to	use	rail	connections	with	Europe	as	a	dip-
lomatic	tool.
•	 The	 local	 governments	 of	 Chinese	 provinces	 and	 cities	 have	 become	key	
actors	in	the	development	of	rail	connections	between	China	and	the	EU.	
There	 are	 both	political	 and	 economic	 reasons	 behind	 the	provinces’	 in-
volvement	in	building	rail	connections.	By	filling	out	the	vision	presented	
by	Xi	Jinping	with	genuine	content	and	by	manifesting	active	support	for	
Beijing’s	plans,	 local	government	officials	are	trying	to	win	political	sup-
port	 from	 the	 central	 authorities.	Rail	 connections	with	Europe	are	also	
treated	 as	 an	 important	 element	 of	 local	 economic	 development	 strate-
gies.	The	provinces	are	playing	a	major	role	in	supporting	specific	connec-
tions	through	subsidies	which	were	crucial	for	the	market	of	rail	connec-
tions	with	Europe	to	develop	to	its	present	size.	At	the	same	time,	specific	
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provinces	compete	with	each	other	mainly	for	attracting	trade	flows	from	
other	parts	of	China.	
•	 Over	the	last	2-3	years,	China’s	central	government	has	been	actively	in-
volved	in	the	process	of	organising	transport	under	the	project	known	as	
CR	Express.	Beijing’s	main	goal	 is	 to	guarantee	more	balanced	develop-
ment	 of	 the	 transport	market.	The	 strategy	 for	 the	development	 of	 rail	
connections	with	Europe	in	2016-2020	assumes,	for	example,	greater	co-
ordination	in	the	process	of	organising	transport,	facilitation	of	the	pro-
cess	 of	 expanding	 China’s	 logistical	 infrastructure,	 as	well	 as	 Beijing’s	
increased	 involvement	 in	relationships	with	 foreign	partners	along	 the	
Belt	and	Road.	In	the	upcoming	years,	a	consolidation	of	the	connections	
should	be	expected	alongside	a	reduction	 in	 the	number	of	Chinese	cit-
ies	able	to	service	the	connections	with	Europe.	Moreover,	the	introduc-
tion	of	a	unified	pricing	policy	and	a	reduction	of	subsidies	are	among	the	
strategy’s	key	points.	
•	 In	the	operational	aspect,	the	main	institution	responsible	for	the	imple-
mentation	of	 the	strategy	adopted	by	Beijing	 is	 the	Chinese	national	 rail	
carrier	 China	 Railway.	 In	 its	 form,	 the	 Organisation	 Committee	 for	 CR	
Express,	 established	 in	2017,	 led	by	China	Railway	and	composed	of	 sev-
en	biggest	local	connection	operators,	resembles	a	cartel	in	that	it	aims	to	
limit	competition	between	transport	companies	controlled	by	local	govern-
ments.	In	Beijing’s	view,	this	competition	is	harmful.
Main stakeholders 
•	 The	 launch	of	a	 specific	 route	 requires	a	wide-ranging	consensus	among	
all	the	states	located	along	this	route.	Within	these	states	it	requires	joint	
action	by	a	number	of	 institutions	and	companies	that	are	important	for	
the	process.	Chinese	intermodal	operators,	which	coordinate	the	transport	
of	goods	across	specific	states,	are	 involved	in	organising	a	specific	train	
connection.	Due	to	varying	infrastructure	standards,	in	the	states	located	
along	 the	 route,	 the	 flatcars	 carrying	 the	 containers	 are	 transported	 by	
local	carriers	using	their	own	locomotives.	They	are	crucial	in	managing	
the	transport	system	and	act	as	a	party	in	negotiations	with	foreign	part-
ners	along	the	corridors.	Other	actors	involved	in	managing	the	transport	
system	 frequently	 include	 local	 freight	 forwarding	 companies	 (that	 or-
ganise	the	transport	of	goods),	customs	officers,	rolling	stock	owners	and	
logistics	infrastructure	owners.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	to	point	to	one	
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stakeholder,	even	the	Chinese	government,	that	would	be	able	to	operate	
and	manage	the	process	of	transporting	goods	from	China	to	the	EU	and	
vice versa	on	its	own.	Local	governments	can	try	to	influence	the	shape	and	
dynamics	of	 the	China-EU	transport	 to	 the	degree	 to	which	they	control	
local	carriers.
•	 The	geographical	structure	of	the	China-EU	rail	transit	and	the	use	of	spe-
cific	 transport	corridors	depend	on	 the	state	of	political	cooperation	and	
the	consensus	among	all	 the	stakeholders	operating	along	a	given	route.	
It	also	depends	on	the	active	involvement	of	numerous	state	institutions.	
‘Soft’	factors	are	of	key	importance	for	the	cost,	speed	and	promptness	of	
transport.	These	 include	 proper	 business	 standards,	 simplified	 customs	
procedures	 and	 formal	 solutions	 worked	 out	 under	 multi-party	 agree-
ments.	The	price	and	duration	of	transport,	as	well	as	the	intensity	of	use	
of	a	specific	transport	corridor,	largely	depend	on	these	agreements	and	on	
the	state	of	the	infrastructure.
•	 China	 is	 striving	 to	 assume	 the	 role	of	 coordinator	 in	 the	expansion	of	
the	 Eurasian	 transport	 corridors,	 including	 by	 devising	 technical	 im-
provements.	A	multi-party	meeting	 of	 railway	 carriers	 during	 the	Belt	
and	Road	forum	in	2017	was	among	a	series	of	initiatives	that	served	this	
purpose.	These	plans	are	facilitated	by	the	dominant	position	of	Chinese	
companies	in	the	organisation	of	train	connections.	On	the	other	hand,	
their	considerable	decentralisation	and	the	leading	role	of	the	provinces	
prevent	Beijing	from	coordinating	the	activities	at	the	domestic	level	and	
working	out	a	unified	stance.	Leaving	the	task	of	shaping	the	rules	of	co-
operation	solely	to	Beijing	is	not	in	the	interest	of	the	states	located	along	
the	route,	including	Russia	and	EU	member	states.	Therefore,	the	key	de-
cisions	regarding	the	development	of	transport	corridors	are	still	being	
worked	out	under	 regional	 agreements	made	by	 the	 states	 involved,	 as	
well	 as	 agreements	 by	multilateral	 international	 organisations	 dealing	
with	transport	issues	(OSJD).	
The benefits for the EU and Central Europe
•	 In	2016,	the	added	value	for	the	EU	states	generated	by	the	China-EU	rail	
connection	was	around	US$	0.28	billion.	Approximately	 72%	of	 this	val-
ue	was	generated	by	tariff	settlements,	17%	by	logistic	services	connected	
with	the	distribution	of	goods	on	the	EU	market,	and	5%	by	revenue	earned	
on	making	rail	infrastructure	and	rolling	stock	available	to	contractors.	In	
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the	next	couple	of	years,	 trade	turnover	 is	expected	to	 increase	dynami-
cally.	As	a	consequence,	by	2020	the	total	added	value	generated	in	the	EU	
by	this	rail	connection	may	reach	more	than	US$	1	billion.	
•	 The	biggest	part	of	the	revenue	will	be	earned	by	states	that	host	logistics	
centres	 in	which	 trains	 from	China	 arrive	 and	 from	which	 they	depart.	
This	will	foster	the	development	of	companies	operating	in	the	transporta-
tion,	forwarding	and	logistics	sector	and	generate	increased	revenues	from	
tariffs.	The	development	of	logistics	centres	supporting	China-EU	rail	con-
nections	may	be	a	development	opportunity	for	those	regions	of	the	EU	that	
struggle	with	structural	problems.
•	 Companies	from	Central	Europe	have	an	opportunity	to	compete	for	a	por-
tion	of	the	forwarding	services	market,	even	though	a	large	segment	of	this	
market	 is	already	being	serviced	by	global	companies	such	as	DB	Schen-
ker	and	DHL.	Poland	and	other	countries	of	the	region	can	make	their	in-
frastructure	available	to	contractors,	offer	logistics	services	and	generate	
revenue	from	import	tariffs	on	goods	transported	from	China	to	Europe.	
Most	revenue	generated	by	the	process	of	establishing	the	rail	connection	
in	itself	is	earned	by	Chinese	companies	that	usually	play	the	role	of	inter-
modal	operators.	An	increase	in	the	number	of	transported	containers	will	
mainly	translate	into	increased	profit	earned	by	the	transport	and	logistics	
industries,	while	an	 increase	 in	 the	value	of	goods	will	mainly	 translate	
into	higher	revenue	from	collected	import	tariffs.	
•	 Fears	that	the	rail	connection	may	contribute	to	an	increase	in	the	trade	
deficit	 between	 Central	 European	 countries	 and	 China	 seem	 unfounded	
because	from	this	region’s	point	of	view	one-sided	trade	balance	analyses	
may	be	confusing.	A	large	portion	of	foreign	trade	flows	between	China	and	
Central	Europe	 remains	beyond	 the	control	of	 individual	 states.	This	 re-
sults	from	the	fact	that	individual	countries	play	various	functions	in	the	
supply	chains	operated	by	global	companies.	 In	many	cases,	components	
produced	in	China	are	then	assembled	in	Central	Europe.	The	final	prod-
uct	is	later	sold	on	the	European	market.	From	this	perspective,	providing	
a	competitive	manner	of	transporting	goods	from	China	by	train	may	trig-
ger	an	increase	in	the	trade	deficit	between	the	states	of	Central	Europe	and	
China,	but	at	the	same	time	may	cause	a	rise	in	the	surplus	they	have	with	
states	which	are	end-product	recipients.
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The potential for building logistics centres in Central Europe
•	 Most	probably,	the	optimisation	of	the	China-EU	rail	connections,	which	
Beijing	is	currently	implementing	on	the	Chinese	side,	will	also	cover	the	
activity	of	Chinese	intermodal	operators	in	Europe.	This	results	from	the	
intention	to	generate	savings	on	logistics	by	achieving	economies	of	scale,	
increasing	the	effectiveness	of	carriages	via	the	connections,	and	by	aim-
ing	to	gain	control	 (at	 least	partly)	of	 the	 infrastructure	available	at	 ter-
minals.	The	connections	will	be	concentrated	in	several	European	logistics	
‘hubs’.	This	will	 concern	 industrial	 areas	 that	have	a	major	potential	 for	
generating	 the	 rail	 traffic	 of	 goods	 (using	 the	model	 of	 creating	 a	 direct	
train	connection	between	factories	located	in	the	EU	and	China).	Similarly,	
locations	that	have	a	major	logistical	potential	will	be	gaining	importance.	
This	will	include	the	centres	performing	a	consolidation	of	European	goods	
on	their	way	to	China	and	the	further	distribution	of	goods	imported	to	Eu-
rope.	This	is	intended	to	foster	an	increase	in	carriage	efficiency,	including	
a	greater	use	of	the	capacity	of	the	trains.
•	 From	 China’s	 perspective,	 Poland	 is	 an	 attractive	 location	 for	 providing	
logistical	services	to	rail	cargo	traffic	with	Central	Europe	and	to	certain	
degree	also	with	Scandinavia	and	the	southern	and	eastern	regions	of	Ger-
many.	 It	 offers	 a	 favourable	 geographical	 location,	 low	 labour	 costs,	 and	
a	relatively	 large	 logistics	and	warehousing	base.	One	 important	asset	 is	
the	big	number	of	companies	that	offer	road	transport	services	at	a	com-
petitive	price.	This	type	of	transport	is	of	key	importance	for	the	consoli-
dation	and	distribution	of	goods	across	the	EU.	At	present,	the	city	of	Łódź	
is	playing	the	role	of	a	‘hub’,	as	it	services	around	25%	of	trains	travelling	
from	China	to	the	EU	and	vice versa,	accounting	for	around	7%	of	the	value	
of	transported	goods.	Another	advantage	of	Poland	is	the	strategic	impor-
tance	of	the	trans-shipment	terminal	in	Małaszewicze	on	the	Polish-Bela-
rus	border.	At	present,	also	Slovakia	and	Hungary	are	competing	for	the	
status	of	a	Central	European	‘hub’.	However,	their	role	is	currently	limited	
due	to	the	difficulties	affecting	transit	via	Ukraine.
•	 German	cities	too	are	hoping	to	increase	their	revenues	from	supporting	
rail	 connections	with	China.	At	present,	Duisburg	 in	North-Rhine	West-
phalia	is	playing	the	role	of	a	logistics	‘hub’	for	the	territory	of	Germany,	
Benelux	and	northern	France.	Rail	connections	between	the	EU	and	China	
generate	around	5.4%	of	rail	trans-shipment	operations	carried	out	there.	
Due	to	the	proximity	of	the	main	industrial	bases	that	use	the	EU-China	
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rail	connections,	around	25%	of	trains,	accounting	for	around	75%	of	the	
value	of	goods,	are	trans-shipped	in	Duisburg.
•	 So	far,	rail	transport	from	China	to	the	EU	and	vice versa	has	been	performed	
using	the	existing	logistics	infrastructure.	An	increase	in	the	intensity	of	
this	 transport	may	trigger	 the	need	to	build	new	terminals	and	 logistics	
centres.	China	will	most	likely	wish	to	participate	in	the	terminal	build-
ing	projects	as	a	majority	stakeholder.	From	the	point	of	view	of	European	
business,	 it	would	be	of	key	 importance	 to	build	 logistics	 infrastructure	
that	would	be	open	and	available	to	both	Chinese	and	European	companies.	
The	final	location	of	the	hubs	in	the	EU	will	depend	on:	the	condition	and	
traffic	capacity	of	road	and	rail	infrastructure	(including	a	well	thought-
out	modernisation	 strategy),	 favourable	 regulatory	 framework	and	price	
regime	adjusted	to	the	needs	of	intermodal	transport,	preferential	customs	
clearance	 procedures	 (for	 example	 delayed	 import	 VAT	 payments),	 the	
adoption	of	 suitable	 regulations	 for	 e-commerce,	 and	 improved	 coopera-
tion	between	various	rail	carrier	companies.
The structure of transported goods and the opportunities for business
•	 When	choosing	their	preferred	method	for	transporting	goods,	companies	
do	not	merely	take	into	account	the	price	and	duration	of	transport.	Every	
time	rail	transport	is	chosen,	a	number	of	business	factors	are	taken	into	
account:	the	geographical	location	of	the	goods,	the	value	of	the	goods,	their	
vulnerability	 to	damage,	 their	 size.	Security	and	promptness	of	delivery	
are	also	important,	as	well	as	its	impact	on	the	environment.
•	 According	to	estimates,	around	65-67%	of	deliveries	by	train	involve	goods	
of	a	relatively	high	value.	Dispatching	this	type	of	goods	by	rail	is	favour-
able	due	to	 the	relatively	small	share	of	 the	cost	of	 transportation	 in	the	
price	of	these	goods.	At	present,	it	is	mainly	electronic	devices,	electrical	
machines,	 pharmaceutical	 and	 chemical	 products	 that	 are	 transported	
from	China	to	Europe	by	rail.	For	these	types	of	products,	delivery	time	is	
important	and	companies	are	willing	to	bear	higher	transportation	costs.	
At	present,	this	is	the	most	frequent	motivation	for	using	rail	transport.	
•	 Usually,	 saving	 time	 is	 the	most	 frequent	motivation	 to	use	 train	 trans-
port	between	China	and	the	EU	as	a	way	of	direct	delivering	components	
and	products	between	manufacturing	plants.	Certain	transformations	in	
China	itself	have	contributed	to	the	creation	of	supply	chains	that	use	new	
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methods	 for	 transporting	 goods.	 Differences	 in	 development	 standards	
between	 specific	 provinces	 convinced	Western	 companies	 to	move	 their	
production	 of	 components	 from	 coastal	 areas	 to	 inner	 provinces.	When	
manufacturing	plants	that	belong	to	one	company	are	connected	by	rail,	
company	owners	rent	entire	trains	to	transport	their	goods.	This	solution	
is	favourable	for	them	both	in	terms	of	price	and	duration	of	transport.	Due	
to	the	fact	that	a	train	is	able	to	transport	fewer	containers	than	a	ship,	it	
can	be	fully	contracted	by	one	company,	whereas	the	 logistics	connected	
with	loading	and	unloading	big	container	ships	is	much	more	complex	and	
less	flexible.	
•	 The	China-EU	rail	connection	is	popular	with	manufacturers	of	seasonal	
goods,	including	in	particular	clothes.	Due	to	specific	deadlines	for	launch-
ing	new	clothing	collections,	the	producers	often	wish	to	save	time	and	do	
not	want	 to	bear	excessive	 transportation	costs.	Emergency	deliveries	of	
goods	are	another	category	of	using	rail	transport.	It	sometimes	happens	
that	the	client	receives	goods	that	does	not	meet	all	the	criteria	and	stand-
ards	specified	in	the	order.	If	this	is	the	case,	sending	additional	batches	of	
products	is	necessary,	for	example	due	to	a	strict	merchandising	deadline.	
In	this	situation,	many	clients	choose	delivery	by	rail,	because	they	do	not	
have	a	sufficient	profit	margin	to	afford	to	deliver	goods	by	air.	
•	 In	2014-2015,	carriers	managed	to	improve	the	organisational	efficiency	of	
the	connection’s	logistics	so	that	now	it	is	possible	to	dispatch	goods	whose	
volume	does	not	exceed	the	volume	of	one	container.	The	opening	of	the	rail	
connection	to	e-commerce	has	created	an	opportunity	to	transport	at	least	
a	portion	of	the	large	market	of	parcels	sent	from	Europe	to	China	and	vice 
versa.	According	to	estimates,	this	market	accounts	for	more	than	half	of	
parcel	traffic	between	Europe	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	Rail	transport	may	
considerably	 increase	 the	competitiveness	of	European	producers	on	 the	
Chinese	e-commerce	market.	
Challenges to the development of EU-China rail connections
•	 The	rapid	increase	in	EU-China	rail	transport	was	only	possible	due	to	sub-
sidies	offered	by	those	Chinese	provinces	that	wished	to	boost	their	logis-
tics	potential.	Usually,	these	subsidies	involve	grants	to	rail	operators	con-
trolled	by	the	governments	of	specific	provinces	and	cities,	which	organise	
transportation.	The	total	annual	amount	of	subsidies	can	be	estimated	at	
US$	 300	 million.	The	 subsidies,	 alongside	 the	 competition	 between	 the	
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provinces,	trigger	transport	price	fluctuations,	disrupt	logistics	chains	and	
frequently	contribute	to	the	fact	that	only	a	small	portion	of	the	trains’	ca-
pacity	is	used.
•	 The	question	of	balancing	the	train	service	from	China	to	Europe	and	from	
Europe	to	China	remains	the	key	challenge	for	the	development	of	rail	con-
nections.	The	rail	transportation	of	goods	from	Europe	to	China	accounts	
for	approximately	just	one	third	of	all	commissioned	trains.	The	costs	re-
sulting	from	unbalanced	trade	are	mainly	borne	by	the	Chinese	provinces,	
which	increases	the	need	to	use	subsidies.	The	task	of	finding	clients	who	
would	use	the	rail	connections	regularly	and	would	help	meet	the	trains’	
capacity	and	guarantee	the	long-term	profitability	of	these	connections,	is	
one	of	the	main	priorities	of	the	Chinese	provinces.	This	mainly	concerns	
goods	exported	from	Europe	to	China,	because	–	paradoxically	–	the	cost	of	
sending	empty	trains,	borne	by	the	provinces,	may	motivate	them	to	sup-
port	imports	from	Europe.
•	 The	Chinese	 leadership	 is	becoming	 increasingly	 aware	 that,	 in	 the	 long	
term,	the	development	of	connections	with	Europe	must	be	based	on	mar-
ket	mechanisms	and	subsidies	must	be	gradually	phased	out.	According	to	
insider	information,	this	is	expected	to	happen	around	2020-2022.	Howev-
er,	the	uncertain	future	of	the	subsidies,	which	depend	on	political	factors,	
makes	European	actors	 involved	 in	transportation	reluctant	 for	example	
regarding	their	investments	to	expand	infrastructure.
•	 One	 important	business	activity	 that	could	help	balance	the	profitability	
of	 the	 connection	 is	 the	 export	 of	 foodstuffs	 from	Europe	 to	China.	This	
mainly	concerns	the	premium	food	segment	in	which	high	profit	margins	
could	 cover	 the	 relatively	 high	 transportation	 cost.	However,	 at	 present	
this	method	of	exporting	food	from	Europe	is	suspended	due	to	a	Russian	
embargo	which	bans	transit	from	the	EU	to	China.	Transporting	foodstuffs	
by	 rail	 requires	 a	 strict	 observance	 of	 deadlines,	 and	 therefore	 customs	
clearance	procedures	would	also	need	to	be	made	more	efficient.	For	Eu-
ropean	foodstuffs	producers,	the	rail	connection	may	be	an	opportunity	to	
gain	a	competitive	advantage	over	their	main	global	competitors.	
The potential of specific EU-China rail routes 
•	 On	 the	newly	 opened	 connections	 between	China	 and	 the	 EU,	 the	 trade	
flows	are	executed	using	 the	easiest	possible	 solutions,	 i.e.	via	 transport	
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corridors	 that	 already	 have	 the	 biggest	 capacity,	 the	 best	 infrastructure	
and	 the	most	 favourable	 legislative	 conditions.	 Due	 to	 their	 competitive	
advantage,	the	development	of	rail	connections	between	China	and	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	has	so	far	been	almost	exclusively	based	on	the	three	trans-
Siberian	routes	that	run	through	Russia.	At	present,	the	biggest	number	of	
containers	is	transported	using	the	corridor	that	runs	via	Kazakhstan	and	
starts	on	the	Chinese-Kazakh	border	crossing	of	Alashankou/Dostyk.	The	
three	corridors	meet	in	the	Urals	near	Yekaterinburg.	Next,	the	goods	are	
transported	to	the	EU	via	Belarus	and	are	unloaded	onto	standard	Euro-
pean	gauge	flatcars	in	Małaszewicze	on	the	Polish-Belarusian	border.	For	
political	reasons,	at	present	the	transit	from	Russia	to	the	EU	via	Ukraine	
is	limited.	A	small	number	of	trains	from	China	have	their	terminus	in	the	
Baltic	states.	
•	 The	 trans-Siberian	 corridors	have	 the	 best	 infrastructure	 of	 all	 existing	
routes.	The	use	of	trans-Siberian	corridors	is	also	facilitated	by	cooperation	
between	the	states	that	belong	to	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	i.e.	Rus-
sia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	From	the	point	of	view	of	Chinese	provinces	
that	provide	subsidies	for	the	rail	connections	with	the	EU,	at	present	the	
trans-Siberian	corridors	are	the	cheapest,	the	fastest	and	the	safest	option.	
They	also	offer	the	most	favourable	relation	of	costs	to	desired	effects.	Due	
to	this,	the	routes	running	through	Russia	have	received	the	biggest	sup-
port	from	the	Chinese	central	government	and	are	a	key	element	of	China’s	
strategies.	Other	 important	stakeholders	 in	the	development	of	 trans-Si-
berian	corridors	are	Russian	Railways	(RZD),	including	Kazakh	Railways	
(KTZ)	and	Belarusian	Railways	(BZD)	that	cooperate	with	them.
•	 From	Beijing’s	point	of	view,	the	use	of	 the	routes	that	run	through	Rus-
sia	 is	of	major	political	significance,	because	in	the	 long	term	it	weakens	
Moscow’s	potential	objection	to	the	Chinese	New	Silk	Road	project.	At	the	
same	time,	the	dependence	of	all	three	trans-Siberian	corridors	on	the	Rus-
sian	railway	system	enables	Russia	to	use	rail	transport	as	a	tool	to	exert	
political	pressure	on	its	neighbours.	Russia’s	hostile	approach	(the	transit	
blockade)	and	Beijing’s	unwillingness	 to	develop	cooperation	have	elimi-
nated	Ukraine	from	participation	in	rail	connections	between	China	and	
the	EU.	This	has	also	strengthened	the	position	of	Belarus	and	Poland	in	the	
trans-Siberian	corridors.
•	 The	remaining	states	that	wish	to	join	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	are	tak-
ing	measures	to	improve	alternative	transport	corridors	to	make	it	possible	
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to	 redirect	 a	portion	of	 trade	flows	 to	 them.	The	 trans-Caspian	 land	and	
sea	corridors	running	through	the	Caspian	Sea,	the	Caucasus	and	the	Black	
Sea	are	one	potential	alternative	to	the	currently	used	trans-Siberian	cor-
ridors.	However,	the	transport	of	goods	using	this	route	is	much	more	com-
plicated	and	requires	complex	 intermodal	solutions	 (such	as	 ferry	cross-
ings).	 So	 far,	 the	 use	 of	 trans-Caspian	 corridors	 in	 rail	 container	 traffic	
with	China	has	been	insignificant	and	limited	to	non-EU	states	which	are	
located	along	the	corridor.	Their	future	potential	is	limited	by	the	relatively	
poor	transport	infrastructure,	as	well	as	certain	formal	limitations	such	as	
those	regarding	border	clearance,	the	absence	of	unified	regulations	and	
technical	standards,	and	varying	transport	costs.	
•	 At	present,	Kazakhstan	and	Azerbaijan	are	the	main	stakeholders	in	the	
development	 of	 the	 trans-Caspian	 corridors	 because	 they	 see	 economic	
benefits	 in	 developing	 the	 logistics	 sector	 and	 the	 transit	 of	 containers	
from	China	 to	Turkey,	 and	 in	 expanding	 their	 own	 trade	 channels	with	
Europe	and	China.	They	have	also	started	cooperation	with	Ukraine,	Po-
land	and	Romania.	The	future	use	of	trans-Caspian	corridors	in	the	trade	
between	China	and	the	EU	is	uncertain	due	to	the	unclear	stance	taken	by	
Beijing.	These	corridors	have	not	yet	received	significant	support	from	the	
Chinese	central	government	and	provinces,	and	this	prevents	the	develop-
ment	of	transportation	on	a	large	scale.	The	present	calculations	regarding	
increased	use	of	the	trans-Caspian	corridors	in	the	transit	of	goods	from	
China	to	the	EU	and	vice versa	are	based	on	the	assumption	that	there	could	
be	disruptions	to	the	smooth	flow	of	transport	via	Russia.	These	could	in-
clude	the	emergence	of	infrastructure	bottlenecks	and	the	potential	desta-
bilisation	of	states	that	are	of	key	importance	for	their	functioning,	i.e.	Be-
larus	and	Kazakhstan.
•	 Another	potential	alternative	to	China-EU	rail	traffic	is	the	southern	route	
that	 runs	 through	Turkey.	 In	 this	variant,	 the	 trains	 travel	partly	 along	
trans-Caspian	corridors	(on	the	China-Georgia	section),	and	then	use	the	
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	rail	connection,	heading	for	the	European	part	of	Turkey.	
The	state	of	rail	infrastructure	in	Turkey	is	the	main	problem	here.	From	
China’s	perspective,	the	present	work	on	the	development	of	the	southern	
corridor	is	mainly	intended	to	build	permanent	connections	with	Turkey.	
At	present,	the	use	of	this	corridor	to	establish	regular	connections	with	
the	EU	is	not	considered	favourable	either	by	Beijing	or	by	individual	prov-
inces.	However,	this	route	is	mentioned	in	the	CR	Express	strategy	as	a	po-
tential	alternative	route	to	the	EU	in	the	future.	Turkey	and	the	Caucasian	
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states	are	also	interested	in	developing	this	corridor.	Most	actions	intended	
to	 improve	 this	 transport	corridor	are	carried	out	under	cooperation	 fo-
rums	which	have	been	in	place	for	years,	such	as	the	Transport	Corridor	
Europe-Caucasus-Asia	(TRACECA).
•	 China	is	also	interested	in	developing	the	so-called	China-Europe	Land-Sea	
Express	Line	which	is	a	maritime	route	connecting	Chinese	ports	with	the	
port	in	Piraeus	in	Greece.	From	there,	goods	are	then	delivered	by	rail	to	
Central	and	Western	Europe.	This	route	coincides	with	the	Pan-European	
Corridor	 X	 running	 through	Macedonia,	 Serbia	 and	Hungary.	However,	
the	Balkan	route	is	not	a	simple	alternative	to	land-based	rail	connections;	
it	 is	rather	a	means	of	reducing	the	duration	of	maritime	transport	from	
China	to	the	EU.	Due	to	certain	infrastructure	limitations,	so	far	rail	trans-
port	via	the	Western	Balkans	has	not	reached	its	full	potential.	Additional	
limitations	include	the	relatively	poor	‘soft’	infrastructure	such	as	simpli-
fied	waybill	 formats	and	customs	procedures.	This	 is	particularly	impor-
tant	in	the	context	of	potential	competition	between	Western	Balkan	ports	
and	ports	in	northern	Europe.	On	the	Chinese	side,	the	main	stakeholder	
in	the	development	of	this	corridor	is	COSCO,	the	owner	of	the	port	in	Pi-
raeus,	involved	in	developing	trade	flows	on	this	route.	The	development	of	
the	land-sea	route	via	the	Balkans	should	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	by	China	
to	increase	its	share	in	the	market	of	maritime	container	traffic	between	
China	and	the	EU.	China’s	involvement	in	expanding	transport	corridors	
via	the	Balkans	has	sparked	major	controversy	within	the	EU.	
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I. ChIna’s goals In developIng raIl transport 
between ChIna and the eU
The	development	of	Eurasian	transport	corridors	connecting	China	and	Europe	
has	become	one	of	the	key	elements	of	the	vision	announced	by	China’s	Presi-
dent	Xi	Jinping	involving	the	construction	of	the	overland	part	of	the	Belt	and	
Road	Initiative	(the	so-called	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt).	One	symbol	of	China’s	
initiative	frequently	referred	to	by	Chinese	diplomats	and	media	is	a	cargo	train	
travelling	through	Asia.	Although	in	the	2013	speech	in	Astana	that	marked	
the	launch	of	the	initiative	the	issue	of	rail	connections	was	not	mentioned	
explicitly,	the	market	of	rail	carriages	from	China	to	the	EU	and	vice versa,	which	
was	then	in	its	initial	phase,	was	quickly	placed	under	the	‘umbrella’	of	this	
initiative.	This	market	had	started	to	develop	in	2008	as	a	result	of	private	and	
grass	roots	initiatives.	A	clear	signal	of	support	given	by	Beijing	triggered	major	
financial	and	organisational	investments	carried	out	by	the	local	authorities	
of	Chinese	provinces.	As a consequence, the 2013 announcement of the Belt 
and Road Initiative has become a turning point for the development of the 
China-EU rail transport market. It provided it with a new dynamic that 
mainly depends on the goals and actions of the Chinese side.	
A development policy tool. From Beijing’s	perspective,	the	Belt	and	Road	Ini-
tiative	is	intended	to	support	the	Chinese	regional	development	strategy	that	
aims	to	reduce	developmental	gaps	between	less	affluent	provinces	in	the	coun-
try’s	centre	and	west	and	the	better-developed	coastal	regions.	The	initiative	
is	an	element	of	a	series	of	projects	of	building	economic	‘belts’	included	in	the	
13th	Five-Year	Plan.	These	‘belts’	are	to	connect	the	inner	provinces	with	the	
coastal	regions	to	alleviate	developmental	gaps	and	to	coordinate	the	prov-
inces’	economic	policy1.	In	the	development-related	aspect,	the	Belt	and	Road	
Initiative	complements	these	strategies	and	is	intended	to	facilitate	the	devel-
opment	of	transport	corridors	running	from	China’s	inner	regions	westward.	
The	launching	of	rail	connections	with	Europe	is	an	element	of	Beijing’s	long-
term	policy	that	promotes	trade	with	Central	Asia	and	Europe	and	facilitates	the	
inflow	of	foreign	investments	to	China’s	inner	provinces.	So	far,	these	provinces’	
trade	with	foreign	partners	has	been	negligible	–	according	to	Chinese	statistics	
in	2015	the	central	and	western	provinces	accounted	for	a	mere	5%	of	total	trade	
with	the	states	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.
1	 The	Yangtze	River	Economic	Belt	(encompassing	for	example	Sichuan,	Chongqing,	Hubei	
and	the	coastal	provinces	of	Zhejiang	and	Jiangsu),	is	a	key	strategy	of	this	type,	as	is	the	
Hebei-Beijing-Tianjin	region.
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Support for China’s expansion abroad.	China’s	involvement	in	building	rail	
connections	with	Europe	is	intended	to	boost	the	role	of	Chinese	companies	
in	EU-China	trade	as	a	whole	along	the	entire	value	chain	(forwarding,	trans-
portation,	 logistics	 infrastructure).	At	present,	European	ship-owners	and	
logistics	companies	are	using	the	two	leading	modes	of	transport,	maritime	and	
air	transport,	to	effect	a	major	portion	of	their	trade.	China’s	involvement	in	rail	
carriages	is	intended	to	increase	its	control	of	deliveries	of	products	that	are	
of	key	importance	from	China’s	perspective	(including	high	value	products)	and	
to	boost	the	share	Chinese	companies	have	in	the	profits	from	supporting	trade	
with	the	EU.	In	the	longer	term,	this	may	help	China	gain	a	competitive	advan-
tage	in	the	high	value	goods	market	(for	example,	electronic	devices)	because	
it	offers	domestic	manufacturers	an	opportunity	to	organise	faster	and	cheaper	
deliveries	to	the	EU	as	compared	with	manufacturers	from	Japan	and	Korea2.
The integration of the Belt and Road states with China.	In	Beijing’s	view,	the	
rail	connections	are	the	core	of	the	‘economic	belts’	abroad.	As	such,	they	are	
intended	to	facilitate	China’s	economic	expansion	in	states	located	along	the	Belt	
and	the	Road.	There	are	plans	to	build	industrial	parks	along	the	railway	routes	
to	attract	Chinese	investors.	This,	in	turn,	may	translate	into	increased	trade	
and	more	frequent	interpersonal	contacts,	and	could	boost	tourism.	Examples	
of	such	activities	include	the	industrial	park	in	Khorgos	in	Kazakhstan	and	the	
Great	Stone	Industrial	Park	in	Belarus.	
An instrument of diplomacy. Trade	connections	have	been	given	clear	prior-
ity	in	the	promotion	of	the	Belt	and	Road	abroad.	Behind	this	approach	were	
the	prospects	of	achieving	instant	and	tangible	effects,	the	international	fame	
of	the	trains	that	are	to	‘connect’	two	continents	(which	is	favourable	for	China)	
and	the	project’s	indirect	relation	to	the	expansion	of	transport	infrastructure	
in	Europe	and	Asia	(in	which	China	wants	to	participate).	A	‘joint	welcome’	
of	the	trains	is	now	organised	during	bilateral	and	multilateral	meetings.	For	
example,	at	the	‘16+1’	summit	in	Latvia,	a	joint	welcome	ceremony	was	offered	
to	the	Yiwu-Riga	train,	and	the	arrival	of	trains	from	China	was	an	impor-
tant	element	of	President	Xi	Jinping’s	visit	to	Poland	in	2016.	The	launch	of	new	
routes	is	frequently	presented	as	an	important	element	of	bilateral	relations.	
One	example	of	this	is	the	2017	launch	of	the	train	service	from	Yiwu	to	London	
that	received	major	media	attention.
2	 At	present,	both	states	are	 trying	 to	develop	 their	own	connections	with	Europe	via	 the	
Russian	Far	Eastern	ports	or	using	transportation	services	offered	by	China.
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1. Chinese provinces as the driving force of cooperation
Initially,	the	new	rail	routes	ran	mainly	through	the	central	provinces	and	
cities	such	as	Chongqing,	Sichuan,	Henan	and	Hubei.	President	Xi	Jinping’s	
2013	announcement	of	 the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	triggered	a	surge	 in	the	
number	of	provinces	involved	in	rail	transportation	to	the	EU.	In	subsequent	
years,	the	drive	to	launch	rail	connections	with	the	EU	spread	throughout	China	
–	regular	train	service	to	Europe	was	opened	also	in	coastal	provinces	such	
as	Tianjin,	Jiangsu,	Liaoning,	and	also	in	western	provinces	including	Xinji-
ang	and	Qinghai.	In	2013-2017,	over	61	regular	rail	connections	were	launched	
connecting	38	Chinese	cities	with	36	European	cities	(see	Map	1).	The	organisa-
tion	of	carriages	became	much	simpler	after	the	rail	transport	corridors	from	
China	to	the	EU	running	through	Sichuan	and	Chongqing	had	been	provision-
ally	‘opened’.	This	enabled	other	provinces	to	establish	their	own	connections	
with	Europe.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	task	of	organising	new	connections	was	
most	often	entrusted	to	local	governments	–	the	job	of	establishing	state-con-
trolled	rail	operator	companies	belonged	to	province-level	bodies,	cities,	and	
local	development	institutions	(such	as	the	management	boards	of	special	eco-
nomic	zones).	This	is	how	the	state-controlled	companies	established	by	local	
governments,	such	as	Zhengzhou	International	Hub	and	Chengdu	International	
Railways,	became	involved	in	the	organisation	of	carriages.	In	some	cases,	local	
state-controlled	companies	took	over	the	organisation	of	connections	that	had	
been	created	by	private	business.	As	a	consequence,	Chinese local govern-
ments have become the main actors in the development of rail connections 
between China and the EU.
the first eU-China connections
In their present shape, rail connections between China and Europe are 
mainly based on the model worked out in 2008-2014 in China’s two south-
western provinces: Sichuan and Chongqing. This model was based on lo-
gistical solutions developed by the private sector, mainly by multinational 
corporations, in cooperation with the governments of the two provinces. 
Due to an increase in labour costs in China’s coastal provinces, in the first 
decade of the 21st century a portion of foreign investors from the electronic 
and automotive sectors launched a process of relocating their manufactur-
ing plants to the inner parts of China, including to Sichuan and Chongqing 
provinces. The unique nature of the products, the distance from Chinese 
ports and the relatively high level of utilisation of the Chinese railway 
system recorded at that time all made rail transport from western China 
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direct to Europe a favourable solution. Starting in 2008, Trans Eurasia Lo-
gistics, a joint venture created by German railways (DB) and Russian rail-
ways (RZD), in cooperation with Chinese rail carriers, began to develop 
rail connections with Europe, with the chief intention of servicing global 
producers of electronic devices and machines (Siemens, Hewlett Packard). 
Simultaneously, a Polish company Hatrans, in cooperation with Chengdu 
International Railways, started to develop a similar model of transport to 
connect the Dell manufacturing plants in Łódź and Chengdu. After sev-
eral years of tests and attempts to select the most suitable routes, in 2011-
2013 the first regular connections from China to Europe were opened on 
the routes Chengdu-Łódź, Chongqing-Duisburg and Zhengzhou-Hamburg, 
mainly to service global producers from the electronic and automotive sec-
tors. The first connections demonstrated the large potential of this mode of 
transport and helped to develop certain logistical solutions necessary for 
the transportation of goods and to devise the formal procedures and prin-
ciples of cooperation between railway carriers.
The political logic. The	political	goals	of	Chinese	local	governments	involved	
in	building	new	rail	connections	with	Europe	are	related	to	the	internal	politi-
cal	aspect	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	By	fleshing	out	the	vision	presented	
by	Xi	 Jinping	with	genuine	 content	 and	demonstrating	an	active	 approach	
towards	the	plans	adopted	by	Beijing,	local	government	officials	are	attempt-
ing	to	obtain	political	benefits.	This	is	particularly	important	due	to	the	central	
government’s	growing	influence	over	how	the	provinces	are	governed,	which	
is	typical	of	Xi	Jinping’s	first	term.	Alongside	the	development	of	political,	busi-
ness	and	interpersonal	contacts	with	the	European	Union,	rail	connections	
with	Europe	are	among	the	long-term	goals	of	China’s	foreign	policy.	Attempts	
by	Chinese	local	governments	to	support	Beijing’s	line	of	thinking	are	impacting	
the	dynamic	of	the	development	of	rail	connections,	thus	politicising	the	whole	
process	to	some	degree.	For	example,	the	selection	of	a	specific	route’s	terminus	
is	not	always	made	based	on	a	purely	economic	calculation,	but	on	a	political	
goal.	This	goal	involves	the	intention	to	establish	a	connection	with	a	specific	
city	or	country	in	the	EU,	rather	than	to	choose	an	optimum	location	from	the	
point	of	view	of	economic	interest.	Due	to	their	strong	political	motivation,	rep-
resentatives	of	even	those	regions	of	China	that	have	a	minor	logistics	poten-
tial	try	to	find	the	European	partners	necessary	for	handling	the	connections.	
In	some	cases,	the	interest	on	the	part	of	Chinese	local	government	officials	
is	limited	to	their	participation	in	the	opening	ceremony	of	a	specific	route	and	
its	media	coverage.	This	results	for	example	in	subsequent	problems	with	main-
taining	a	regular	train	service	on	these	routes.	
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The economic logic. The	Belt	and	Road	Initiative,	as	well	as	the	rail	connec-
tions	with	Europe	built	as	part	of	it,	are	viewed	as	an	important	element	of	local	
economic	development	 strategies.	Over	 the	 last	decade,	major	 investments	
have	been	carried	out	in	central	China	involving	the	transport	infrastructure	
expansion	of	river	ports,	airports,	motorway	and	railway	networks.	As	a	result	
of	this,	several	intermodal	hubs	(i.e.	hubs	offering	many	modes	of	transporta-
tion)	were	created.	The	main	centres	of	this	type	are	located	in	Chongqing	(the	
largest	inland	port	on	Yangtze	river),	Zhengzhou	(one	of	China’s	major	rail-
way	hubs)	and	Chengdu.	At	present,	direct	rail	connections	with	Europe	are	
an	important	element	of	the	development	strategies	of	Chinese	transport	hubs	
and	also	of	plans	to	attract	China-EU	trade	flows.	Currently,	90%	of	the	overall	
trade	with	Europe	passes	through	ports	in	coastal	provinces.	Aside	from	seek-
ing	trade	partners	in	Europe,	local	governments	are	involved	in	expanding	the	
network	of	intermodal	connections	with	other	Chinese	provinces	and	other	
Asian	states.	In	doing	so,	they	intend	to	redirect	the	container	transport	flows	
to	local	inland	hubs,	and	then	to	send	them	to	Europe	by	rail.	Increased	trade	
flows	are	expected	to	benefit	local	companies	operating	in	the	sectors	of	logistics	
(intermodal	operators,	warehousing	agents,	trans-shipment	companies)	and	
business	services	(financial	and	customs	services).	Industrial	parks	and	pilot	
free	trade	zones	are	being	built	around	container	rail	terminals.	Aside	from	
bringing	the	expected	benefits	from	trade-related	services,	these	actions	are	
intended	to	attract	foreign	investors.	The	presence	of	a	regular	rail	connection	
with	target	markets	and	production	bases	in	Europe	is	taken	into	account	when	
deciding	on	the	location	of	manufacturing	plants	in	western	China,	for	example	
the	plants	of	electronics	producers	in	Chongqing	and	Sichuan.	
The role of subsidies. The	logic	of	developing	rail	connections	with	Europe	
applied	by	Chinese	local	governments	to	date	has	largely	been	based	on	the	
assumption	that	an	intervention	on	the	part	of	the	state,	both	as	regards	infra-
structure	 investments	 and	 the	 organisation	of	 carriages,	 is	 a	 precondition	
for	business	activity	to	be	stimulated	and	major	trade	flows	to	be	launched.	
Although	as	regards	the	intensity	of	rail	transport,	the	Eurasian	rail	connection	
market	is	still	in	its	initial	phase,	some	Chinese	provinces	have	made	consider-
able	investments	in	the	infrastructure	intended	to	service	these	connections.	
For	example,	in	the	capital	of	Sichuan	province,	a	dry	rail	port	was	built	for	
12.5	billion	yuan	(over	US$	1.8	billion).	It	has	been	organised	so	that	it	is	able	
to	service	the	import	of	automotive	parts	and	foodstuffs	from	Europe,	among	
other	things.	Subsidies are the basic instrument for supporting rail connec-
tions. Although the exact amount of these subsidies has not been officially 
revealed, according to representatives of the European logistics industry, 
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they are instrumental in the market developing to its present size.	Accord-
ing	to	information	from	the	industry,	the	subsidy	for	a	single	container	(a	forty-
foot	container)	is	around	US$	2,000-4,000.	The	provinces	that	are	the	most	
actively	involved	in	this	process	spend	over	US$	30	million	annually	on	subsi-
dising	regular	freight	train	connections3.	Assuming	that	the	average	subsidy	
per	container	is	US$	2,500,	at	present	the	total	fiscal	burden	the	provinces	have	
to	shoulder	is	about	US$	200-300	million	annually4.	
Intra-Chinese competition. The	 competition	 between	Chinese	 provinces,	
that	has	been	ongoing	for	years,	has	spread	onto	the	field	of	rail	connections	
with	Europe.	It	is	evident	as	early	as	at	the	stage	of	establishing	the	connec-
tions	and	seeking	partners	in	Europe,	and	frequently	takes	the	form	of	sending	
competing	teams	of	representatives	to	individual	European	countries.	In	the	
case	of	connections	that	are	already	operating,	Chinese	provinces	mainly	com-
pete	to	attract	trade	flows	from	other	parts	of	China.	Aside	from	political	and	
development-related	motivation,	 the	 reason	behind	 this	 competition	 is	 the	
need	to	obtain	a	return	on	infrastructure	investments.	The	provinces	carried	
out	these	investments	hoping	for	a	rapid	increase	in	rail	trade	with	Europe.	
This	concerns	in	particular	several	neighbouring	central	provinces	(Hunan,	
Sichuan,	Hubei,	Chongqing,	Shaanxi)	that	aspire	to	the	role	of	the	most	impor-
tant	logistics	land	hub	along	the	Belt	and	Road.	Exporters	from	the	remaining	
Chinese	provinces	are	tempted	mainly	by	various	types	of	‘promotional’	subsi-
dies:	from	a	provisional	reduction	of	the	standard	fee	for	transporting	one	con-
tainer	from	a	local	terminal	to	Europe,	through	providing	free	delivery	of	goods	
from	other	locations	in	China	(for	example	within	a	1,500	km	radius)	to	the	
terminal,	to	direct	subsidies	offered	to	producers.	The	price	war	waged	by	the	
provinces	results	in	strong	pressure	on	the	cost	of	transportation	(by	increasing	
the	amount	of	subsidies,	sometimes	to	several	dozen	per	cent	of	the	container	
transportation	price),	considerable	carriage	price	fluctuations	and	a	disruption	
of	logistics	chains	(sometimes	freight	forwarders	send	their	goods	not	to	the	
nearest	terminal,	but	to	terminals	that	offer	‘special’	prices	and	are	located	
several	hundred	kilometres	away).	
3	 This	figure	was	recorded	in	2014	–	the	present	intensity	of	transport	is	much	bigger,	which	
means	that	the	scale	of	subsidies	is	also	bigger.	
4	 The	calculation	is	based	on	data	pertaining	to	2016	trade	flows	(153,000	TEU)	and	the	esti-
mated	number	of	trains	in	2017.	The	estimated	level	of	subsidisation	has	been	based	on	infor-
mation	 from	 industry	 representatives	 and	 the	Landbridge	Logistics	Alliance	 report,	 see	
http://www.landbridgenet.com/landbridgetransunion/2017-04-26/45524.html
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2. China’s central government as the new leader of creating 
connections with europe
In	recent	years,	the	central	government	has	been	stepping	up	its	direct	involve-
ment	in	the	organisation	of	rail	transport	between	China	and	the	EU.	Beijing	
intends	to	improve	the	internal	coordination	of	how	the	market	is	develop-
ing	and	boost	the	role	of	market	mechanisms.	However,	this	is	being	met	with	
strong	resistance	from	Chinese	provinces.
Coordination at the central level. The	competition	between	Chinese	provinces	
has	made	the	process	of	developing	the	rail	connections	very	dynamic,	which	
from	Beijing’s	point	of	view	was	initially	favourable.	However,	as	the	inten-
sity	of	this	mode	of	transportation	increased,	its	negative	consequences	began	
to	emerge.	This	has	led	to	the	involvement	of	the	central	government	in	the	coor-
dination	of	the	process	as	a	whole	under	the	project	referred	to	as	CR	Express	
(zhongou banlie).	The	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC),	
which	in	October	2016	announced	the	plan	for	the	development	of	rail	con-
nections	with	Europe	in	2016-20205,	has	become	the	main	actor	in	setting	the	
goals	for	the	development	of	the	transport	sector.	Examples	of	what	the	vision	
outlined	in	the	document	provides	for	are:	the	greater	coordination	of	the	pro-
cess	carriage	organisation	on	the	part	of	Chinese	carriers,	improvement	of	the	
process	of	expanding	logistics	infrastructure	in	China,	and	Beijing’s	increased	
involvement	in	relations	with	foreign	partners	along	the	Belt	and	Road.	Bei-
jing’s	actions	are	mainly	intended	to	solve	China’s	domestic	problems,	including	
to	reduce	the	financial	burden	associated	with	subsidies	and	the	risk	of	exces-
sive	infrastructure	investments.	From	Beijing’s	perspective,	the	basic	problem	
involves	the	very	high	number	of	overlapping	connections	that	subsequent	
cities	open,	frequently	disregarding	their	economic	aspect.	In the upcoming 
years, there are plans to consolidate the connections, and to reduce their 
number and the number of Chinese cities authorised to perform rail trans-
ports to Europe6.	The	main	goal	is	to	adjust	the	connection	grid	to	China’s	main	
production	and	logistics	bases,	which	in	turn	is	expected	to	boost	the	trains’	
profitability.
5	 中欧班建设发展规划（2016–2020)	 年年-	 (CR	 Express	 development	 plan	 for	 2016-2020);	 http://
www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201610/P020161017547345656182.pdf
6	 The	document	reduces	the	number	of	cities	that	have	the	potential	for	generating	proper	
trade	flows	to	11.	It	is	only	these	11	cities	that	are	to	be	allowed	to	develop	rail	connections	
with	Europe	on	a	bigger	scale.	Goods	from	the	remaining	parts	of	China	are	to	be	directed	
to	and	consolidated	in	the	nearest	rail	hubs,	and	then	dispatched	to	Europe.	See	Map	1.
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Map 1. China’s CR Express strategy. Provinces and cities selected to serve as 
logistics hubs
Yu
nn
an
G
ui
zh
ou
N
in
gx
ia
Q
in
gh
ai
G
ua
ng
xi
H
aj
na
nG
ua
ng
do
ng
Fu
jia
nZh
ej
ia
ng
A
nh
ui
Ji
an
gx
i
H
un
an
H
ub
ei
C
ho
ng
qi
ng
Si
ch
ua
n
Sh
aa
nx
i
H
en
an
Sh
an
xi
Sh
an
do
ng
H
eb
ei
Li
ao
ni
ng
Ji
lin
H
ei
lo
ng
jia
ng
In
ne
r
M
on
go
lia
G
an
su
Ti
be
t
X
in
jia
ng
Ji
an
gs
u
H
ar
bi
n
U
la
nq
ab
Be
iji
ng T
ia
nj
in
Ji
na
n
N
an
jin
g
Sh
an
gh
ai
H
an
gz
ho
u
Zh
en
gz
ho
u
U
ru
m
qi
H
on
g 
Ko
ng
M
ac
au
Sh
en
ya
ng
Su
zh
ou
Yi
w
u
H
ef
ei
W
uh
an
Xi
an
Ch
an
gs
ha
D
on
gg
ua
n
Ch
en
gd
u
La
nz
ho
u
Ch
on
gq
in
g
U
ru
m
qi
CR
 E
XP
RE
SS
 IN
TE
RM
O
D
A
L 
H
U
BS
PR
O
VI
N
CE
S 
W
IT
H
 IN
TE
N
SI
VE
 C
A
RG
O
 T
RA
FF
IC
(m
or
e 
th
an
 9
,0
00
 T
EU
 in
 2
01
6)
CR
 E
XP
RE
SS
 P
RO
D
U
CT
IO
N
 B
A
SE
S
H
ef
ei
One	of	 the	key	points	 in	 this	strategy	 is	 to	 introduce	a	unified	price	policy	
in	 order	 to	 eliminate	 the	 ‘disorderly’	 competition	 among	 the	 provinces.	 It	
is	also	 intended	to	 improve	China’s	negotiation	position	 in	price	 talks	with	
foreign	partners	involved	in	the	carriages	(so	far	the	negotiations	have	been	
performed	separately	by	operators	from	specific	provinces)	and	help	it	gain	
a	dominant	position	(zhudaoquan)	in	setting	the	price	of	rail	freight.	This	in	turn	
is	intended	to	increase	the	competitive	advantage	of	rail	transport	(over	other	
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means	of	transportation)	by	reducing	its	cost. The	CR	Express	development	plan	
also	provides	for	Beijing’s	increased	involvement	in	creating	‘soft’	infrastruc-
ture	for	carriages	including	the	standardisation	of	waybills	and	simplification	
of	customs	clearance	procedures.	These	actions	are	also	intended	to	increase	
China’s	impact	on	the	development	of	the	rail	transport	sector	across	the	globe.	
The role of China Railway. In	the	operational	dimension,	the	main	institution	
responsible	for	implementing	Beijing’s	strategy	is	the	Chinese	national	rail	car-
rier	China	Railway.	Since	2014,	Beijing	has	been	making	attempts	to	gain	greater	
control	of	the	organisation	of	carriages.	Initially,	these	attempts	met	with	strong	
resistance	on	the	part	of	local	governments	and	the	transport	companies	they	
controlled,	which	were	 sceptical	 of	Beijing’s	 actions7.	The	actions	by	China	
Railway	only	gathered	momentum	when	the	NDRC	became	directly	involved	
in	them	and	when	in	the	second	half	of	2016,	at	a	meeting	of	the	Small	Lead-
ing	Group	for	Advancing	the Belt	and	Road,	the	highest	representatives	of	the	
Communist	party	announced	their	support	for	the	initiative.	As	a	consequence,	
in	May	2017	the	Organisational	Committee	for	CR	Express	was	established,	led	
by	China	Railway	and	grouping	the	seven	biggest	local	rail	connections	opera-
tors8.	In its form, the newly created tool for coordinating rail connections 
with Europe resembles a cartel in that it aims to limit the competition 
between transport companies controlled by local governments. In Beijing’s 
view, this competition is harmful. 
Representatives of Chinese government circles are becoming increas-
ingly aware that in the long term the development of the connections 
with Europe needs to be based on market mechanisms and the subsidies 
need to be progressively abandoned. According to insider information, 
this is expected to happen around 2020-2022. However, the	implementation 
of	Beijing’s	plans	to	curb	the	harmful	price	competition	and	to	adjust	the	struc-
ture	of	rail	connections	to	actual	trade	flows	is	still	uncertain. The resolution 
of these key issues depends on the actual impact of the newly created coor-
dination structures on local governments that act in their own interests. 
Their	position	is	relatively	strong	because	they	control	the	key	‘assets’	including	
the	logistics	infrastructure	and	business	contacts	with	cooperating	partners	
along	the	Belt	and	Road.	The	tension	between	the	central	government	and	the	
7	 Caixin,	中欧班列整合开局	 (Early	 stage	 of	 CR	 Express	 integration),	 19	 June	 2017,	 http://
weekly.caixin.com/2017-06-16/101102651.html
8	 These	include	rail	companies	from	Chongqing,	Chengdu,	Zhengzhou,	Xian,	Suzhou,	Wuhan	
and	Yiwu.	
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provinces	also	results	from	the	absence	of	a	consensus	as	to	who,	 in	a	situ-
ation	of	centralisation,	should	be	financing	further	subsidies	to	the	connec-
tions	(at	least	in	the	transition	period).	The uncertain future of the subsidies, 
which depend on political factors, makes European actors involved in the 
carriages cautious, for example when making decisions regarding infra-
structure expansion investments. 
At	the	same	time,	the	CR	Express	committee	is	trying	to	act	as	a	coordinator	
in	the	process	of	eliminating	barriers	to	market	development	that	have	an	inter-
national	dimension.	This	includes	optimising	the	connection	grid,	expanding	
the	offer	of	insurance	services	and	working	out	documentation	standards.	One	
of	the	main	achievements	to	date	has	involved	the	delivery	of	a	 large	num-
ber	of	containers	bearing	the	CR	Express	logo	to	rail	carriers.	These	containers	
are	already	being	used	in	rail	trade	with	Europe9.	CR	Express	is	also	taking	
part	in	negotiations	with	foreign	partners	–	in	May	2017	during	the	Belt	and	
Road	forum	in	Beijing	it	acted	as	a	party	to	an	understanding	on	giving	priority	
to	EU-China	connections.	
9	 This	has	both	promotional	and	practical	significance	–	it	unifies	the	brand	and	shifts	a	por-
tion	of	responsibility	for	completing	the	container	cycle	onto	CR	Express.	See	Chapter	II.1.
27
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
II. raIl ConneCtIons between ChIna and the eU: 
the present shape and the prospeCts
The	annual	number	of	trains	that	have	travelled	on	the	routes	covered	by	the	
China	Railway	Express	project	constitute	the	main	statistics	which	the	Chi-
nese	 side	 is	using	 to	promote	 rail	 connections10.	According	 to	CR	Express	
data,	 the	dynamic	of	rail	carriages	between	China	and	Europe	 is	growing	
–	 in	 2011-2016	 the	 annual	 number	 of	 carriages	 rose	 a	 hundred-fold,	 from	
17	 to	 1702.	During	 the	 record-breaking	2017,	3,673	 freight	 trains	 travelled	
between	China	and	the	EU.	Since	2011,	the	annual	increase	in	the	number	
of	carriages	has	been	around	100-150%.	The	figures	cited	by	the	Chinese	side	
coincide	with	data	published	by	Russian	Railways	which	use	TEU	(twenty-
foot	containers)	as	a	unit	to	estimate	the	volume	of	transit	between	Europe	
and	China. According	to	data	published	by	Russian	Railways,	 the	number	
of	containers	transported	via	Russia	on	the	route	from	China	to	the	EU	and	
back	rose	gradually	and	reached	44,200	TEU	in	2014,	81,100	TEU	in	2015	and	
153,000	TEU	in	2016.	However,	these	volumes	remain	modest	when	compared	
to	maritime	transports.	In	2016	more	than	10	million	TEU	were	shipped	from	
China	to	Europe	using	cargo	vessels11.
With	no	official	statistics	available,	it	is	particularly	hard	to	estimate	the	value	
of	 goods	 transported	using	EU-China	 rail	 connections.	According	 to	 press	
reports,	 in	 2016	 the	 four	 largest	 Chinese	 logistical	 centres	 that	 perform	
EU-China	rail	carriages	(namely	Chengdu,	Chongqing,	Zhengzhou	and	Suzhou),	
trans-shipped	goods	with	a	total	value	of	US$	20.8	billion12.	When	lesser	termi-
nals	are	added,	the	overall	value	of	goods	transported	by	rail	can	be	estimated	
at	US$	22.9	billion13.	This	means	that	in	2016	about	4%	of	the	overall	EU-China	
10	 No	detailed	 structure	 of	 carriages	 covered	by	 this	 calculation	has	 been	 revealed	 –	how-
ever	it	should	be	assumed	that	Chinese	statistics	cover	connections	with	Europe	as	a	whole	
(including	with	Russia	and	Belarus),	not	only	with	EU	member	states.	More	specific	data	
suggests	that	most	routes	lead	to	EU	member	states.
11	 Containers	from	Asia	to	Europe	down	1.2%	in	2016,	Container News,	21.02.2017,	http://con-
tainer-news.com/containers-asia-europe-volume/	
12	 2017年中欧班列步入发展“快车道”成都重庆计划“运力翻倍”(CR	 Express	 expected	 to	 enter	
the	‘fastlane’:	Chengdu	and	Chongqing	plan	to	double	their	capacity),	21	Shiji	Jingji	Baodao,	
02.09.2017,	http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2017-02/09/content_55645.htm
13	 Due	to	special	features	of	Chongqing-Duisburg	connection,	the	value	goods	in	465	trains	
transhipped	by	lesser	terminals	were	estimated	by	multiplying	this	numer	by	the	average	
value	of	a	train	transhipped	in	Chengdu,	Suzhou	and	Zhengzhou	(about	US$	4.6	million).
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trade	value	was	transported	using	trains14.	In	2017	the	number	of	containers	
transported	doubled	when	compared	to	2016,	therefore	the	share	of	rail	trans-
port	in	overall	EU-China	trade	will	rise.	
Chart 1. Number of cargo train journeys on the China-Europe route, 2011-2017
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Container rail carriages 
The dynamic development of the China-EU rail carriage market is based on 
the model of a so-called ‘block-train’, which considerably reduces the dura-
tion of carriage. Containers are collected in the entry terminal (in Europe 
or in China) and then they are collectively transported to their destination. 
This grouping considerably accelerates the carriage (compared with the 
shipment of single containers) because it enables operators to arrange the 
dispatch of goods on an ongoing basis and also because it simplifies customs 
clearance procedures. It also contributes to increased predictability and the 
promptness of carriages. One train can transport around 40 forty-foot con-
tainers (on the most popular route via Kazakhstan). Due to the differences 
in gauge in the countries of the former USSR (1,520 mm) and in Europe and 
China (1,435 mm), at border points the containers are moved onto suitable 
flatcars (wagons). End customers are usually offered intermodal solutions 
(that use several different means of transportation) – after reaching the 
14	 The	value	of	2016	EU-China	trade	can	be	estimated	at	US$	571.2	billion	(using	the	average	
yearly	exchange	rate	of	US$	1.11	to	1	euro),	http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/sep-
tember/tradoc_113366.pdf
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end terminal the goods are sent to other rail terminals or directly ‘door-to-
door’ by road transport. 
At present, two types of carriages are offered on the market: the so-called 
private train and public train. Private train is launched on the date that 
suits one specific client, frequently in the form of a regular train service. 
Due to the minimum cargo size of 40 containers, this type of carriage is 
mainly used by big multinational companies. Public trains, where single 
containers can be shipped, travel on regular pre-arranged dates. The use 
of this type of train is connected with a higher risk that the train’s capacity 
will not be used in full.
1. Main challenges to China-eU rail transport 
The key challenge to the development of the Eurasian transport corridors 
is how to balance the number of carriages from China to Europe and those 
from Europe to China.	Due	to	its	 impact	on	the	trade	balance	with	China,	
at	present	this	issue	has	been	given	high	political	priority	in	the	EU15.	However,	
balancing	goods	flows	is	important	also	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	organisa-
tion	of	the	carriages	in	itself.	The	evident	disproportion	to	Europe’s	disadvan-
tage	(in	2015-2017	rail	carriages	to	China	accounted	for	a	mere	1/3	of	the	number	
of	launched	trains)	has	far-reaching	consequences	for	the	profitability	of	these	
carriages16.	Due	 to	a	 significant	surplus	of	carriages	 from	China	 to	Europe,	
a	large	number	of	flatcars	pile	up	in	locations	where	track	gauge	changes,	most	
frequently	in	Brest.	Due	to	limited	storage	possibilities,	the	operator	responsible	
for	the	organisation	of	a	specific	train	has	to	bear	the	cost	of	transporting	the	
flatcars	back	to	the	vicinity	of	the	Chinese	border	(within	a	deadline	specified	
by	their	owner,	for	example	within	14	or	30	days).	Containers	are	transferred	
to	Europe	along	with	the	goods	they	contain.	They	can	then	be	sold,	recycled,	
transported	by	sea	or	stored	at	the	terminal	(waiting	for	the	next	load	of	goods),	
but	this	is	costly17.	One	method	to	optimise	the	cost	is	to	send	empty	containers	
back	to	China	by	rail.	This	means	that	an	increase	in	the	number	of	trains	sent	
from	Europe	to	China	is	not	necessarily	tantamount	to	an	increase	in	trade,	
as	some	container	are	shipped	back	empty.	Therefore,	the	statistics	that	compare	
15	 For	a	more	detailed	discussion	see	Chapter	IV.4.
16	 This	phenomenon	is	also	observed	in	maritime	trade	–	it	is	estimated	that	around	half	of	the	
total	number	of	containers	transported	by	sea	are	empty	mainly	due	to	the	disproportion	
of	trade	between	Asia	and	the	rest	of	the	world.
17	 Some	containers	are	used	in	EU-Russia	trade	and	cover	a	portion	of	the	distance	in	this	way.
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the	number	of	trains	travelling	in	either	direction	are	misleading	when	it	comes	
to	trade	flows,	especially	given	that	the	loading	capacity	of	trains	travelling	
from	China	to	Europe	is	met	to	a	larger	degree	than	it	is	the	case	with	trains	
travelling	from	Europe	to	China.	
The	differences	in	the	geographical	location	and	the	economic	structure	of	indi-
vidual	provinces	of	China	and	the	regions	in	Europe	with	which	they	are	con-
nected	have	a	direct	impact	on	the	key	characteristics	of	each	specific	rail	con-
nection,	including	its	profitability,	transportation	costs	and	the	potential	for	
meeting	the	train’s	 loading	capacity.	Usually,	trains	departing	from	Europe	
to	China	are	filled	to	a	much	smaller	degree	than	the	trains	travelling	on	the	
route	from	China	to	Europe.	For	example,	in	the	Łódź-Chengdu	train,	the	con-
tainer	capacity	(the	proportion	of	containers	filled	with	goods	to	the	total	num-
ber	of	containers)	is	a	mere	17%,	whereas	in	the	trains	travelling	in	the	oppo-
site	direction	the	figure	is	around	63%18.	For	other	routes,	where	the	operators	
publish	the	corresponding	statistics,	for	example	the	Shilong-Duisburg	train,	
the	ratio	is	79.6%.	
Attempts to find clients who would use the rail connections regularly and 
would help meet the trains’ capacity and guarantee the long-term profit-
ability of a specific train service, are among the priorities of the Chinese 
provinces. This mainly concerns goods exported from Europe to China, 
because paradoxically the cost borne by specific provinces may motivate 
them to support imports from Europe. In	specific	terminals,	the	import	from	
Europe	of	various	categories	of	goods	(for	example	fruit,	meat,	cars)	is	being	
regulated	by	way	of	licences	issued	in	Beijing.	This	is	why	the	Chinese	provinces	
make	every	effort	and	compete	with	each	other	to	obtain	licences	for	the	import	
of	specific	types	of	goods,	wishing	to	‘seize’	specific	flows	of	goods	incoming	
from	Europe.	Another	method	for	supporting	imports	is	by	setting	prices	–	for	
some	routes	the	cost	of	sending	a	container	from	Europe	to	China	is	sometimes	
much	lower	than	the	cost	of	sending	one	from	China	to	Europe.	The	need	to	sub-
sidise	carriages	largely	results	from	the	fact	that	it	is	necessary	to	cover	the	cost	
of	the	train’s	return	journey	to	China,	when	the	train	is	frequently	empty.	From	
the	point	of	view	of	a	local	operator,	any	type	of	European	good	that	is	loaded	
onto	the	pre-paid	train	travelling	back	to	China	reduces	the	need	to	subsidise	
the	carriage.	
18	 A	presentation	of	the	Chengdu+	strategy,	Łódź,	June	2017.
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2. Carriage organisation and handling – the need for international 
cooperation
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	cost,	the	speed	and	the	promptness	of	carriages,	
‘soft’	factors	are	of	great	importance.	These	include	proper	business	standards,	
simplified	 customs	 clearance	 procedures	 and	 formal	 solutions	worked	 out	
under	multilateral	agreements19.	Launching	a	train	service	on	a	specific	route	
requires	broad	consensus	from	all	the	states	located	along	this	route.	Within	
these	states	it	requires	joint	action	by	a	number	of	institutions	and	companies	
that	are	involved	in	this	process.	The	cooperation-based nature of carriages 
generates far-reaching consequences for the shape of the market currently 
being formed, the stability of the train service and the geographical struc-
ture of the routes. 
the process of organising a train 
Regardless of the status and the country of origin of the operator that organ-
ises the carriages, the present model of carriage organisation requires the 
multi-level cooperation of all the states situated along a specific transport 
corridor, as well as the involvement of a large number of market players. 
One reason for this are the differences in technical standards applicable in 
specific states (the track gauge, traction technical parameters, voltage), as 
well as legal regulations and experience on local markets that promote lo-
cal carriers. As a consequence, the trains travelling from China to Europe 
require multiple swaps of flatcars (a switch to wider tracks when leaving 
China and back to narrower tracks when entering the EU) and locomotives. 
For example, for a train travelling from China to the EU via the central 
Asian corridor, the cooperation of rail carriers from China, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Belarus and Poland is necessary. These carriers each dispose of roll-
ing stock that is suited to local technical and legal standards. The coopera-
tion process also requires the involvement of the owners of flatcars (which 
are frequently affiliated to national carriers) and national rail agencies that 
book specific train services. In addition, depending on the local situation, 
the organisation of carriages sometimes requires the involvement of con-
tainer lease companies, the owners of rail terminals, customs agents etc. 
19	 For	example,	according	to	CCTT,	the	2013	data	for	the	trans-Siberian	route	suggests	that	
the	fact	that	waybills	were	incorrectly	filled	in	and	delivered	accounted	for	as	many	as	64%	
of	cases	in	which	goods	were	stopped	at	the	border,	whereas	additional	customs	procedures	
and	infrastructure	faults	accounted	for	a	mere	16%	of	these	cases.
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Due to the complexity of the process, the successful organisation of car-
riages fully depends on the consensus of all the parties involved.
The	development	of	rail	connections	between	China	and	the	EU	fully	depends	
on	the	advancement	of	international	cooperation	between	local	carriers	and	
infrastructure	operators	in	the	states	located	along	a	specific	route.	It	is	their	
decisions	that	impact	the	final	carriage	timetable	and	the	priority	given	to	par-
ticular	trains,	and	this	determines	the	length	of	time	a	train	spends	waiting	
to	use	specific	sections	of	infrastructure	(on	rail	routes	cargo	trains	are	obliged	
to	‘give	way’	to	higher	priority	trains,	for	example	passenger	trains	and	other	
cargo	trains)20.	Similarly,	local	regulators	set	transport	rules	and	regulations	
that	are	of	key	importance	for	international	transit	traffic,	as	well	as	other	
additional	regulations	including	reduced	fare	for	the	shipment	of	empty	con-
tainers.	However,	the	final	decision	regarding	the	organisation	of	carriages	
rests	with	local	rail	carriers	that	control	the	rolling	stock	and	frequently	also	
the	key	infrastructure	(for	example	the	sidings	and	the	flatcars).	Due	to	the	
reach	of	their	activity	–	they	are	often	major	companies	that	hold	a	nation-
wide	monopoly	–	local	carriers	are	the	dominant	driving	force	in	the	entire	
process,	even	more	powerful	than	local	governments,	and	are	the	main	nego-
tiation	partners	for	the	Chinese	side.	The market in this shape has political 
implications – it is impossible to point to a single actor, even the Chinese 
government, that would be able to handle China-EU transportation on its 
own21. The governments of the states located along a specific route are then 
capable of shaping the form and the dynamic of China-EU transportation 
to the degree to which they control the local rail carriers.
The	 political	 cooperation	 between	 the	 states	 located	 along	 specific	 routes	
is	another	factor	of	key	importance	for	the	development	of	rail	connections	
between	China	and	the	EU.	The	number	of	border	clearances	needed,	the	com-
plexity	level	of	customs	procedures,	and	the	presence	of	technical	standards	
to	guarantee	the	required	traffic	capacity	of	a	specific	transport	corridor,	all	
20	 The	rules	of	how	infrastructure	can	be	used	are	different	in	individual	states	–	for	exam-
ple	EU	law	makes	it	possible	to	split	the	activities	performed	by	the	carrier	and	the	infra-
structure	operator.	This	facilitates	the	operation	of	foreign	carriers	on	specific	EU	markets	
(in	Poland,	these	carriers	include	Deutsche	Bahn).	The	situation	is	considerably	different	
in	the	remaining	states	located	along	the	route	(Russia,	Belarus,	Kazakhstan),	where	the	
entire	process	is	controlled	by	national	carriers.
21	 Due	to	the	paramount	importance	of	subsidies,	in	the	end	the	launch	of	a	regular	train	ser-
vice	depends	on	China’s	decisions.	However,	it	is	a	foregone	conclusion	that	Chinese	opera-
tors	will	cooperate	with	local	companies	along	the	route.
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depend	on	 this	 cooperation.	 For	 example,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 customs	union	
in	2012	that	introduced	a	unified	tariff	in	Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	was	
one	of	the	processes	that	laid	the	foundations	for	the	present	dynamic	of	rail	
transport.	 For	 example,	 it	 reduced	 the	number	of	 customs	 clearance	 stops	
needed	at	the	border	from	four	to	two	(when	the	train	travels	through	all	three	
states):	 on	 the	Polish-Belarusian	 and	 the	Kazakh-Chinese	border.	This	has	
contributed	to	a	reduction	in	the	travel	duration	by	around	4-6	days.	Another	
consequence	of	the	introduction	of	the	customs	union	has	been	a	partial	inte-
gration	of	the	rail	and	logistics	sector	aimed	at	eliminating	the	barriers	to	rail	
transit	and	at	harmonising	legislation.	This	has	been	accompanied	by	the	intro-
duction	of	a	unified	waybill	for	goods	transported	by	rail,	worked	out	by	some	
of	the	EU	member	states	and	the	CIS	countries	back	in	2006.	Simplifying	the	
formalities	and	offering	‘soft’	infrastructure	are	mainly	the	tasks	of	the	states	
that	are	located	along	a	specific	route.	However,	for	these	solutions	to	be	pos-
sible,	a	number	of	multilateral	agreements	need	to	be	worked	out	and	imple-
mented.	Therefore, the geographical structure of the China-EU rail transit 
routes and the utilisation of specific transport corridors depend on the 
advancement of political cooperation and consensus among all the parties 
involved in managing a specific route, as well as on the active involvement 
of numerous state institutions.
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III. the developMent of ChIna-eU raIl transport 
CorrIdors
Since	the	1990s,	the	development	of	rail	transport	corridors	between	Europe	and	
East	Asia	has	been	the	subject	of	numerous	international	initiatives	including	
the	work	under	the	United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Commission	for	Asia	
and	the	Pacific,	the	CAREC22	programme	and	the	Transport	Corridor	Europe-
Caucasus-Asia	(TRACECA).	Under	these	initiatives,	a	number	of	actions	of	key	
importance	for	boosting	the	China-EU	rail	transport	have	been	implemented,	
including	the	construction	and	modernisation	of	railway	routes,	the	improve-
ment	of	customs	and	border	clearance	procedures,	the	unification	of	waybills,	
and	attempts	to	increase	the	safety	of	carriages.	The	Russian-inspired	economic	
integration	in	the	post-Soviet	area	has	been	an	important	driving	force	behind	
the	elimination	of	formal	barriers	to	Eurasian	transport	corridors.	The	for-
mer	‘bottlenecks’	in	Central	Asian	infrastructure	have	been	gradually	elimi-
nated	owing	to	the	involvement	in	the	process	of	funds	and	know-how	pro-
vided	by	external	actors	including	Japan,	the	EU,	the	Arab	states	and	the	USA.	
Some	infrastructure	investments	have	been	carried	out	independently	by	the	
resource-rich	countries	of	the	region	including	Kazakhstan	and	Azerbaijan.	
Since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century,	China	has	been	increasing	its	involve-
ment	in	the	transport	and	logistics	infrastructure	sector	in	Asia,	 including	
by	funding	projects	and	offering	cost-effective	construction	works.	However,	
it	is	still	the	international	institutions,	mainly	those	participating	in	the	CAREC	
programme,	that	play	the	most	important	part	in	the	process	of	expanding	the	
transport	corridors.	The	situation	is	similar	when	it	comes	to	creating	 ‘soft’	
transport	infrastructure,	where	the	negotiations	over	the	elimination	of	for-
mal	barriers	are	mainly	being	conducted	in	specialised	forums	and	multilat-
eral	international	organisations	including	the	Organisation	for	Cooperation	
of	International	Railways	(OSJD)	and	the	Intergovernmental	Organisation	for	
International	Carriage	by	Rail	(OTIF).	China	plays	a	minor	role	in	the	process	
of	simplifying	customs	clearance	and	formal	procedures,	although	Beijing	has	
clearly	expressed	its	readiness	to	assume	the	role	of	coordinator23.	
22	 It	groups	11	states	of	the	region	and	six	international	development	banks	including	the	Jap-
anese-led	Asian	Development	Bank,	the	World	Bank,	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruc-
tion	 and	Development	 and	 the	 Islamic	Development	 Bank.	Over	 2001-2015,	 they	 funded	
projects	focused	on	transport,	trade	and	energy	worth	over	US$	27	billion.	See	http://www.
carecprogram.org/index.php?page=carec-projects
23	 See 中欧班建设发展规划（2016–2020)	年–	(CR	Express	development	plan	for	2016-2020),	http://
www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201610/P020161017547345656182.pdf
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As	far	as	the	access	to	transport	infrastructure	and	formal	solutions	are	con-
cerned,	the	present	development	of	China-EU	rail	transport	owes	its	significant	
dynamic	mainly	to	the	projects	implemented	prior	to	the	announcement	of	the	
Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	From	the	point	of	view	of	long-term	infrastructure	
projects,	the	announcement	of	China’s	initiative	has	happened	quite	recently.	
At	present,	the	trade	flows	via	the	newly	opened	China-EU	connections	are	
executed	using	the	easiest	possible	solutions,	i.e.	via	the	transport	corridors	
that	already	have	the	biggest	capacity,	the	best	infrastructure	and	the	most	
favourable	legislative	conditions.	Due	to	their	competitive	advantage,	aside 
from a small number or test trains, all regular rail connections between 
China and the European Union have so far been carried out via the trans-
Siberian routes that run through Russia.	However,	the	stakeholders	of	the	
Belt	and	Road	Initiative,	including	both	China	and	the	states	that	wish	to	join	the	
initiative,	are	making	attempts	to	develop	alternative	transport	corridors	and,	
in	the	long-term	perspective,	redirect	some	of	the	trade	flows	to	other	routes.	
Table 1. A comparison of transport corridors connecting the European Union 
and eastern China (Shanghai-Łódź)
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distance (km) 11,430 9,910 12,120 12,430 20,810
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no of trans-shipment operations 2 2 6 2 2
Table 2. A comparison of competing transport corridors connecting 
the European Union with central China (Chengdu-Łódź)
Corridor
tr
an
s-
si
be
ri
an
  
(M
an
zh
ou
li-
br
es
t)
tr
an
s-
K
az
ak
h 
(d
os
ty
k-
br
es
t)
tr
an
s-
Ca
sp
ia
n 
(d
os
ty
k-
a
kt
au
-b
ak
u-
po
ti
-C
ha
rn
om
or
sk
)
so
ut
he
rn
 
(d
os
ty
k-
te
hr
an
-
Is
ta
nb
ul
)
M
ar
it
im
e 
ro
ut
e 
(s
ha
ng
ha
i-
g
da
ńs
k)
distance (km) 12,350 8,870 11,070 11,390 22,770
no of border clearances 2 2 5 6 1
no of trans-shipment operations 2 2 6 2 2
Source:	Own	calculations,	searates.com
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Map 2. China-EU rail transport corridors
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1. the trans-siberian corridors (via russia)
Map 3. The trans-Siberian transport corridors connecting China and the EU
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1.1. Utilisation to date
So	far,	the	development	of	rail	connections	between	China	and	the	European	
Union	has	been	based	almost	entirely	on	the	three	trans-Siberian	corridors	that	
run	through	Russia.	At	present,	most	containers	are	transported	via	the	corridor	
that	runs	through	Kazakhstan	and	starts	on	the	Chinese-Kazakh	border	cross-
ing	of	Alashankou/Dostyk.	In	2014-2016,	the	number	of	containers	transported	
via	this	corridor	rose	from	22,000	TEU	to	104,000	TEU.	In	2016,	it	accounted	
for	68%	of	the	entire	volume	of	China-	EU-China	transit	via	Russia.	The	second	
corridor	uses	the	broad-gauge	connection	between	the	Chinese-Mongolian	bor-
der	crossing	of	Erenhot	and	the	Chinese-Russian	border	crossing	in	Naushki.	
In	2016,	13,300	TEU	of	cargo	was	transported	via	this	corridor.	The	oldest	trans-
Siberian	corridor	that	starts	in	Zabaikalsk	in	the	Russian	Far	East	is	ranked	
second	in	terms	of	the	number	of	containers	transported	(32,700	TEU	in	2016).	
However,	in	recent	years	it	has	recorded	the	slowest	increase	in	cargo	volumes24.	
All	three	corridors	meet	in	the	Urals,	near	Yekaterinburg.	From	there,	the	goods	
are	transported	to	the	EU	via	Belarus	and	are	transloaded	onto	standard	gauge	
flatcars	in	Małaszewicze	on	the	Polish-Belarusian	border.	For	political	reasons,	
at	present	transit	volumes	from	Russia	to	the	EU	via	Ukraine	are	very	limited.	
A	small	number	of	trains	have	their	terminus	in	the	Baltic	states	(for	example	
the	Yiwu-Riga	train).	
24	 Back	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	up	to	15%	of	trade	between	Japan	and	Europe	was	transported	
by	 the	 trans-Siberian	 railway.	 Due	 to	 the	 chaos	 surrounding	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	the	reduced	pace	of	deliveries	and	their	compromised	security,	the	line	was	practi-
cally	no	longer	used	in	transit.	Attempts	by	Russian	Railways	to	resume	cargo	transport	
by	the	trans-Siberian	railway	and	to	reform	transport	pricelists	made	it	possible	to	increase	
the	use	of	this	route	by	China-EU	rail	connections.
41
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
Chart 2. China-EU rail transit (both directions) via Russia, in thousand TEUs, 
2014-2016
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Source:	TransContainer
1.2. Hard infrastructure 
The trans-Siberian corridors are characterised by the best infrastructure 
of all the routes discussed in this paper.	Aside	from	selected	sections	–	the	
Zaudinskiy-Naushki	(253	km)	section	in	the	Mongolian	corridor	and	the	Monty-
Dostyk	(853	km)	section	in	Kazakhstan	–	all	rail	routes	are	electrified	double-
track	railways.	In	2015,	Russian	Railways	announced	an	investment	of	50	bil-
lion	roubles	(US$	830	million)	intended	to	expand	the	trans-Siberian	corridors.	
The	main	problems	in	the	development	of	the	trans-Siberian	corridors	concern	
the	rolling	stock,	for	example	the	insufficient	number	of	flatcars.	Since	2009,	a	dry	
port	with	an	estimated	capacity	of	600,000	TEU	has	been	under	construction	
in	the	vicinity	of	the	new	rail	border	crossing	in	Khorgos	on	the	Chinese-Kazakh	
border.	It	is	combined	with	a	special	economic	zone	intended	for	the	logistics	
industry.	Infrastructural	deficiencies	in	Kazakhstan	are	being	gradually	made	
up	for	under	local	development	strategies.	In	the	longer	term,	the	Polish-Belaru-
sian	border	crossing	of	Terespol-Brest,	which	needs	expansion	and	is	at	present	
servicing	the	entire	traffic	incoming	from	the	trans-Siberian	corridors,	could	
be	a	potential	bottleneck.	The	transit	traffic	capacity	between	China	and	the	EU	
is	estimated	at	around	300,000	TEU	annually	via	the	trans-Kazakh	corridor	and	
around	250,000	TEU	annually	by	the	trans-Siberian	railway25.	
25	 E.Vinokurov,	Transport	Corridors	of	the	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	Across	the	Eurasian	Eco-
nomic	Union:	Preliminary	Estimates	for	Transportation	Capacity	and	Investment	Needs;	
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2771587	
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the bottleneck. the Małaszewicze trans-shipment terminal 
The complete domination of the trans-Siberian corridors, combined with 
the elimination of transit via Ukraine, make the border crossings between 
Poland and Belarus points of key importance for EU-China rail connec-
tions. At present, nearly all of the trade flows are serviced on the Terespol-
Brest border crossing that offers the most comprehensive trans-shipment 
facilities of all the border crossings on the EU border, enabling a shift from 
broad to standard track width. With current traffic intensity the border 
crossing’s capacity (which is 14 pairs of trains per day on the Polish side) is 
already strained. This is causing numerous examples of congestion – fre-
quently the trains incoming from China have to wait for up to several days 
for their cargo to be transloaded. The Belarusian side could help improve 
the situation, however its potential for action is limited due to insufficient 
infrastructure and the SMGS international agreement it is party to (it de-
termines the exact location of cargo trans-shipment operations). Therefore, 
the modernisation of a portion of the railway and of the Małaszewicze ter-
minal, planned in the upcoming years, is of key importance not only from 
the point of view of Poland and Belarus but also for the development of the 
system of EU-China rail connections as a whole. The excessively long dura-
tion of infrastructure modernisation and the absence of a correct sequence 
of works may lead to a temporary drop in China-EU rail traffic, and in the 
long-term perspective – to trade flows being redirected to other corridors 
and border crossings. 
1.3. Soft infrastructure 
The use of trans-Siberian corridors is facilitated by the thriving coop-
eration between the states of the Eurasian Economic Union, i.e. Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus.	In	2014,	rail	carriers	from	all	three	EEU	founding	
states	jointly	established	a	holding	known	as	the	United	Transportation	and	
Logistics	Company	(UTLC)	that	groups	the	stakes	held	by	local	container	opera-
tors.	Its	tasks	include	the	unification	of	price	lists,	completion	of	the	system	
of	how	containers	circulate,	joint	preparation	of	carriage	timetable,	the	unifi-
cation	of	procedures.	This	leads	to	a	reduction	in	the	cost	and	duration	of	the	
trains’	journeys.	The	question	of	EU-China	transit	has	been	given	high	political	
priority,	as	evidenced	by	a	joint	declaration	regarding	the	setting	of	a	minimum	
daily	distance	to	be	covered	by	a	train	at	1,000	km.	This	is	tantamount	to	giv-
ing	high	priority	to	international	transit	trains,	similar	to	that	of	passenger	
trains,	in	the	congested	Russian	railway	system.	In	2012,	the	carriage	price	lists	
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on	the	Zabaikalsk-Brest	route	were	reduced	by	33%	and	in	2014	there	was	an	
11%	reduction	of	the	fees	for	handling	the	containers	on	some	of	the	routes.	Evi-
dent	tension	between	the	EEU	member	states,	which	manifested	itself	in	the	
reintroduction	of	border	control	on	the	border	crossings	between	Russia	and	
Belarus26,	seems	not	to	have	had	any	impact	on	the	operation	of	the	China-EU	
cargo	trains	to	date.	
1.4. Stakeholders
At	the	May	2017	summit	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	in	Beijing	an	agreement	
was	signed	by	seven	national	carriers	operating	in	the	trans-Siberian	corri-
dor	(China,	Russia,	Mongolia,	Kazakhstan,	Belarus,	Poland,	Germany)	regard-
ing	efforts	to	improve	carriage	efficiency.	This	is	proof	of	Beijing’s ambition 
to assume the role of coordinator in the expansion of the trans-Siberian 
corridors.	It	is	facilitated	by	the	leading	role	Chinese	companies	have	in	the	
organisation	of	carriages.	Other	important	stakeholders	in	the	development	
of	 the	 trans-Siberian	corridors	 include	Russian Railways (RZD),	 and	also	
Kazakh Railways	(KTZ)	and	Belarusian Railways	(BZD) that	cooperate	with	
RZD.	They	have	their	own	interests	connected	with	the	maintaining	of	their	
leading	position	in	the	China-EU	container	transport,	and	also	re-directing	
trade	flows	to	the	logistics	infrastructure	that	belongs	to	them.	In	politically-
sensitive	situations,	such	as	the	blockade	of	transit	via	Ukraine,	RZD’s	actions	
are	subordinated	to	the	Kremlin’s	interests27.	Kazakhstan	is	another	country	
that	has	been	significantly	involved	in	the	development	of	the	western	corridor.	
Under	its	Nurly	Zhol	development	strategy,	it	is	gradually	modernising	its	rail	
and	logistics	infrastructure,	thereby	increasing	its	attractiveness	as	a	Central	
Asian	logistics	hub.	
In the European section of the corridor, several EU states located in Cen-
tral Europe, including Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, may benefit from 
offering transit and logistics services.	The	key	role	in	shaping	the	system	
of	carriages	is	played	by	local national rail carriers	which	most	frequently	act	
as	parties	in	negotiations	with	foreign	partners	operating	along	the	corridors.	
26	 Financial Times,	 Belarus’s	 Lukashenko	 slams	 Russia	 over	 border	 controls,	 https://www.
ft.com/content/4eeeb5ca-ea1f-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539?mhq5j=e6
27	 TransContainer,	a	container	operator	controlled	by	Russian	Railways	(via	UTLC),	is	renting	
a	container	terminal	in	the	town	of	Dobra	in	Slovakia	near	the	border	with	Ukraine,	which	
is	the	final	stop	on	a	broad-gauge	railway	that	ends	in	Slovakia.	The	decision	to	block	transit	
via	Ukraine	has	contributed	to	a	reduction	in	the	volume	of	goods	transloaded	at	this	termi-
nal	to	less	than	10,000	TEU.
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Due	to	Russia’s	blockade	of	Ukrainian	railways,	at	present	almost	all	EU-China	
carriages	pass	through	Belarus	and	Poland	with	the	key	point	of	the	track	gauge	
switch	being	 the	border	crossing	of	Brest-Terespol.	 In	2017	 transit	 through	
Ukraine	was	partially	re-opened,	with	several	test	trains	passing	to	Slovakia	
and	Hungary28.	Trains	passing	through	Ukraine	could	also	possibly	enter	south-
ern	Poland.
The governments of Lithuania and Latvia are trying to attract a portion 
of transit flows incoming to the EU.	To	achieve	this,	they	are	developing	a	rail	
connection	between	the	ports	in	Riga	and	Klaipėda,	and	China.	Their	major	asset	
is	their	broad-gauge	connection	with	the	Russian	railway	network.	Regard-
less	of	the	fact	that	test	connections	to	Western	Europe	have	been	launched	
(including	 the	China-Riga-Rotterdam	connection),	 the	potential	 for	 taking	
over	rail	transit	flows	from	China	to	Western	Europe	is	very	limited	due	to	the	
high	cost	of	transloading	cargo	onto	ships.	However,	this	could	be	a	business	
niche	in	the	sector	of	goods	transportation	to	Scandinavia.	Moreover,	Lithu-
ania	intends	to	build	a	trans-shipment	terminal	on	the	Sestokai-Kaunas	route	
to	offer	a	switch	from	broad	gauge	to	European	standard	gauge,	that	would	be	an	
alternative	to	the	facilities	in	Małaszewicze.	The	possibilities	of	taking	over	
major	trade	flows	will	be	limited	until	Lithuania	is	connected	with	the	European	
network	via	Rail	Baltica.
As far as the development of the trans-Siberian corridors is concerned, 
Beijing’s strategies are convergent with the interests of Russia and other 
states located along the route. From	the	point	of	view	of	the	Chinese	provinces	
that	are	currently	subsidising	the	rail	connections	with	the	EU,	currently	the	
cheapest,	fastest	and	safest	trans-Siberian	corridors	also	offer	the	best	relation	
of	costs	to	desired	effects.	As a consequence, the trans-Siberian corridors 
have received the biggest support from the Chinese central government 
and are key elements in Chinese strategies. Under	the	CR	Express	strategy,	
container	flows	incoming	from	China	are	to	be	directed	to	all	three	trans-Sibe-
rian	corridors	(with	exports	from	specific	Chinese	provinces	being	assigned	
to	each	of	them).	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	corridor	running	through	Kazakh-
stan	is	mentioned	in	strategic	documents	drawn	up	under	the	Belt	and	Road	
28	 Should	the	plan	to	extend	the	Slovak	broad-gauge	railway	from	Košice	to	Vienna	be	imple-
mented,	 Austria	 could	 join	 the	 group	 of	 stakeholders	 interested	 in	 providing	 logistics	
services	for	the	carriages.	However,	at	present	the	future	of	this	project	is	uncertain	due	
to	 problems	with	 its	 funding	 (in	which	 Russia	was	 to	 be	 involved)	 and	 the	 low	 chance	
of	increased	trade	flows	on	this	route.
45
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
Initiative	as	being	one	of	key	importance29.	As	a	consequence,	Beijing’s	increased	
involvement	in	the	expansion	of	these	corridors,	both	in	terms	of	hard	and	soft	
infrastructure,	should	be	expected	in	the	future.	
1.5. The political context
From	Beijing’s	point	of	view,	 the	use	of	 the	routes	 that	run	 through	Russia	
is	of	major	political	significance,	because	in	the	long	term	it	weakens	Moscow’s	
potential	objection	to	the	Chinese	project	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	Observ-
ers	point	to	the	possible	rivalry	between	the	Chinese	regional	initiative	and	
the	Russian	Eurasian	Economic	Union	project.	By	using	the	routes	that	run	
through	Russia,	it	creates	a	practical	opportunity	to	combine	the	two	initiatives	
and	thereby	avoid	Russian-Chinese	rivalry.	In	addition,	in	the	Russian	domes-
tic	political	scene	Russian	Railways	(RZD)	increasingly	often	acts	as	a	lobbyist	
in	favour	of	close	cooperation	with	China.
Alongside	this,	 the	dependence	of	all	 three	trans-Siberian	corridors	on	the	
Russian	railway	network	enables	Russia	to	use	rail	transport	as	a	tool	to	exert	
political	pressure	on	its	neighbours.	In	2016,	following	an	order	from	the	Rus-
sian	government,	RZD	suspended	its	cooperation	with	Ukrainian	railways	and	
fully	suspended	rail	transport	between	the	two	states.	Although	the	intention	
to	disrupt	Ukraine’s	exports	to	Central	Asia	should	be	seen	as	Russia’s	primary	
goal,	the	railway	blockade	has	successfully	excluded	Ukraine	from	participa-
tion	in	servicing	China-EU	container	traffic.	Similarly,	Russia’s	actions	have	
a	negative	impact	on	the	prospects	for	balancing	rail	trade	between	China	and	
those	EU	states	that	are	covered	by	Russia’s	foodstuffs	embargo.	Although	the	
wording	of	the	Russian	regulation	excludes	international	rail	transit	from	the	
sanctions	regime,	in	fact	Russian	customs	officers	block	the	transport	of	some	
types	of	goods	to	China.	This	includes	meat	and	fruit,	which	are	viewed	in	the	
region	as	promising	export	goods.	China,	for	its	part,	seems	to	tolerate	Russia’s	
actions	in	this	respect.
the blockade of transit via Ukraine 
The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict is one of the factors shaping the de-
velopment of the European section of EU-China rail connections. Starting 
29	 In	Chinese	documents	this	corridor	is	referred	to	as	Eurasian	Landbridge. See Building	the	
Belt	 and	 Road:	 Concept,	 Practice	 and	 China’s	 Contribution,	 https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/
wcm.files/upload/CMSydylyw/201705/201705110537027.pdf	
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from January 2016, a blockade of rail transit from Ukraine to Central Asia 
was introduced, following a decision by the Russian government. This 
move was mainly intended to disrupt Ukraine’s exports. The tightening of 
the blockade by Russia and the retaliatory measures taken by Ukraine have 
brought a halt to rail transit from China to the EU via Ukraine. The reasons 
behind this were both practical (blockade) and business-related (increased 
risk and instability of supplies).
Starting from June 2017, test transit trains to the EU heading for Slovakia 
(Bratislava) and Hungary (Budapest) began to pass through Ukraine again. 
The governments of these states hope to benefit from the development of the 
connections via Ukraine. Slovakia intends to build a new logistics centre in 
Košice that would use the existing ŠRT broad-gauge railway from Užhorod 
to the US Steel steelworks. However, the potential for the development of 
transit via Ukraine is limited due to the country’s domestic instability and 
political risks, including the conflict with Russia, as well as the low level 
of bilateral relations with China. Fears regarding the security of supplies 
may discourage the main clients, i.e. global companies, from opting for the 
transit of high value goods via Ukraine. As a consequence, the potential for 
the development of the trans-Siberian corridors is still largely dependent 
on the traffic capacity of the Małaszewicze trans-shipment terminal. 
The blockade of transit via Ukraine has significant consequences for Cen-
tral Europe. Most cargo flows are concentrated on the route that runs 
through Belarus and Poland. So far, the connections with the Czech Re-
public and Hungary (Yiwu-Budapest) have been carried out via the Polish 
border crossing in Terespol-Brest, instead of via Ukrainian-Slovak and 
Ukrainian-Hungarian rail border crossings (or the Polish border crossing 
in Medyka or the LHS broad-gauge railway). The exclusion of Ukraine from 
the development of overland rail connections between the EU and China is 
weakening the position of some Central European states including in their 
ability to benefit from transit and logistics services rendered for the con-
nections. 
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2. the trans-Caspian corridors 
Map 4. The trans-Caspian transport corridors connecting China and the EU
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2.1. Utilisation to date
The trans-Caspian corridors	form	a	potential	alternative	to	the	currently	used	
rail	transit	routes	from	China	to	the	EU. However, the transport of goods 
via these corridors is much more complicated and requires complex inter-
modal solutions.	The	trains	departing	from	China	pass	through	Central	Asian	
states	and	reach	Caspian	Sea	ports	(Aktau,	Kuryk,	Türkmenbaşy)	where	they	
are	loaded	onto	ferries	which	take	them	to	ports	in	Azerbaijan.	Next,	they	are	
transported	by	rail	to	Georgia,	from	where	the	goods	are	transported	by	ferry	
to	the	European	Black	Sea	ports.	Next,	they	are	sent	to	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe	by	rail	or	by	road.	
So far, the use of the trans-Caspian corridors in rail container trade with 
China has been insignificant and has been limited to the non-EU states 
located along this corridor.	 In	 2015,	 on	 the	 initiative	 of	Kazakhstan	 and	
Azerbaijan,	in	cooperation	with	a	private	operator,	Mingsheng	Logistics,	an	
occasional	train	service	known	as	the	‘Nomad	Express’	was	launched	connect-
ing	Baku	with	Xinjiang.	At	that	time,	the	government	of	Ukraine	attempted	
to	launch	a	train	service	with	China	that	would	bypass	Russia.	A	Ukrainian	
test	train	launched	in	January	2016	departed	from	the	port	in	Charnomorsk	
(called	Ilichevsk	at	that	time)	and	reached	the	Chinese-Kazakh	border	within	
16	days.	In	the	future,	the	train	service	is	to	operate	regularly	and	the	route	
is	to	be	extended	to	EU	member	states:	Lithuania,	and	also	Poland	–	by	a	broad-
gauge	railway	to	the	terminal	in	Sławków.	
2.2. Hard infrastructure
The potential for using the trans-Caspian corridors is limited due to their 
poor transport infrastructure.	Only	half	of	the	route	is	in	a	double-track	
standard,	and	major	portions	of	it	remain	non-electrified.	The	route’s	capac-
ity	 is	also	 limited	by	antiquated	signalling	systems	as	well	as	restrictions	
regarding	train	weight	on	certain	sections	of	 the	route.	The	average	 train	
speed	on	this	route	is	estimated	at	40	km/h.	Despite	major	investments	car-
ried	out	by	Azerbaijan	in	the	Kazakh	port	of	Aktau	and	in	Baku	(the	munici-
pality	of	Alyat),	the	railway	remains	insufficiently	suited	to	major	container	
carriages.	The	insufficient	number	of	ferries	capable	of	transporting	trains	
across	the	Caspian	Sea	is	another	problem.	The	fact	that	the	route	runs	via	
two	seas	(the	Caspian	Sea	and	the	Black	Sea)	increases	the	risk	connected	
with	bad	weather,	which	is	much	smaller	in	the	case	of	connections	using	
overland	routes	only.
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2.3. Soft infrastructure
The main problems affecting transit in the trans-Caspian corridor involve 
formalities including: border clearances, the absence of unified regula-
tions and technical standards, and the volatility of transportation price 
lists.	They	are	aggravated	by	the	fact	that	six	separate	customs	zones	function	
along	the	corridor.	A	number	of	actors	are	involved	in	resolving	the	current	
problems	and	building	an	efficient	intermodal	transport	corridor	connecting	
China	with	the	Black	Sea	states.	One	of	the	oldest	initiatives	that	has	served	
as	the	foundation	for	most	of	the	other	projects	is	the	so-called	Transport	Cor-
ridor	Europe-Caucasus-Asia	(TRACECA),	established	in	1993	by	the	EU	in	coop-
eration	with	fourteen	states	of	the	region30.	At	present,	the	EU’s	influence	on	the	
development	of	the	corridor	has	been	on	the	wane	and	that	of	the	region’s	states	
has	been	rising.	The	cooperation	under	the	Trans-Caspian	International	Tran-
sit	Route	(TITR),	initiated	in	2015	by	Kazakhstan,	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia,	has	
been	developing	dynamically.	Its	direct	aim	is	to	introduce	solutions	that	would	
facilitate	container	trade	between	China	and	the	EU,	and	also	China	and	Turkey.	
In	2016,	rail	transportation	fees	applicable	on	a	section	of	the	corridor	were	
reduced	by	50%,	and	taxes	and	transit	fees	have	also	fallen.	These	actions	are	
intended	to	lower	the	cost	of	China-EU	carriages	sent	via	this	corridor,	to	enable	
the	creation	of	a	genuinely	competitive	business	alternative	to	the	trans-Sibe-
rian	corridors.
2.4. Stakeholders
So far, the corridors running through the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and 
the Black Sea to the EU have not received any substantial support from the 
Chinese central government and the provinces.	At	present,	Kazakhstan	and	
Azerbaijan	are	the	main	stakeholders	in	the	development	of	trans-Caspian	cor-
ridors.	They	hope	to	draw	economic	benefits	from	the	development	of	the	logis-
tics	sector	to	facilitate	container	transit	from	China	to	Turkey	and	from	expand-
ing	their	own	channels	of	trade	with	Europe	and	China31.	The	development	
30	 Its	participant	states	include:	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	Bulgaria,	Georgia,	Iran,	Kazakhstan,	
Kyrgyzstan,	Moldova,	Romania,	Tajikistan,	Turkmenistan,	Turkey,	Ukraine,	Uzbekistan.	
The	goals	of	this	comprehensive	initiative	include	the	development	of	rail	connections.	So	
far,	85	projects	have	been	implemented	as	part	of	the	initiative,	worth	a	total	of	187	million	
euros.	Since	2009,	which	was	when	the	initiative	lost	its	funding	from	the	EU	budget,	its	
dynamic	on	the	EU	side	has	visibly	dwindled.
31	 In	the	case	of	the	route	running	through	the	Caucasus	to	Turkey,	the	Turkish	government	
is	another	major	stakeholder	–	see	Chapter	III.3.
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of	the	trans-Caspian	corridors	has	become	a	political	priority	for	Ukraine.	This	
is	due	to	the	blockade	of	rail	transit	via	Russia,	which	is	important	for	Ukrainian	
exporters	operating	in	Central	Asia32.	Despite	the	EU’s	partial	withdrawal	from	
the	development	of	the	TRACECA	corridor,	some	EU	member	states,	including	
Romania	and	Poland,	are	involved	in	new	initiatives.	The	emergence	of	major	
trade	flows	from	China	to	Western	European	states	via	the	trans-Caspian	corri-
dors	may	potentially	boost	competition	between	individual	states	in	Central	and	
Eastern	Europe	–	mainly	between	the	transit	routes	that	run	through	Romania	
(Poti-Constanța),	Poland	(Poti-Chernomorsk-Sławków/Medyka)33	and	Slovakia	
(Poti-Chernomorsk-Dobra).	
The future use of the trans-Caspian corridors for China-EU trade is uncer-
tain due to Beijing’s unclear stance on this matter.	Although	they	were	men-
tioned	in	the	CR	Express	strategy	as	a	potential	route	for	goods	transported	from	
western	China,	at	present	China’s	involvement	in	the	expansion	of	this	corridor	
has	been	insignificant.	No	major	actor	associated	with	the	Chinese	central	gov-
ernment	is	involved	in	the	development	of	TITR	and	to	date	the	project’s	busi-
ness	partner	on	the	Chinese	side	has	been	a	private	company	from	Hong	Kong.	
According	to	some	Chinese	rail	operators	and	also	European	logistics	compa-
nies,	at	present	this	corridor	is	too	unpredictable	and	risky	for	them	to	be	able	
to	convince	their	clients	to	use	it34.	This	concerns	in	particular	the	transit	via	
Ukraine,	which	the	Chinese	leadership	and	logistics	industry	representatives	
view	as	an	unstable	state	characterised	by	an	unfriendly	business	environment.	
The	importance	of	transit	via	the	Caspian	Sea	and	the	Black	Sea	could	poten-
tially	increase	when	the	subsidies	are	launched	but,	due	to	its	relatively	high	
cost,	Chinese	provinces	do	not	see	it	as	an	attractive	alternative.
2.5. The political context
The	construction	of	the	trans-Caspian	corridors	has	clear	political	motives,	
including	the	intention	to	bypass	Russia.	These	motives	have	been	emphasised	
to	varying	degrees	by	individual	stakeholders	involved	in	the	initiative.	Rep-
resentatives	of	Azerbaijan	and	Kazakhstan	pointed	to	the	need	to	reduce	the	
political	risk	connected	with	the	low	level	of	predictability	of	Russian	politics,	
32	 The	 50%	 reduction	 of	 prices	 in	 Azerbaijan	 and	 Kazakhstan	 was	 possible	 as	 a	 result	
of	Ukraine’s	efforts,	among	other	things.
33	 The	second	route	requires	two	additional	border	clearance	procedures.
34	 Authors’	talks	with	representatives	of	logistics	sector	in	China	and	Central	Europe,	2017.
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the	sanctions,	and	with	the	actions	that	destabilise	the	region35.	The	corridor	
is	being	presented	as	complementing	the	current	routes	and	as	an	alternative	
that	guarantees	the	stability	of	supplies.	Ukraine’s	actions	intended	to	facilitate	
the	development	of	the	trans-Caspian	routes	are	presented	as	an	element	of	the	
trade	war	with	Russia	and	as	such	are	criticised	by	the	Russian	press.	Similarly,	
the	corridor’s	profitability	is	frequently	challenged	by	some	Russian	experts36.	
The present calculations regarding increased use of the trans-Caspian 
corridors for China-EU transit are based on the assumption that there 
could be disruptions to the smooth flow of transit via Russia, including 
the potential destabilisation of states that are of key importance for the 
functioning of these corridors, i.e. Belarus and Kazakhstan37.	There	may	
be	political	reasons	behind	Beijing’s	insignificant	involvement	in	the	initiative;	
if	China	openly	supported	these	more	expensive	corridors	that	bypass	Russia	
and	if	it	funded	them,	Moscow	could	interpret	this	as	an	unfriendly	gesture.
35	 Kolejowy	korytarz	transkaspijski	–	alternatywa	dla	trasy	przez	Rosję’	(The	trans-Caspian	
rail	corridor	–	an	alternative	to	the	Russian	route),	Rynek Kolejowy,	15.05.2017,	http://www.
rynek-kolejowy.pl/wiadomosci/kolejowy-korytarz-transkaspijski--alternatywa-dla-
trasy-przez-rosje-81692.html
36	 Derailed:	 Ukrainian	 Silk	 Road	 Train	 Returns	 Home	 Empty,	 Sputnik	 News,	 22.04.2016,	
https://sputniknews.com/business/201604221038432755-ukraine-freight-train-empty/;	
Dashed	Hopes:	‘No	One	Needs	Ukraine’s	New	Silk	Road’,	Sputnik	News,	02.04.2016,	https://
sputniknews.com/europe/201604021037366206-ukraine-train-project/
37	 If	 the	 problems	 regarding	 the	 infrastructure	 available	 in	 the	 trans-Caspian	 corridors	
remain	unresolved,	 sea	and	air	connections	may	regain	 importance	should	Russia	block	
the	route.	
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3. the southern corridors via turkey
Map 5. The southern transport corridors connecting China and the EU
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3.1. Utilisation so far
Another	potential	alternative	route	used	in	China-EU	rail	trade	runs	through	
Turkey.	In	this	variant,	the	trains	would	travel	partly	along	the	trans-Caspian	
routes	(on	the	China-Georgia	section),	and	then	use	the	Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	rail	
connection	and	head	for	the	European	part	of	Turkey.	In	the	long	run,	over-
land-only	connections	are	planned	that	will	run	via	Central	Asia	and	Iran.	
Before	the	railway	link	between	Georgia	and	Turkey	was	opened	in	November	
2017,	a	trains	services	–	under	the	brand	name	Nomad	Express	–	reached	Tur-
key	by	ferry	across	the	Black	Sea	or	by	trucks.	According	to	representatives	
of	Kazakh	Railways,	in	2016	three	trains	from	China	travelled	via	this	route38.	
According	to	TITR	(which	is	involved	in	developing	the	connections	with	Tur-
key,	among	other	things),	the	volume	of	trade	flows	that	passed	through	this	
route	in	2017	is	estimated	at	around	5,000	TEU39.	In	plans	adopted	by	the	states	
involved	in	the	construction	of	this	corridor,	the	volume	of	rail	container	trade	
between	China	and	Turkey	(including	transit)	is	expected	to	rise	to	300,000	TEU	
annually	by	2020.
3.2. Hard infrastructure
Despite	the	modernisation	of	the	Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	railway,	the main limita-
tion of southern corridors is the condition of rail infrastructure in Turkey.	
It	includes	numerous	sections	that	have	only	one	set	of	tracks	and	the	average	
daily	distance	covered	by	a	cargo	train	is	around	400	km	(on	the	routes	that	run	
via	Russia	it	is	around	1,000	km)40.	Another	problem	involves	the	insufficient	
availability	of	ferries	on	the	Caspian	Sea.	Should	transit	be	extended	to	the	EU,	
the	Bosphorus	could	be	a	potential	bottleneck	–	cargo	trains	would	need	to	cross	
it	by	ferry.	The	situation	may	change	when	the	last	stage	of	construction	of	the	
Marmaray	undersea	railway	tunnel	in	Istanbul	is	finished,	which	is	expected	
at	the	end	of	2018.	However,	the	launch	of	the	project	has	repeatedly	been	post-
poned	and	the	tunnel’s	capacity	for	cargo	transport	will	be	limited	due	to	large	
passenger	flows.	
38	 Over	50	trains	will	pass	Azerbaijan	via	TITR	project	in	2016,	Azernews,	3.07.2017,	https://
www.azernews.az/business/97543.html
39	 TRACECA	Logistics	Processes	and	Motorways	of	the	Sea	II,	LOGMOS	Master	Plan	–	Annex	9.1,	
http://www.traceca-org.org/fileadmin/fm-dam/TAREP/65ta/Master_Plan/MPA9.1KZ.pdf
40	 O.F.	Uysal,	The	Iron	Silk	Road:	How	will	Turkey	be	Involved?,	Caucasus	International,	http://
www.elibrary.az/docs/JURNAL/jrn2016_540.pdf
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3.3. Soft infrastructure
Due	to	the	partial	overlap	of	southern	corridors	with	the	trans-Caspian	cor-
ridors,	most	actions	aimed	at	facilitating	the	transport	from	China	via	Turkey	
are	carried	out	in	existing	forums,	including	TITR	(where	Turkey	cooperates	
with	Azerbaijan	and	Kazakhstan),	and	under	the	European	TRACECA	initiative.	
Over	the	last	several	years,	the	government	of	Turkey	has	been	implementing	
a	programme	known	as	the	Caravan	Project.	Projects	carried	out	under	the	
programme	and	meetings	of	representatives	of	the	states	of	the	Caucasus	and	
Central	Asia	are	mainly	intended	to	harmonise	trade	and	customs	regulations	
in	that	region.	In	Turkey	alone	since	2016,	reforms	to	liberalise	the	railway	
market	have	been	implemented	that	could	potentially	help	facilitate	the	traffic	
on	China-EU	transit	connections.
3.4. Stakeholders
From China’s perspective, the present work on the development of the 
southern corridor has mainly been focused on establishing a permanent 
train service with Turkey.	At	present,	using	this	corridor	to	offer	a	regular	
train	service	to	the	EU	is	not	an	attractive	option	either	for	Beijing	or	for	the	
individual	provinces41.	In	the	long-term,	this	route	has	been	mentioned	in	the	
CR	Express	strategy	as	a	future	potential	alternative	route	to	the	EU.
Aside from China, Turkey is the main stakeholder in the southern corri-
dor –	the	development	of	rail	connections	with	China	is	an	element	of	the	plans	
to	develop	intermodal	corridors	in	Turkey.	Turkey’s	interests	are	convergent	
with	the	interests	of	Kazakhstan,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	(which	will	be	using	
the	option	of	transit	via	the	Caucasus).	Similarly	to	the	trans-Caspian	corridors,	
the	connections	via	Turkey	are	viewed	by	some	Turkish	experts	as	a	potential	
route	for	transporting	goods	from	China	to	the	EU	which	bypasses	Russia42.	
However,	this	route	is	much	longer	than	the	trans-Siberian	corridors.	
41	 Interviews	with	representatives	of	Chinese	regional	governments	and	the	logistics	sector,	
August-September	2017.
42	 Rail	 Turkey,	 Can	 Turkey	 replace	 Russia	 in	 China-Europe	 rail	 traffic?,	 8	 December	 2016,	
https://railturkey.org/2015/12/08/can-turkey-replace-russia-in-china-europe-rail-traffic/
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3.5. The political context
So	far,	the	economic	cooperation	of	the	states	located	along	the	route	that	leads	
to	Turkey	has	shown	that	pragmatic	collaboration	focused	on	the	improvement	
of	transport	corridors	is	possible.	The	instability	of	the	governments	of	Central	
Asian	states	(including	Kazakhstan)	and	the	potentially	destabilising	actions	
of	the	Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	(PKK)	in	eastern	Turkey	generate	political	risk.
the routes via Iran 
In the CR Express strategic document published in 2015, the route that runs 
from China via Central Asia, Iran and Turkey was mentioned as another 
corridor that could potentially connect China with Europe. Only a few test 
trains connecting China and Iran have been launched in this corridor (for 
example on the Yiwu-Tehran and Chengdu-Tehran routes). So far, China 
has been interested in servicing trade with Iran and not in performing 
transit operations to the EU. So far, Turkey has not shown a major interest 
in developing this type of connections either43, although this may form a po-
tential field for a pragmatic cooperation with Iran. Tehran’s transport poli-
cy includes plans to develop alternative transport corridors to Europe that 
would run through the Black Sea, which is partially convergent with the 
plans adopted by China. Although unlike the trans-Caspian corridors, this 
route does not require the use of ferries, it has several drawbacks including 
poor infrastructure and the political instability of the areas through which 
the trains would be passing. If it is to be used more extensively, the insuf-
ficient railway infrastructure in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan would have to 
be improved.
43	 O.F.	Uysal,	The	Iron	Silk	Road:	How	will	Turkey	be	Involved?,	Caucasus	International,	http://
www.elibrary.az/docs/JURNAL/jrn2016_540.pdf	
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4. a separate sea-land route – the balkan corridors 
Map 6. China-EU sea-land Balcan transport corridors
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4.1. Utilisation to date 
The	role	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	the	development	of	the	Belt	and	Road	
Initiative	is	not	limited	to	rail-only	corridors.	China is also interested in the 
development of the so-called Land-Sea Express Route (zhongou luhai 
kuaixian) which is a maritime route from Chinese ports to the Greek 
port of Piraeus, from which the goods are then transported to Central 
and Western Europe by rail.	This	makes	it	possible	to	reduce	the	traditional	
maritime	route	from	China	to	the	EU	(that	runs	from	the	Suez	Canal,	via	the	
Strait	of	Gibraltar	to	the	ports	on	the	North	Sea	and	the	Baltic	Sea)	by	around	
4,500 km.	The	use	of	the	port	in	Piraeus	and	the	corridor	that	runs	via	the	
Balkans	reduces	the	total	duration	of	maritime	transport	from	China	to	the	
EU	border	by	around	8-12	days44.	Therefore,	this	corridor	is	not	a	direct	alter-
native	 to	 the	overland	rail	 corridors	 (as	 regards	 the	scope	 in	which	 these	
compete	with	each	other).	It	is	rather	a	section	of	the	maritime	‘Road’	and	
not	of	the	overland	‘Belt’	discussed	above.	At	present,	from	Piraeus	the	goods	
may	be	transported	to	Central	Europe	using	two	corridors	–	via	Bulgaria	and	
Romania	(the	so-called	TEN-T	IV	corridor)	or	via	Macedonia	and	Serbia	(the	
so-called	Corridor	X).
China’s	biggest	shipping	company	COSCO	Shipping’s	2009	purchase	of	the	
container	terminal	in	Piraeus,	followed	by	the	company	gaining	control	of	the	
entire	port	in	2016	triggered	the	development	of	these	corridors.	Having	built	
the	missing	connection	between	the	terminal	and	the	Greek	railway	network,	
in	2013	COSCO	and	the	Greek	railway	carrier	TrainOSE	began	to	offer	block-
train services	to	Central	Europe	to	multinational	companies	that	had	estab-
lished	their	logistics	centres	in	Piraeus.	These	companies	include:	Hewlett-
Packard,	Foxconn,	Hyundai	and	Sony45.	The	goods	are	delivered	to	manufac-
turing	plants	in:	the	Czech	Republic	(Pardubice),	Slovakia	(Bratislava)	and	
Hungary	(Győr).	In	2015	around	500	trains	(carrying	around	30,000	TEU)46	
travelled	on	this	route.	In	2017,	COSCO	launched	two	test	train	services	on	the	
Piraeus-Budapest	 route	 that	 carried	 various	 Chinese	 products,	 including	
44	 The	ultimate	amount	of	time	saved	will	depend	on	the	distance	of	specific	destinations	from	
the	port	in	Piraeus,	which	means	that	this	form	of	transport	is	the	most	favourable	for	Bal-
kan	and	Central	European	locations.
45	 Before	2013,	the	container	terminal	in	Piraeus	had	not	been	connected	to	the	Greek	railway	
system.
46	 Potenciál	 pro	 rozvoj	 kombinované	 dopravy	 v	 Řecku	 [The	 potential	 for	 the	 development	
of	intermodal	transport	in	Greece],	http://www.mzv.cz/athens/cz/obchod_a_ekonomika/
obchodne_ekonomicke_aktuality/potencial_pro_rozvoj_kombinovane_dopravy.html
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furniture47.	Currently	COSCO	launches	about	8	freight	trains	from	Piraeus	
to	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	a	week	(this	is	equal	to	35,000	TEU	a	year)48.	
Similar	services	are	offered	in	the	port	in	Piraeus	by	other	major	interna-
tional	forwarding	companies,	including	the	German	company	DHL.	In	2016,	
around	200,000	TEU49	were	trans-shipped	in	Piraeus,	intended	for	further	
transit.	A	quarter	of	them	is	later	transported	to	mainland	Europe	by	rail50.	
Due	to	the	absence	of	statistics,	the	present	use	of	specific	rail	routes	is	dif-
ficult	to	estimate.
4.2. Hard infrastructure
Due to the present infrastructure limitations, rail transport via the cor-
ridors discussed above has not yet reached its full potential.	Most	of	the	
rail	sections	of	the	corridor	that	runs	through	Romania	and	Bulgaria	is	a	single-
track	railway	and	the	maximum	speed	a	train	can	reach	travelling	on	this	route	
is	60-70	km/h.	At	present,	the	duration	of	a	train’s	travel	on	the	route	from	
Thessaloniki	to	Budapest	is	around	26	hours.	The	corridor	has	been	entered	
onto	the	list	of	core	corridors	under	the	European	TENT-T	network,	which	has	
opened	the	way	to	more	extensive	financing	of	infrastructure	modernisation	
from	EU	funds.	At	present,	modernisation	is	ongoing	in	Romania	(a	490	km	sec-
tion	costing	2.9	billion	euros)	and	Bulgaria	(1.6	billion	euros).	The	travel	time	
is	to	be	reduced	to	14	hours	by	2020.
The	rail	route	that	runs	from	Piraeus	to	Budapest	via	Serbia	and	Macedonia	
(Corridor	X)	 is	 around	300	km	shorter	but	 it	 offers	poorer	 infrastructure.	
The	average	train	speed	in	this	corridor	is	around	35	km/h	and	the	average	
duration	of	travel	from	Thessaloniki	to	Budapest	is	49	hours.	According	to	the	
plans	adopted	by	the	government	of	Serbia	(85%	of	this	route	runs	through	
Serbian	territory),	in	the	upcoming	decade	investments	to	facilitate	the	cor-
ridor’s	development	costing	around	2	billion	euros	will	be	carried	out	and	the	
47	 Xinhua, 中欧陆海快式联运正式开通	(The	sea-land	connection	with	Europe	has	been	offi-
cially	launched),	2	July	2017,	http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017-02/07/c_129470373.htm
48	 Author’s	conversation	with	a	representative	of	COSCO	Shipping,	November	2017.
49	 The	basic	field	of	operation	of	 the	port	 in	Piraeus	 is	 the	 transloading	of	 containers	 from	
bigger	container	ships	onto	smaller	ones	(referred	to	as	feeders)	that	deliver	Asian	goods	
to	 less	prominent	European	ports.	Since	the	Chinese	company	COSCO	acquired	the	port,	
the	volume	of	transloaded	goods	has	increased	from	around	400,000	TEU	in	2008	to	more	
than	3	million	TEU	in	2014.
50	 A.	Bauranov,	The	Port	of	Piraeus	–	Opportunity	for	Railways	in	South	East	Europe?,	https://
www.globalrailwayreview.com/news/29672/port-piraeus-railways-south-east-europe/	
64
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
cruising	speed	will	be	80-100	km/h.	Russian	Railways	(RZD)	are	involved	in	the	
modernisation	of	the	selected	sections	of	Corridor	X	in	Serbia,	and	the	project	
is	funded	as	part	of	the	US$	800	million	credit	line	offered	to	Serbia	by	Russia51.	
In	2014,	memorandums	worth	2.9	billion	euros	were	signed	by	China,	Serbia	
and	Hungary	regarding	the	modernisation	of	a	section	of	the	rail	route	con-
necting	Belgrade	with	Budapest52.	There	are	doubts	to	whether	the	project	will	
be	implemented	by	the	Hungarian	side	due	to	legal	controversies	(including	
non-compliance	of	the	tender	procedure	with	EU	law);	the	European	Commis-
sion	has	launched	an	investigation	procedure	on	this	matter53.	
4.3. Soft infrastructure
The poor quality of ‘soft’ infrastructure is the basic limitation prevent-
ing the use of the corridors that run through the Balkans, in particular 
in the context of their potential competition with the ports in northern 
Europe.	Other	problems	that	need	resolving	include:	the	need	to	devise	proper	
transit	procedures,	to	simplify	customs	clearance	procedures	and	to	expand	
the	cooperation	of	rail	carriers	and	logistics	companies	operating	in	the	states	
located	along	the	corridor.	For	the	Thessaloniki-Budapest	route,	the	average	
waiting	time	at	border	crossings	in	Corridor	IV	is	around	8	hours	(30%	of	total	
travel	time).	For	Corridor	X	it	is	as	long	as	25	hours	(more	than	half	of	total	
travel	time).	The	unpredictability	of	delivery	schedules,	with	differences	of	up	
to	several	hours,	remains	a	major	challenge	for	the	development	of	transport	
in	this	corridor.	
4.4. Stakeholders
The emergence of China as a new actor in the development of rail trans-
port corridors that run through the Balkans has significantly increased 
the importance of Corridor X that runs through Macedonia, Serbia and 
Hungary.	From	Serbia’s	perspective,	the	development	of	this	corridor	is	conver-
gent	with	the	strategy	of	expanding	the	local	railway	network	intended	mainly	
for	cargo	traffic.	The	government	in	Belgrade	is	also	trying	to	build	up	Serbia’s	
position	as	the	key	transit	state	in	the	region.	For	both	Serbia	and	Hungary,	
51	 Russia	to	finance	Serbian	rail	investment,	4	June	2013,	http://www.railjournal.com/index.
php/europe/russia-to-finance-serbian-rail-investment.html	
52	 The	project	is	funded	by	Chinese	banks.
53	 Financial Times,	EU	sets	collision	course	with	China	over	‘Silk	Road’	rail	project,	20	Febru-
ary	2017,	https://www.ft.com/content/003bad14-f52f-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608?mhq5j=e6	
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the	expansion	of	infrastructure	in	Corridor	X	is	an	important	element	of	their	
bilateral	relations	with	China.
On	the	Chinese	side,	the	main	stakeholder	involved	in	corridor	development	
is	COSCO,	which	is	actively	supporting	the	development	of	trade	flow	on	this	
route,	including	by	expanding	the	port	in	Piraeus	and	developing	its	coopera-
tion	with	the	global	producers	of	electronic	devices.	As	far	as	infrastructure	
construction	is	concerned,	China	Railway	is	active	in	Corridor	X	and	is	respon-
sible	for	the	modernisation	of	the	railway	connecting	Belgrade	and	Budapest.	
These	actions	have	received	political	support	from	the	Chinese	government.	
For	example,	a	Hungarian-Serbian-Macedonian	taskforce	to	simplify	customs	
clearance	procedures	has	been	established	under	the	 ‘16+1’	cooperation	for-
mat.	So	far,	China’s	actions	in	Corridor	IV,	which	in	EU	strategies	continues	
to	be	a	priority,	have	been	insignificant.	However,	this	does	not	rule	out	the	
possibility	that	COSCO	will	use	this	corridor	in	its	operations.
The development of the land-sea route via the Balkans should be viewed 
as a method China applies to increase its share in maritime container 
freight between China and the EU.	China’s	actions	intended	to	redirect	a	por-
tion	of	trade	flows	to	Piraeus	may	meet	with	resistance	on	the	part	of	northern	
European	ports	and	the	states	where	they	are	located54.	In	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe,	the	development	of	this	corridor	may	potentially	threaten	the	Baltic	
ports,	for	example	in	offering	services	to	companies	from	Central	Europe.	Cor-
ridor	development	is	also	impacted	by	actions	carried	out	by	the	alliance	of	the	
two	largest	originally	European	shipping	companies:	Maersk	and	MSC.	The	lat-
ter	has	decided	to	move	its	operations	from	Piraeus	to	Turkey,	which	contrib-
uted	to	a	major	drop	in	the	number	of	containers	which	Chinese	companies	
trans-shipped	in	Piraeus.
4.5. The political context
China’s involvement in the expansion of transport corridors that run via 
the Balkans has sparked major controversy in the EU.	This	mainly	concerns	
the	modernisation	of	the	Hungarian	section	of	the	Budapest-Belgrade	rail	con-
nection	funded	by	China.	It	is	also	being	viewed	as	a	key	element	of	China’s	
expansion	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	According	to	representatives	of	EU	
54	 F.-P.	van	der	Putten	(ed.),	The	Geopolitical	Relevance	of	Piraeus	and	China’s	New	Silk	Road	
for	 Southeast	 Europe	 and	 Turkey,	 https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
Report_the%20geopolitical_relevance_of_Piraeus_and_China’s_New_Silk_Road.pdf	
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institutions,	as	well	as	experts	from	some	European	states	(Germany	in	par-
ticular)	China’s	actions	are	intended	to	build	political	influence	in	the	region	
that	subsequently	could	be	used	to	break	up	the	unity	of	the	EU’s	policy	towards	
China.	Doubts	are	also	being	raised	regarding	the	model	of	financing	offered	
by	China,	including	its	transparency	and	consequences	in	the	context	of	debt	
increase.	Due	to	the	fact	that	Beijing	has	given	clear	political	priority	to	the	mod-
ernisation	of	the	Belgrade-Budapest	railway	(which	is	being	presented	as	one	
of	the	first	achievements	of	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	itself),	this	may	cause	
political	tension	that	could	affect	the	development	of	Corridor	X.
Rail	transport	via	the	Balkans	could	also	potentially	be	disturbed	should	the	
migrant	crisis	worsen.	In	2015,	as	a	result	of	the	railway	on	the	Greek-Macedo-
nian	border	being	blocked	by	migrants	who	had	used	the	Balkan	route	to	reach	
Europe,	around	fifteen	trains	transporting	goods	from	Greece	were	stopped	for	
several	days.	Actions	intended	to	make	EU	borders	less	porous	also	contribute	
to	further	delays	during	border	clearance	procedures	–	this	is	happening	for	
example	on	the	border	crossing	between	Serbia	and	Hungary,	where	trains	are	
X-rayed	for	individuals	trying	to	cross	the	border	illegally.	
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Iv. the eConoMIC potentIal of the ChIna-eU raIl 
ConneCtIon
Most	forecasts	assume	that	only	a	few	per	cent	of	the	total	volume	of	goods	sent	
from	Asia	to	Europe	can	be	transported	by	rail55.	Indeed,	rail	is	not	necessarily	
a	suitable	means	of	transporting	raw	materials	and	unprocessed	metals	from	
China	to	Europe.	However,	it	is	not	the	weight	of	the	transported	goods	that	
matters	the	most	for	the	connection	as	a	whole.	The	connection	could	be	an	
important	means	of	transportation	for	technologically	advanced	products	such	
as	electronic	devices,	advanced	components	and	specialist	machines.	These	
products	are	not	large	and	frequently	their	main	asset	is	their	high	value.	There-
fore,	it	is	likely	that	small	amounts	of	very	important	goods	will	be	transported	
by	rail,	which	may	help	China	gain	a	competitive	advantage	over	its	Asian	com-
petitors	in	the	sector	of	the	logistics	of	goods	sent	to	Europe.	Moreover,	it	will	
be	a	chance	for	Europe	to	strengthen	its	position	in	the	Chinese	market,	in	par-
ticular	in	the	sector	of	luxury	products	and	premium	food.
From	the	historical	point	of	view,	the	present	development	of	the	rail	connection	
between	Asia	and	Europe	is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	The	1970s	saw	a	dynamic	
development	of	the	rail	transportation	of	goods	via	Siberia;	most	of	these	goods	
were	transported	on	to	Europe.	In	1980,	the	volume	of	transported	goods	was	
110,000	TEU56.	Goods	transported	from	Japan	rather	than	to	Japan	made	up	
a	major	portion	of	this	volume57.	Until	1979,	20%	of	Japan’s	exports	to	Europe	
was	transported	by	rail58.	Similar	estimates	are	cited	by	other	authors	who	
claim	that,	back	in	the	1980s,	around	11%	of	trade	between	Asia	and	Europe	
55	 The	authors	of	the	Retrack	report	have	arrived	at	more	optimistic	conclusions.	According	
to	them,	in	2010	the	rail	route	via	Siberia	could	have	potentially	accounted	for	the	transport	
of	1.43%	of	goods	traded	between	the	EU27	and	China.	The	forecast	for	2020	is	even	more	
optimistic.	It	suggests	that	9.24%	of	goods	in	EU27-China	trade	could	potentially	be	trans-
ported	via	Siberia	by	rail.	According	 to	 the	authors	of	 the	Retrack	report,	 in	2020	18.5%	
could	be	transported	by	rail	from	Asia	to	Europe	and	vice versa	provided	that	the	transpor-
tation	price	is	reduced	by	50%	compared	with	2010	and	that	the	duration	of	travel	is	reduced	
by	25-30%.	See:	Potential	for	Eurasia	land	bridge	corridors	&	logistics	developments	along	
the	corridors	p.	 176-177.	https://www.tno.nl/media/2825/report_potential_eurasia_land_
bridge_rail-corridors_final_25042012.pdf
56	 A.	Liliopoulou,	M.	Roe,	I.	Pasukeviciute,	Trans	Siberian	Railway:	from	inception	to	transi-
tion,	European	transport,	No.	29(2005),	2005,	p.	51.
57	 L.	Myles,	L.	C.	Robertson,	Soviet	Policy	Towards	Japan:	An	Analysis	of	Trends	in	the	1970s	
and	1980s,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988,	p.	57.
58	 A.	Liliopoulou,	M.	Roe,	I.	Pasukeviciute,	Trans	Siberian	Railway:	from	inception	to	transi-
tion,	European	transport,	No	29(2005),	2005,	p.	51.
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was	transported	by	rail59.	The	reasons	behind	such	a	rapid	development	of	the	
rail	connection	included	the	speed	of	transportation	and	the	low	transit	fees	
charged	by	Soviet	railways.	The	collapse	of	the	USSR,	combined	with	a	drop	
in	maritime	transport	prices,	contributed	to	a	major	decrease	in	the	use	of	the	
rail	connection	recorded	in	the	1990s.
1. trade exchange – the strengths and weaknesses of rail transport
Rail connections between China and Europe are a niche solution suited 
to selected categories of goods and business models. They are in the middle 
of the scale between inexpensive and slow maritime transport and costly 
and fast air freight60.	On	almost	all	of	the	routes	discussed	above,	goods	can	
be	transported	from	Asia	to	Europe	by	rail	twice	as	fast	as	maritime	trans-
port	and	twice	as	slow	as	air	transport.	The	time	it	takes	to	transport	goods	
from	one	terminal	to	another	by	air	is	5-9	days,	by	rail	15-19	days	and	by	sea	
37-50	days61.	Similarly,	rail	transport	is	more	expensive	than	maritime	trans-
port	and	cheaper	than	air	transport.	In	the	present	market	situation,	includ-
ing	in	particular	the	exceptionally	low	cost	of	maritime	transport,	rail	freight	
costs	nearly	twice	as	much	as	sea	freight	and	is	many	times	cheaper	than	air	
freight.	When deciding on goods logistics, companies do not merely take 
into account the price and duration of transport. Every time rail trans-
port is chosen, a number of business factors are taken into account: the 
geographical location of the goods, their value, their vulnerability to dam-
age, their size. Other important issues include the safety and promptness 
of delivery and the impact on the environment.
59	 Z.	Farkas,	A.	Pap,	N.,	Reményi,	Hungary’s	place	on	Eurasian	rail	land	bridges	and	the	east-
ern	opening,	Hungarian Geographical Bulletin,	65	(2016)	p.	8.
60	 There	is	another,	less	frequently-used	combined	air-sea	mode	of	transportation.	It	involves	
the	sea	freight	of	goods	from	China	to	Dubai,	followed	by	air	transport	to	Europe.	The	dura-
tion	 of	 transport	 in	 this	 case	 is	 comparable	 to	 rail	 transport,	 however,	 it	 is	much	more	
expensive.
61	 E.	Gerden,	China	may	heavily	subsidise	container	rail	shipments	to	Russia,	https://www.
joc.com/rail-intermodal/international-rail/asia/china-may-heavily-subsidize-container-
rail-shipments-russia_20160129.html	
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Table 3. A comparison of the shipping cost and time for goods transported 
between China and Europe
shanghai-gdynia plane* train ship
price (Us$/container) 37,000 4,500 2,600
duration (days) 5-9 19 37-42
Chengdu-warsaw plane train ship
price (Us$/container) 37,000 5,000 4,500
duration (days) 5-9 15 43-50
shanghai-rotterdam plane train ship
price (Us$/container) 37,000 5,000 2,200
duration (days) 5-9 18 27-37
*The	air	transport	price	is	only	an	estimate.
Source:	Own	calculations	based	on	data	published	on	the	website	https://www.searates.com	on	3	Octo-
ber	2017	
Rail transport is more attractive than maritime transport for places 
located at a greater distance from sea ports.	One	example	of	this	are	rail	con-
nections	from	central	and	western	China	to	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Here	
the	price	is	frequently	similar	to	the	price	of	maritime	transport62.	Transporting	
goods	to	ports	and	collecting	them	from	ports,	frequently	by	road,	is	a	costly	
solution.	Transportation	inside	China	is	quite	costly	due	to	various	bureaucratic	
requirements	regarding	cargo	traffic	between	provinces63.	In	the	case	of	rail	
transport,	usually	there	is	no	need	to	use	long-distance	road	transport	because	
many	cargo	terminals	are	available,	both	in	China	and	in	Europe.	For	the	same	
reason,	rail	transport	is	more	attractive	than	maritime	transport,	when	the	
duration	of	load	consolidation	and	deconsolidation	is	taken	into	account.	Many	
ships	are	able	to	take	more	than	fifty	thousand	containers	onboard	and	load-
62	 At	present,	this	is	mainly	due	to	subsidies	being	offered.	The	cost	of	transporting	one	con-
tainer	from	western	China	to	Europe	is	estimated	at	around	US$	6,000-7,000.
63	 Frequently,	 in	 their	 manufacturing	 plants,	 foreign	 automotive	 companies	 manufacture	
cars	intended	for	a	specific	province.	They	argue	that	it	 is	more	cost-effective	to	produce	
fewer	cars	and	locate	manufacturing	plants	in	the	vicinity	of	the	target	market	than	to	bear	
high	costs	of	goods	logistics.
70
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
ing	and	unloading	them	is	a	logistically	complex	and	time-intensive	task.	This	
is	why	the	duration	of	goods	delivery	in	the	door-to-door	mode	may	be	con-
siderably	different	than	the	time	needed	to	deliver	goods	from	one	terminal	
to	another.	For	rail	transport,	these	differences	are	considerably	smaller.	
In many industries the pace of market changes is so fast that companies 
may be ready to pay more for transporting their products than what they 
pay for maritime transport, just to win some time.	Rail can also be an 
attractive solution for transporting products that have so far been trans-
ported by air – provided that the slightly longer delivery time is accept-
able.	Transport	by	train	is	cost-effective	mainly	in	the	case	of	goods	that	require	
major	capital	investments	as	well	as	goods	with	a	high	profit	margin.	The	higher	
the	value	of	the	transported	goods	per	container,	the	less	important	the	trans-
portation	cost	is	for	the	final	product	price.	According	to	UN	reports,	catego-
ries	of	goods	that	may	be	transported	by	rail	in	a	cost-effective	manner	(taking	
into	account	the	duration	of	transportation	and	high	product	value)	include:	
pharmaceutical	products,	electronic	devices,	IT	products,	fashion	items,	shoes,	
automotive	components,	tyres,	selected	construction	elements,	wood,	chemical	
products,	fertilisers,	household	items,	pipes,	selected	machines	and	some	cat-
egories	of	agricultural	produce64.	In	a	foreseeable	future,	it	will	not	be	cost-effec-
tive	to	transport	goods	by	rail	that	are	rather	inexpensive	and	large-sized,	for	
example:	construction	materials,	petroleum	derivatives	and	liquefied	gas.	Rail	
also	enables	the	introduction	of	innovations	to	improve	the	standard	of	trans-
porting	goods.	One	example	of	this	is	the	introduction	of	containers	in	which	
items	of	clothing	can	be	transported	hanging,	to	preserve	their	shape.	
According to analyses prepared by DHL, at present rail freight is the most 
popular with manufacturers of automotive products and capital-intensive 
goods such as machines. Rail transport is slightly less frequently chosen 
by companies from the high-tech, electronics, computer and FMCG (fast-
moving consumer goods) sectors. Manufacturers of chemical products, 
spare parts, household items and medicines are less inclined to opt for rail 
transport and companies from the fashion and food processing industries 
are only occasionally interested in this mode of transportation. 
64	 Report	 Identification	of	 cargo	flows	on	 the	Euro-Asian	 transport	 links,	 2016,	http://www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2016/sc2/ECE-TRANS-SC2-2016-id02e.pdf,	pp.	62–63.
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Expected savings on capital are an important criterion when choosing rail 
transport for products.	The	maritime	transport	of	high	value	goods	requires	
some	capital	to	be	frozen	for	several	weeks	and	generates	major	costs	for	compa-
nies,	in	particular	those	using	external	funding.	This	factor	is	also	important	for	
capital-rich	companies,	because	when	capital	is	frozen,	they	are	unable	to	use	
it	for	other	purposes.	
Table 4. A comparison of the cost of transporting one container of goods worth 
US$ 1 million by rail and by sea, taking into account the costs of capital freezing
the value of goods in the container Us$ 1,000,000
Mode of transportation from China to europe by rail by sea
Loan interest rate 6% 6%
Duration of transportation (days) 20 50
Carriage price (US$) 5,000 2,000
Cost of capital use 6% (US$) 3,288 8,219
price of carriage and capital use (Us$) 6% 8,288 10,219
Cost of capital use 8% (US$) 4,384 10,591
price of carriage and capital use (Us$) 8% 9,384 12,591
Source:	Own	calculations
Table	4	shows	a	comparison	of	the	cost	of	carriage	of	one	container	by	sea	versus	
by	rail	from	China	to	Europe	taking	account	of	the	cost	of	capital	freezing65.	It	
has	been	assumed	that	the	container	contains	goods	worth	US$	1	million,	which	
suggests	that	these	are	goods	of	medium	to	high	value,	for	example	electronic	
devices.	When	premium	electronic	devices	are	transported,	the	value	of	one	
container	can	be	as	much	as	US$	10	million.	Another	assumption	was	that	the	
annual	cost	of	lending	capital	is	6%,	which	is	a	standard	market	rate,	taking	pre-
sent	interest	rates	into	account.	This	calculation	suggests	that	the	cost	of	lend-
65	 The	importance	of	the	cost	of	capital	in	the	strategies	of	individual	companies	is	confirmed	
by	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	 production	 organisation	 processes	 in	 the	 automo-
tive	sector,	which	involved	the	use	of	the	 ‘just-in-time’	model.	This	model’s	primary	goal	
is	to	limit	the	need	to	store	car	parts	and	for	subassemblies	to	the	necessary	minimum.	This	
is	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	rail	connection	is	popular	with	major	suppliers	to	automotive	
companies.
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ing	capital	to	fund	the	goods	alone	is	US$	3,288	for	one	train	which	travels	for	
20	days,	and	US$	8,219	if	the	goods	are	to	be	transported	by	ship,	which	takes	
50	days.	If	these	costs	are	included	in	the	price	of	the	train	service,	it	turns	
out	that	in	the	case	of	goods	of	medium	to	high	value,	the	saving	made	when	
choosing	rail	transport	from	Europe	to	Asia	is	US$	1,931.	This	suggests	that	rail	
transport	is	cheaper	than	maritime	transport	if	the	container	value	is	at	least	
US$	0.61	million.	The	importance	of	the	argument	regarding	the	cost	of	capi-
tal	will	likely	rise	when	the	global	cycle	of	central	banks	raising	their	respec-
tive	interest	rates	begins.	If	interest	rates	are	raised	by	2	percentage	points	
from	the	present	record	low	to	8%,	the	cost	of	using	capital	for	rail	transport	
of	goods	worth	US$	1	million	will	increase	from	US$	3,288	to	US$	4,384,	and	
the	cost	of	transporting	them	by	sea	will	increase	from	US$	8,219	to	US$	10,959.	
The	transportation	savings	will	increase	by	42%	from	US$	1,931	to	US$	2,740.	
Another manner of using rail transport is to transport goods that require 
fast delivery. These	include	promotional	fashion	items,	as	well	as	products	
delivered	in	connection	with	customer	complaints	or	a	failure.	In	these	situ-
ations,	time	is	of	key	importance,	because	the	company’s	production	or	sales	
plans	must	not	be	disturbed.	 It	sometimes	happens	that	companies	receive	
faulty	subassemblies	from	their	Chinese	subcontractors	and	request	replace-
ments	to	be	dispatched	by	rail	as	quickly	as	possible,	so	that	their	production	
cycle	is	not	interrupted.	In	these	circumstances,	maritime	transport	lasts	too	
long	and	air	transport	is	relatively	expensive.
One	example	of	the	creative	use	of	rail	transport	involves	the	lease	of	specialist	
systems	and	machines.	There	are	situations	in	which	a	company	needs	to	lease	
a	machine	in	Europe	to	carry	out	its	investment	in	China,	for	example	when	
it	intends	to	relocate	its	manufacturing	plant.	In	this	situation,	the	rail	trans-
portation	of	this	machine	can	be	a	suitable	solution	due	to	the	reduced	dura-
tion	of	the	machine’s	transport	to	China	and	back	by	as	much	as	a	month.	This	
generates	tangible	savings	on	the	cost	of	leasing	the	machine.	Similarly, rail 
transport is potentially favourable for large-sized products and goods 
that are vulnerable to damage.	Transporting	large	and	non-standard-sized	
goods	by	ship	is	very	costly	due	to	the	fact	that	these	goods	need	to	be	properly	
positioned	onboard	the	ship.	Frequently,	the	air	transport	of	such	goods	is	not	
possible	at	all.	The	problem	in	particular	affects	the	machine	building	industry	
and	the	factory	equipment	sector,	as	this	equipment	is	sometimes	bigger	than	
the	container	which	is	supposed	to	transport	it.	For	rail	operators,	transport-
ing	such	goods	is	a	much	easier	challenge,	which	is	why	this	type	of	service	
can	be	cheaper	not	only	than	air	transport	but	also	than	sea	transport.	From	
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this	perspective,	rail	transport	may	contribute	to	greater	competition	between	
European	producers	and	their	Chinese	counterparts.	For	example,	Chinese	
companies	operating	in	the	turbine	sector	had	problems	entering	the	European	
market	because	their	products	are	heavy	and	difficult	to	transport.	
Rail	transport	generates	a	smaller	risk	that	the	goods	may	get	damaged,	lost	
and	contaminated	by	sea	water.	Ocean	freight	is	exposed	to	weather-related	
risk	including	the	risk	of	containers	falling	overboard.
Temporary problems on the sea freight market are favourable for the rail 
transport market. In	recent	years,	delivery	by	sea	was	becoming	increasingly	
slower	for	example	due	to	congestion	during	the	loading	and	unloading	of	goods	
in	the	ports,	as	well	as	to	limitations	of	ship	speed	due	to	so-called	‘slow	steaming’	
to	save	fuel66.	The	introduction	of	this	system	has	caused	an	increase	in	the	dura-
tion	of	maritime	transport	of	goods	between	Chinese	and	Western	European	ports	
from	28	days	to	35	days67.	Recently, the viability of maritime freight has been 
additionally challenged by major price fluctuations.	The	collapse	of	Hanjin,	
a	Korean	container	operator,	has	caused	major	shifts	in	market	alliances	formed	
by	the	largest	shipping	companies,	as	well	as	temporary	problems	with	goods	
transportation,	which	turned	out	to	be	favourable	for	rail	transport68.	In	addi-
tion	to	this,	in	recent	years	maritime	transport	has	been	characterised	by	major	
price	fluctuations,	which	prevented	companies	 from	making	 long-term	plans	
regarding	the	cost	of	freight.	The	difference	in	the	maritime	transportation	price	
due	to	price	fluctuations	can	be	up	to	US$	1,000	per	container	over	a	year,	which	
means	that	the	rate	charged	for	transporting	one	container	may	even	double	over	
the	course	of	a	year.	There	are	numerous	indications	that	recent	shifts	in	mari-
time	transport	alliances	are	not	the	final	stage	of	this	sector’s	restructuring.	This	
is	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	the	sector’s	problems	with	maintain-
ing	profitability	even	in	a	favourable	market	situation	when	oil	prices	are	low69.	
However, there are several structural factors that, at least in the 
medium-term perspective, speak in favour of the better cost-effectiveness 
66	 M.	Bolle,	A.	Kortsarl,	Europe	–	Asia	Railway	Transport:	Issues	&	Prospects,	p.	11.
67	 Report	Identification	of	cargo	flows	on	the	Euro-Asian	transport	links,	2016,	http://www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2016/sc2/ECE-TRANS-SC2-2016-id02e.pdf,	p.	47.
68	 I.	Putzger,	On	the	rails:	Growth	in	Asia’s	slower	lane,	9.02.2017,	http://aircargoworld.com/
allposts/on-the-rails-growth-in-asias-slower-lane/
69	 China's	dominance	in	intra-Asia	trade	troubles	carriers,	1	June	2017,	https://www.joc.com/
maritime-news/trade-lanes/intra-asia/chinas-dominance-intra-asia-trade-troubles-car-
riers_20170101.html
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of maritime transport compared with rail transport.	These	include	the	
economies	of	scale	due	to	the	large	volumes	of	the	transported	goods,	the	flex-
ibility	of	the	price	list	policy,	the	use	of	the	slow	steaming	sailing	mode	and	the	
existence	of	ship-owner	alliances70.	The	global	economic	crisis	has	slowed	down	
the	pace	of	development	of	global	trade	and	resulted	in	a	reduced	pace	of	the	
increase	in	demand	for	new	transportation	opportunities.	It	has	also	strongly	
contributed	to	the	unblocking	of	Chinese	ports	which	had	had	increasing	prob-
lems	with	the	efficient	trans-shipment	of	goods.	A	weaker	demand	for	transpor-
tation	has	caused	a	crisis	in	the	maritime	transport	sector,	as	a	result	of	which	
some	shipping	companies	became	insolvent.	It	also	created	a	certain	pressure	
to	reduce	the	price	of	transporting	goods	by	sea.	Moreover,	any	rail	connection	
needs	to	develop	on	an	ongoing	basis	to	meet	the	basic	market	requirements	
such	as:	the	regularity	of	the	train	service,	promptness	of	delivery,	the	flex-
ibility	of	carriage	price	lists	depending	on	the	current	market	situation,	and	the	
availability	of	added	value	services	combined	with	the	transportation	services71.	
It is not known for how long cargo rail transport will continue to be subsi-
dised by the Chinese government. This generates a certain level of political 
risk and may discourage some potential investors from investing major 
funds in logistics infrastructure.	On	the	one	hand,	in	its	various	documents	
the	government	in	Beijing	has	announced	that	within	a	couple	of	years	it	would	
like	to	launch	the	process	of	limiting	the	scope	of	subsidies.	Attempts	of	this	type	
have	already	been	made,	but	they	met	with	strong	resistance	on	the	part	of	the	
provinces.	According	to	some	of	our	interviewees,	the	ultimate	goal	of	the	Chi-
nese	leadership	is	to	gradually	reduce	the	tariffs	by	20%	annually	over	a	period	
of	several	years.	However,	it	seems	that	the	present	scale	of	China’s	political	
involvement	in	the	rail	connection	initiative	will	guarantee	a	stable	level	of	the	
subsidies	offered	to	rail	transport	for	at	least	the	next	several	years.
Rail has not yet reached its optimum potential as regards the duration 
of transport between Asia and Europe.	According	to	the	World	Bank,	the	trans-
Siberian	routes	still	have	major	potential	for	making	improvements	that	could	
reduce	the	duration	of	train	travel.	These	improvements	include	the	creation	
of	alliances	of	international	forwarding	companies	to	coordinate	the	transport	
of	goods	between	China	and	Europe,	performing	the	loading	of	goods	in	a	smaller	
number	of	bigger	terminals,	and	the	introduction	of	non-stop	goods	tracking	
70	 Identification	of	cargo	flows	on	the	Euro-Asian	 transport	 links,	Eurasian	Rail	Transport	
Conference,	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Europe,	p.	10.
71	 Ibid.
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systems	and	information	exchange,	which	in	turn	could	facilitate	customs	con-
trols72.	Efficient	cooperation	between	the	states	through	which	a	specific	train	
travels	remains	an	issue	of	key	importance	for	the	development	of	the	connec-
tions.	The	introduction	of	common	procedure	standards	may	not	only	reduce	the	
bureaucratic	costs,	but	also	increase	the	predictability	of	delivery.	In	all	the	states	
located	along	a	specific	route,	rail	carriers	are	at	pains	to	give	priority	to	trains	
travelling	from	China	to	Europe	and	vice versa.	Frequently,	this	happens	on	border	
crossings	as	well.	Attempts	are	being	made	to	introduce	common	customs	clear-
ance	and	carriage	procedures.	Within	a	couple	of	years	this	may	lead	to	the	adop-
tion	of	improved	procedures	to	increase	the	predictability	of	the	delivery	of	goods	
dispatched	by	rail73.	However,	in	this	case	success	depends	on	how	advanced	the	
political	cooperation	between	specific	actors	along	the	Route	will	be.	
The advantage of air and sea transport over rail transport is that, in the 
case of the former two options, the goods do not need to undergo customs 
checks other than at their entry and exit points. This means that the deliv-
ery of goods dispatched by air and by sea is usually more prompt. Trains	
reach	their	terminus	1-2	days	before	or	after	their	expected	arrival	time,	whereas	
for	ships	and	planes	the	time	window	is	several	hours.	A	train	needs	to	undergo	
several	customs	checks	which	not	only	prolong	the	duration	of	transportation	
but	also	generate	the	risk	that	delivery	may	be	delayed	or	goods	may	be	returned	
to	their	sender	should	the	waybills	be	wrongly	filled	in.	From	the	perspective	
of	logistics	terminals,	the	promptness	of	goods	delivery	is	extremely	impor-
tant	because	they	usually	prepare	precise	hourly	schedules	for	their	logistics	
operations.	This is why the problem involving the predictability of delivery 
is one potential barrier to the development of rail connections between 
Asia and Europe.	At	present,	what	matters	more	for	the	customers	is	a	guar-
anteed	delivery	time	rather	than	a	reduction	in	the	duration	of	transportation	
by	several	days.	From	the	perspective	of	multinational	companies,	this	alone	
can	make	rail	freight	a	reliable	means	of	transportation.	However,	transporting	
goods	by	rail	is	favourable	also	due	to	the	greater	flexibility	of	customs	proce-
dures.	Especially	in	China,	goods	dispatched	by	sea	undergo	customs	clearance	
in	their	exit	ports,	whereas	when	they	are	transported	by	rail,	these	procedures	
72	 C.	Rastogi,	 J.	Arvis,	The	Eurasian	Connection	Supply-Chain	Efficiency	along	 the	Modern	
Silk	Route	through	Central	Asia,	World	Bank,	Washington	2014,	p.	7.
73	 One	of	the	problems	is	the	fact	that	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	train’s	journey	time	and	
the	exact	time	of	its	arrival	in	the	end	terminal,	especially	since	the	states	of	Central	Asia	
are	characterised	by	their	 low	level	of	supply	chain	reliability	when	it	comes	to	delivery	
promptness.	See.	C.	Rastogi,	J.	F.	Arvis,	The	Eurasian	Connection	Supply-Chain	Efficiency	
along	the	Modern	Silk	Route	through	Central	Asia,	World	Bank,	Washington	2014,	p.	63.
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can	take	place	on	the	premises	of	manufacturing	plants	that	have	their	own	
rail	terminals.	
Rail transport may prove more attractive due to its lower impact on the 
environment.	The	train	service	organised	by	Fujitsu	and	Siemens,	connecting	
China	and	Germany,	is	advertised	as	the	Green	IT	train	because	it	generates	
95%	lower	emissions	of	CO2,	non-methane	hydrocarbons	and	nitrogen	oxides	
than	the	previously-used	air	transport.	Global	trends	such	as	the	increasingly	
stricter	environmental	requirements,	combined	with	a	greater	environmen-
tal	awareness	on	the	part	of	customers,	may	cause	a	shift	from	air	transport	
to	rail	transport,	even	if	the	latter	offers	a	slightly	longer	delivery	time74.	This	
may	be	particularly	important	for	the	luxury	goods	sector	which	is	used	to	dis-
patching	most	of	its	goods	by	air75.	Rail	is	more	favourable	from	the	environ-
mental	point	of	view,	especially	when	compared	with	air	transport76.	It	should	
be	emphasised	that	at	present	container	ships	are	fuelled	by	so-called	heavy	oil	
which	is	the	cheapest	fuel	available	on	the	market.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	
the	environmental	factor	will	be	decisive	in	raising	the	price	of	the	maritime	
transport	of	goods	in	the	future.
2. transport of goods by rail – an added value for eU member states
Most experts assume that rail transport can only cover several per cent 
of the volume of goods transported from China and the EU and vice versa. 
However, the share of rail transport in the value of EU-China trade 
is likely to be much higher.	At	present,	it	is	unlikely	that	one	particular	cat-
egory	of	popular	consumer	goods	will	emerge	that	could	be	transported	from	
China	to	Europe	and	back	by	rail.	It	is	worth	noting	that	rail	transport	is	partic-
ularly	favourable	for	high	value	and	capital-intensive	goods.	As	far	as	the	value	
of	goods	is	concerned,	air	transport	should	be	the	reference	point,	accounting	
74	 Engineering	&	Manufacturing	2025+	Building	The	World	–	A	DHL	Perspective	On	Future	
Engineering	&	Manufacturing	Supply	Chains,	2015,	http://www.dhl.com/content/dam/
downloads/g0/logistics/white_papers/DHL_EandM_2015%2B_Building_The_World.
pdf,	p.	25.
75	 E.	 Jiang,	What	China's	$1	Trillion	New	Silk	Road	Spells	for	Fashion,	23	June	2017,	https://
www.businessoffashion.com/articles/global-currents/one-belt-one-road-optimistic-fan-
tasy-or-chinas-biggest-fashion-opportunity-yet
76	 According	 to	 estimates	 by	 DHL,	 on	 the	 route	 from	 Shanghai	 to	 Vienna	 rail	 transport	
emits	twice	as	much	carbon	dioxide	as	ships,	but	it	emits	much	less	of	other	harmful	pol-
lutants:	40%	less	non-methane	hydrocarbons,10%	less	sulphur	oxide	and	three	times	less	
nitrogen	oxides.	See	https://www.joc.com/sites/default/files/u48783/pdf/tpm_asia_2012/
Ambrose_Linn.pdf
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for	a	mere	1%	of	the	weight	of	transported	goods	globally	and	for	35%	of	the	value	
of	global	trade77.	The	value	of	goods	transported	by	rail	between	China	and	the	
EU	in	2016	is	estimated	at	around	US$	22.9	billion,	or	around	4%	of	the	total	
value	of	EU-China	trade.	Therefore,	it	may	be	cautiously	assumed	that	in	the	
upcoming	years	the	proportion	may	rise	to	as	much	as	20%.	This	means	that	the	
share	of	the	goods	transported	by	rail	in	the	total	volume	of	EU-China	trade	will	
be	bigger	in	terms	of	the	value	of	the	goods	than	in	terms	of	their	weight.	This	
has	major	consequences	for	the	distribution	of	carriage-related	added	value.	
From	the	perspective	of	EU	member	states,	the	local	added	value	generated	
by	the	China-EU	rail	connections	is	evident	in	three	revenue	categories:	tran-
sit	fees	for	the	transportation	sector,	income	earned	by	logistics	companies,	
and	other	budget	revenues	earned	by	those	states	in	which	the	customs	clear-
ance	of	goods	imported	from	China	is	carried	out.	An	increase	in	the	number	
of	transported	containers	will	mainly	translate	into	higher	profits	for	the	trans-
port	and	logistics	sectors.	On	the	other	hand,	an	increase	in	the	value	of	the	
goods	mainly	affects	the	amount	of	import	tariffs	collected	which	in	Europe	are	
collected	in	the	state	in	which	the	cargo	is	ultimately	unloaded. 
Table 5. The value chain related to the performance of a rail carriage
organisation 
of carriage load preparation
transporta-
tion 
Unloading and 
further transport 
Booking of rail 
infrastructure
Contracting carrier 
services
Completing the 
order
Renting a container
 Organisation of 
transport to the 
terminal
Load consolidation
Loading the 
containers onto a 
train
Preparing 
documents 
Paying export 
tariffs 
Insuring the cargo
Transit fees
Locomotive fees
Cargo 
monitoring 
service
Customs 
clearance in 
transit states
Unloading
Goods warehousing
Customs service 
Organisation of further 
transport if needed
Warehousing empty 
containers
Repacking of goods for 
retail customers
Connecting 
subassemblies to evade 
tariffs
Source:	The	authors’	own	compilation	based	on	industry-specific	data
77	 Trends	in	the	air-freight	business,	14	April	2017,	https://www.economist.com/news/busi-
ness-and-finance/21720901-fewer-electronics-are-being-flown-instead-planes-are-full-
fresh-produce-trends
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The	performance	of	the	rail	transportation	of	goods	from	China	to	Europe	can	
be	divided	into	four	stages.	
•	 Stage one focuses on the organisation of the rail connection. It	involves	
a	 coordination	 of	 the	 timetables	 of	 several	 carriers	 operating	 along	 the	
route	so	that	they	are	able	to	provide	a	locomotive	at	a	given	time,	at	a	spe-
cific	border	crossing,	of	the	given	state,	and	to	make	infrastructure	avail-
able	(including	tracks	and	trans-shipment	terminals). This	is	done	by	an	
intermodal	operator. A	major	portion	of	the	intermodal	transport	market	
is	dominated	by	Chinese	companies	in	which	the	Chinese	provinces	have	
a	stake.
•	 Stage two includes the handling and completing of load.	If	the	volume	
of	goods	ordered	by	end-customer	is	too	small	to	meet	the	capacity	of	the	
entire	train,	it	is	the	task	of	the	intermodal	operator	to	collect	a	sufficient	
volume	of	goods	and	make	sure	that	dispatching	a	specific	cargo	train	is	
cost-effective78.	Frequently,	the	job	of	meeting	the	trains’	capacity	belongs	
to	forwarding	companies	that	cooperate	with	the	operator	and	are	able	to	
reach	the	end	customer.	At	present,	a	major	portion	of	this	market	is	con-
trolled	by	multinational	companies	such	as	DB	Schenker	and	DHL	that	are	
subject	to	increasing	pressure	from	their	Chinese	competitors.	Intermod-
al	operators	from	China	are	trying	to	seize	control	of	this	element	of	the	
supply	chain	by	offering	 forwarding	services	directly	 to	 the	biggest	cus-
tomers.	Numerous	Polish	companies	are	involved	in	freight	forwarding	as	
well.	Forwarders’	tasks	include	the	transportation	of	goods	to	the	terminal,	
and	preparation	of	the	necessary	documents	and	insurance	policies.	When	
hired	by	big	 clients,	 intermodal	 operators	 try	 to	work	directly	with	 end	
customers	(bypassing	the	forwarding	company).
•	 Another stage involves logistics and transportation activities car-
ried out after the train leaves the terminal.	At	this	stage,	the	main	task	
involves	making	sure	that	the	goods	are	transported	in	proper	conditions	
and	monitoring	the	train’s	smooth	and	uninterrupted	travel	along	the	en-
tire	route	operated	by	specific	carriers.	The	carrier	acts	as	a	subcontractor	
to	the	intermodal	operator	–	carriage	is	performed	by	local	rail	companies	
78	 As	the	regularity	of	the	train	service	increases,	these	problems	disappear	since	permanent	
timetables	are	introduced	and	clients	are	increasingly	aware	that	the	rail	transportation	
of	goods	is	one	of	the	options	they	can	choose	from,	which	in	turn	helps	meet	the	trains’	
capacity.
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whose	task	it	is	to	provide	a	locomotive	that	is	suitable	for	local	technical	
standards.	In	addition,	other	services	are	available	along	the	route,	includ-
ing:	cargo	monitoring	(for	example	to	make	sure	that	the	wagon	doors	are	
locked),	checking	the	conditions	in	which	cargo	is	being	transported	(hu-
midity,	tremor/vibrations,	temperature),	as	well	as	making	sure	that	the	
train	is	travelling	according	to	schedule	(GPS	tracking).	
•	 ·The final stage involves unloading the cargo, customs clearance and 
transport on from the terminal.	Numerous	 terminals	 also	 offer	 cargo	
warehousing	services	and	the	further	intermodal	transport	of	the	goods.	
Onward	 transport	 is	usually	organised	by	a	 forwarding	company.	A	 for-
warding	company	is	able	to	organise	transport	from	anywhere	in	the	world	
and	there	is	no	need	for	 its	employees	to	be	actually	present	in	the	place	
where	 the	goods	are	dispatched,	although	this	may	facilitate	 the	process	
of	transport	organisation.	The	goods	can	undergo	customs	clearance	in	the	
terminal	which	 the	 train	 from	China	 arrives	 at,	 or	during	 a	 subsequent	
stage	of	 transportation.	There	 is	a	disproportion	 in	 the	volumes	of	goods	
transported	from	China	to	Europe	and	vice versa,	which	creates	the	need	to	
manage	empty	containers.	Contrary	to	statements	by	the	Chinese	side,	so	
far	no	balancing	of	the	volume	of	goods	sent	from	China	to	Europe	and	vice 
versa	has	been	recorded.	Rail	connection	operators	sometimes	fail	to	collect	
their	empty	containers	for	as	long	as	fifteen	months,	which	may	limit	the	
level	of	the	utilisation	of	space	available	at	the	terminal	regardless	of	the	
revenue	earned	on	the	fees	paid	for	storing	these	containers79.	
79	 Interviews	with	trans-shipment	terminal	operators,	March-September	2017.
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Table 6. A division of revenues from transporting a container from one termi-
nal to another 
forwarding 
company Intermodal operator Carrier
Infrastructure 
provider
Around 5% of the 
price of transport-
ing a container 
(terminal–to-terminal)
Around 5% of the price of 
transporting a container 
(terminal–to-terminal)*
Jointly around 90% of the price 
of transporting a container 
(terminal–to-terminal
Contacts the client
Acts as intermediary in 
selling train capacity
In addition:
Offers services to the 
client before the goods 
are loaded onto a train
May offer cargo 
monitoring services 
during the train’s travel
Provides services after 
the goods reach the 
terminal
Organises the rail 
connection
Negotiates with 
carriers and 
infrastructure 
providers
Usually, contracts are 
signed for a term of at 
least several months, 
so the operator takes 
the risk that specific 
connections will not 
be realised regardless 
of the agreements 
made with the carriers 
and infrastructure 
providers 
Provides 
a locomotive 
on the route 
section that 
runs through 
a specific state 
and performs 
the carriage of 
goods
Makes 
infrastructure 
available for the 
contracted train
*	When	carriage	is	subsidised,	most	frequently	by	the	intermodal	operator,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	
exact	amount	of	profit	earned	from	transporting	the	containers,	most	of	the	time	this	activity	brings	losses.
The	official	price	cited	for	transporting	goods	between	the	EU	and	China	by	rail,	
i.e.	US$	3,000-7,000	per	one	FEU	container,	covers	the	cost	of	transportation	
service	performed	between	terminals	in	China	and	the	EU.	The	revenues	from	
this	activity	are	split	 into	forwarding	companies	that	act	as	intermediaries	
in	selling	the	carriage	capacity,	rail	operators,	as	well	as	rail	carriers	and	infra-
structure	providers	(see	Table	6).	
As	far	as	the	fees	for	the	transit	of	containers	are	concerned,	estimates	sug-
gest	that	90%	of	the	train’s	price,	i.e.	around	US$	300	million,	goes	directly	
to	rail	companies	that	transport	the	goods	and	to	the	operators	that	collect	the	
fee	for	making	infrastructure	available80.	In	2016,	Poland,	which	is	assumed	
80	 The	basis	for	this	calculation	is	the	price	offered	on	the	market	for	one	container	(US$	5,000),	
but	the	actual	cost	of	transportation	(excluding	the	subsidy)	is	likely	higher.	
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to	collect	a	fee	that	is	proportional	to	the	distance	covered	by	the	train,	earned	
around	US$	13	million	from	this	amount	and	will	earn	US$	40	million	in	202081.	
It	should	be	noted	that	these	figures	include	the	fees	for	the	trans-shipment	
of	goods	at	border	crossings	and	in	the	end	terminal.	
Carriage	organisation	and	agency	services	connected	with	selling	train	capac-
ity	account	for	up	to	10%	of	the	container	transport	price.	A	portion	of	this	
amount	 is	earned	by	Chinese	companies	 that	organise	 the	connections.	 It	
is	estimated	that	in	2016	1,702	trains	were	launched.	They	each	transported	
41	containers	during	one	trip.	Based	on	these	data,	it	may	be	assumed	that	
European	intermediaries	(forwarding	companies)	can	earn	US$	17	million	
annually	(assuming	that	the	forwarding	company	receives	a	margin	of	5%	
of	the	order	price	being	US$	5,000	per82).	This	figure	will	rise	to	US$	50	mil-
lion	if	the	forecasts	suggesting	that	as	many	as	5,000	trains	will	be	opera-
tional	in	2020	turn	out	to	be	correct.	Compared	with	2016,	in	2017	the	market	
is	expected	to	grow	by	80%	and	in	2018	–	by	250%,	unless	the	problems	regard-
ing	the	capacity	of	the	terminal	in	Małaszewicze	cause	a	reduction	in	the	pace	
of	development	of	the	rail	connection.	
Forwarding companies will generate the biggest revenues on services 
connected with cargo pre-carriage and post-carriage.	Therefore,	the	US$	
17	million	mentioned	needs	to	be	increased	by	the	cost	of	additional	services	
that	the	forwarding	company	may	provide	before	the	train	departs	from	the	
terminal	or	after	it	arrives	in	its	destination	terminal.	Provision of these ser-
vices considerably increases the added value that specific EU economies 
receive in relation with the rail connection.
81	 Chinese	 statistics	 show	 that	 27%	 of	 the	 trains	 departing	 from	 China	 have	 their	 termi-
nus	 in	Łódź,	and	 the	remaining	portion	arrives	 in	Germany.	This	means	 that	453	 trains	
travel	 on	 the	Małaszewicze-Łódź	 route,	 and	 the	 remaining	 1,249	 cross	Poland.	 It	 should	
be	expected	that	 in	practice	this	amount	 is	higher	by	at	 least	several	dozen	per	cent	due	
to	the	fact	that	the	rates	for	providing	the	wagons	and	using	the	infrastructure	are	usually	
higher	in	the	EU	than	in	Russia	and	Kazakhstan.	
82	 No	official	statistics	are	available	regarding	the	train	capacity	utilisation	ratio	for	trains	
travelling	from	China	to	Europe	and	vice versa.	According	to	the	Polish	Foreign	Ministry,	
the	average	figure	for	China-bound	trains	is	50%.	Information	obtained	during	interviews	
with	 representatives	 of	 forwarding	 companies	 suggests	 that	 the	 figure	 for	 trains	 trav-
elling	 from	China	 to	Europe	 is	much	higher.	 (Chengdu:	Rail	 link	with	Lodz	a	chance	 for	
food	 industry,	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 of	 Poland,	 http://www.szanghaj.msz.gov.pl/
en/news/chengdu__rail_link_with_lodz_a_chance_for_food_industry)	Representatives	
of	 forward	ing	 companies	 claim	 that	 the	 ratio	 is	 considerably	 higher	 for	 Europe-bound	
trains	than	for	trains	travelling	in	the	opposite	direction.	Our	assumptions	are	convergent	
with	the	forecasts	by	experts	from	the	rail	and	logistics	sectors.
82
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
Table 7. Examples of rates83 for transporting one container from a terminal in 
Warsaw to selected locations (in US$)
Intermodal lorry terminal fees
prague 2,400
30*budapest 3,000
Munich 2,600
stockholm 2,200 90**
Source:	Calculations	based	on	data	published	on	www.searates.com84
*The	estimated	fees	have	been	calculated	on	the	basis	of	price	lists	for	goods	trans-shipment	offered	by	
intermodal	terminals	available	at	http://clip-group.com/cennik/	and	http://www.pccintermodal.pl/wp-
-content/uploads/2016/04/Taryfa_obsluga-pociagow_PL_final.pdf
**Higher	terminal	trans-shipment	rates	for	goods	travelling	to	Stockholm	are	related	to	the	need	for	
them	to	be	trans-shipped	in	a	land	terminal	in	Warsaw,	and	then	again	in	a	sea	terminal	in	Gdańsk.
Table	7	shows	an	example	of	the	cost	of	carriage	from	the	terminal	in	Warsaw	
to	selected	cities	that	are	the	recipients	of	goods	transported	from	China	by	rail.	
Forwarding	companies	can	earn	around	US$	250	on	transporting	one	container	
from	a	terminal	in	China	to	a	terminal	in	Europe,	but	further	handling	of	the	
container	can	bring	much	higher	revenues.	If	the	goods	are	being	transported	
to	a	more	distant	location,	the	forwarding	company	can	hope	to	make	additional	
revenue	of	around	US$	2,600.	This	amount	should	be	increased	by	extra	profit	
from	rendering	unloading	services	at	the	terminal,	which	can	be	estimated	
at	a	minimum	of	US$	30	per	container.	A	cautious	assumption	can	be	made	that	
the	cost	of	services	rendered	after	the	goods	are	transported	to	the	terminal	
in	Poland	or	from	the	terminal	to	end-customer	may	be	US$	1,000	per	container.	
Assuming	that	all	trains	incoming	from	China	would	have	their	terminus	in	one	
specific	state	and	that	the	former	assumptions	are	correct,	additional	revenues	
from	these	services	would	be	US$	48	million	in	2016	and	US$	164	million	in	2020.	
83	 We	consulted	the	rates	with	experts	from	logistics	companies.	The	price	is	for	a	full	truck	
load	option	due	to	the	fact	that	one	lorry	can	transport	one	container.	Despite	the	fact	that	
usually	the	volume	of	a	container	is	smaller	than	the	volume	of	a	semi-trailer,	it	is	not	pos-
sible	to	load	more	cargo	on	the	semi-trailer.	The	transportation	price	has	been	calculated	for	
both	directions,	because	most	of	the	time	the	container	needs	to	be	returned	to	the	terminal	
from	which	it	departed,	as	it	is	does	not	belong	to	the	client.
84	 The	www.searates.com	website	shows	estimates	only.	They	illustrate	the	likely	proportion	
of	revenue	from	handling	transport	incoming	from	China	to	revenue	from	further	logistics	
of	goods.
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This	amount	should	be	increased	by	revenues	from	a	number	of	extra	services	
such	as	warehousing	and	packaging,	which	further	increase	the	added	value	
from	logistics	services	provided	to	the	EU-China	rail	connections.
Companies	from	Central	Europe	have	an	opportunity	to	compete	for	a	portion	
of	the	forwarding	services	market,	even	though	a	major	portion	of	these	services	
is	provided	by	global	companies	such	as	DB	Schenker	and	DHL.	Transportation	
services	between	the	terminal	and	end-customer	may	be	rendered	by	European	
forwarding	companies	not	only	in	Europe	but	also	in	China.	The	forwarding	com-
pany’s	brand	and	the	fact	that	it	has	offices	abroad	may	be	important	criteria	which	
the	customer	considers	when	choosing	their	forwarding	contractor.	This	is	par-
ticularly	true	for	global	companies.	As	a	consequence,	companies	from	Central	
Europe	may	be	in	a	less	favourable	situation	than	the	largest	global	forwarders.	
However,	the	competitive	advantage	of	smaller	companies	lies	in	their	flexibility,	
which	makes	them	tough	competitors	in	the	rivalry	for	the	e-commerce	market.	
Table 8. Tariffs imposed by the EU on major categories of goods transported 
from China by rail
type of goods textiles Machines vehicles other industrial products
tariff 6.6% 2.4% 4.1% 2.4%
Source:	http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=E28
From the point of view of direct budget revenue, revenue from tariffs may 
be the most profitable aspect of each rail connection.	It	should	be	emphasised	
that	it	is	important	to	see	the	difference	between	the	value	of	transported	goods	
and	their	volume	when	calculating	 the	financial	gains	 that	 the	rail	 transport	
of	goods	can	bring	to	transit	states.	Some	transport-related	services	such	as	tran-
sit	fees	depend	on	the	volume	of	goods,	while	other	services	are	determined	by	the	
value	of	goods,	for	example	certain	aspects	of	customs	clearance	and	insurance.	
In	the	EU,	the	states	are	allowed	to	transfer	25%	of	tariff	revenues	to	their	budg-
ets	to	cover	the	cost	of	tariff	collection85.	Tariff	revenues	are	an	important	source	
of	income	for	EU	member	states,	with	major	differences	between	individual	states86	
85	 Wieloletnie	Ramy	 Finansowe	 –	 słowniczek	 pojęć,	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	Affairs	 of	 Poland,	
http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/5baca434-1692-4cdd-8af0-62d281e53692:JCR
86	 According	to	Eurostat,	the	countries	with	the	biggest	incomes	from	tariffs	as	a	proportion	
of	GDP	include:	Belgium	(0.6%	GDP),	the	Czech	Republic	(1.7%	GDP),	Germany	(0.8%	GDP),	
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According	to	estimates	based	on	Chinese	statistics,	operators	from	Chinese	
provinces	involved	in	rail	transport	to	Europe	have	so	far	transported	goods	
worth	about	US$	22.9	billion87.	Around	90%	of	these	goods,	i.e.	products	worth	
US$	20.5	billion	were	sent	 to	Europe.	Although	the	average	tariff	for	goods	
imported	to	the	EU	is	around	2%,	the	categories	of	goods	transported	by	rail	
are	usually	subject	to	a	higher	tariff.	Assuming	that	the	average	tariff	is	4%,	
tariff	revenues	may	amount	to	US$	800	million	and	the	states	that	collect	the	
tariff	are	entitled	to	transfer	a	quarter	of	this	sum,	i.e.	US$	200	million,	to	their	
budgets.	By	2020,	the	amount	of	tariff	revenue	may	increase	to	US$	834	million	
(with	an	estimated	overall	trade	value	of	US$	76.5	billion).	
However,	it	should	be	noted	that	there	are	major	disproportions	as	regards	the	
value	of	goods	transported	by	rail	between	China	and	Europe.	Goods	of	the	
highest	value,	such	as	electronic	devices	and	automotive	parts,	are	transported	
from	one	manufacturing	plant	to	another.	According	to	estimates	by	Chinese	
customs	offices,	in	2016	453	trains	that	travelled	on	the	Chengdu-Łódź	route	
transported	goods	worth	US$	1.5	billion,	whereas	413	trains	that	travelled	
between	Chongqing	and	Duisburg	transported	goods	worth	US$	17	billion88.	
This	means	that	from	the	perspective	of	Central	Europe,	countries	that	wish	
to	generate	higher	tariff	revenues	should	try	to	encourage	investors	to	build	
manufacturing	plants	that	use	the	China-Europe	rail	connections.	This	would	
enable	Central	Europe	to	take	over	some	of	the	revenues	from	tariffs	collected	
in	Western	European	ports	or	to	provide	logistics	handling	of	the	biggest	pos-
sible	portion	of	the	market	of	transporting	goods	to	manufacturing	plants	
in	Germany.	
The efficiency of customs procedures is of key importance for tariff rev-
enues. In the EU, a tariff may be calculated at the location where the 
goods are unloaded or in the destination state.	Therefore,	some	clients	
may	be	interested	in	performing	the	customs	clearance	of	goods	intended	for	
the	Polish	market	in	Germany,	similarly	to	the	procedure	applied	for	goods	
transported	by	sea.	This	decision	may	be	the	result	of	the	greater	digitisation	
Ireland	(1.5%	GDP),	Luxembourg	(2.6%	GDP),	the	Netherlands	(1.6%	GDP),	and	also	Poland	
and	Portugal	 (0.6%	GDP	each).	These	 are	mainly	 smaller	 states	 that	 operate	major	ports	
or	are	EU	border	states.	The	states	with	the	smallest	share	of	tariff	revenues	in	their	GDP	
include:	Austria,	France,	Croatia	and	Italy	(where	tariff	revenues	account	for	0.1%	of	GDP	
in	each	of	these	states).
87	 2017年中欧班列步入发展“快车道”成都重庆计划“运力翻倍”(CR	 Express	 expected	 to	 enter	
the	‘fastlane’:	Chengdu	and	Chongqing	plan	to	double	their	capacity),	op. cit.
88	 Ibid.
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of	 German	 customs	 offices	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 postpone	 the	 payment	
of	import	VAT.	The	limited	capacity	of	the	trans-shipment	in	Małaszewicze,	
which	reduces	the	efficiency	of	customs	procedures,	is	an	extremely	signifi-
cant	barrier	to	the	development	of	rail	connections	and	to	the	increase	in	tariff	
revenues.	
Table 9. Potential economic benefits from the China-Europe rail connection 
(in US$ millions)
type of benefit 2016 2020*
direct forwarding service (acting as intermediary) 17 50
additional forwarding services 48 164
service involving carriage and making infrastructure available 13 40
tariff revenues 200 834
total added value 278 1088
*This	takes	into	account	the	assumption	made	by	the	government	in	Beijing	that	in	2020,	5,000	trains	
will	be	travelling	between	China	and	Europe,	which	is	consistent	with	the	estimates	by	experts	repre-
senting	container	terminals	in	Małaszewicze.	It	is	assumed	that	the	train	capacity	utilisation	ratio	will	
increase	from	70%	to	80%.	For	customs	revenues	this	will	mean	that	the	value	of	goods	transported	on	
one	train	will	increase	from	US$	13.4	million	to	US$	15.3	million.	The	amount	of	US$	13.4	million	has	been	
calculated	by	dividing	the	total	value	of	transported	goods	(US$	22.9	billion)	by	the	number	of	trains	
transporting	goods	between	China	and	the	EU	in	2016	(1,702).
Summing	up	the	points	discussed	above,	it	may	be	stated	that	in	2016	the	added	
value	for	EU	member	states	generated	by	the	rail	connections	was	around	US$	
278	million,	which	may	seem	not	much.	However,	it	should	be	taken	into	account	
that	over	the	next	couple	of	years	a	high	trade	dynamic	should	be	expected.	
As	a	consequence,	the	added	value	generated	by	the	rail	connections	will	rise	
to	about	US$	1.1	billion.	It	should	be	noted	that	this	calculation	omits	the	esti-
mates	regarding	the	market	share	of	individuals	states,	although	it	is	evident	
that	a	major	portion	of	this	revenue	will	be	earned	by	those	states	in	which	the	
trains	have	their	terminus. 
3. location of logistics centres and distribution of added value 
within the eU
The distribution of benefits generated by China-EU rail transport depends 
on the role of a specific state in the entire value chain. Transit	states	can	
mainly	expect	to	generate	revenue	from	business	activities	of	rail	carriers,	
86
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
as	well	as	revenue	from	fees	for	using	local	infrastructure.	The economic ben-
efits are bigger in those states that host logistics centres in which the EU-
China trains arrive and from which they depart.	Local	companies	can	make	
a	profit	from	providing	agency	services	in	selling	carriage	capacity	and	the	
further	logistics	handling	of	goods.	In	addition,	a	logistics	centre	can	arrange	
customs	clearance	procedures	for	goods	imported	to	the	EU,	which	means	that	
a	quarter	of	the	tariff	revenues	will	be	transferred	to	the	budget	of	the	state	
that	hosts	the	centre.	This	is	why	EU	member	states	located	along	the	train’s	
route	compete	for	participation	in	the	development	of	logistics	centres	intended	
to	support	China-EU	rail	connections.	
The present Chinese logic of developing the China-EU rail transport mar-
ket suggests that several principal logistics centres to handle the carriages 
are likely to be built in the EU. The	process	of	optimising	the	connections	
on	the	Chinese	side,	which	Beijing	is	currently	implementing,	will	likely	soon	
include	the	activity	of	Chinese	intermodal	operators	in	Europe.	The	connec-
tions	will	concentrate	in	industrial	areas	that	have	major	potential	for	gener-
ating	rail	trade	flows	(the	model	of	‘creating	direct	train	connections	between	
manufacturing	plants’).	Locations	with	a	major	logistics	potential	will	also	gain	
importance.	Their	task	is	to	consolidate	European	goods	dispatched	to	China	
and	further	distribute	goods	imported	to	Europe.	This	is	intended	to	help	boost	
carriage	effectiveness,	including	by	increasing	the	train	capacity	utilisation	
ratio,	which	is	Beijing’s	primary	goal.
So	far,	the	China-EU	carriages	have	been	handled	via	the	existing	European	
inland	terminals.	An	increase	in	the	number	of	carriages	may	trigger	the	need	
to	build	new	terminals	and	logistics	centres,	including	in	cooperation	with	Chi-
nese	companies,	using	Chinese	capital.	This	possible	cooperation	was	mentioned	
by	China’s	Prime	Minister	Li	Keqiang	at	the	‘16+1’	summit	in	Budapest.	From the 
point of view of European business, it is of key importance to build open 
logistics infrastructure that could be used by both Chinese and European 
companies. The	ownership	structure	is	also	important	because	it	determines	
which	actors	can	have	access	to	infrastructure	and	how	profit	will	be	distrib-
uted.	The	final	location	of	logistics	centres	in	the	EU	will	depend	on:	the	condition	
and	traffic	capacity	of	road	and	rail	infrastructure	(including	a	well	thought-out	
modernisation	strategy),	a	favourable	regulatory	framework	and	price	regime	
adjusted	to	the	needs	of	intermodal	transport,	preferential	customs	clearance	
procedures	(for	example	delayed	import	VAT	payments),	the	adoption	of	suit-
able	regulations	for	e-commerce,	and	improved	cooperation	between	different	
rail	carrier	companies.
87
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
From China’s perspective, Poland is an attractive location for the logistics 
handling of rail trade with Central Europe, and partly also with Scandi-
navia and the southern and eastern regions of Germany.	The	favourable	
geographical	location	of	Polish	terminals	facilitates	the	transportation	of	goods	
to	more	distant	locations	in	Europe. According	to	Eurostat	data,	with	a	turno-
ver	of	around	2	billion	euros,	Poland	is	the	second	largest	provider	of	services	
related	to	rail	transport	after	Germany	(around	4	billion	euros).	Another	advan-
tage	of	Poland	is	the	large	number	of	price-competitive	companies	that	offer	
road	transport	solutions	used	in	goods	consolidation	and	distribution	in	the	EU.	
Large	companies	that	relocate	their	logistics	operations	to	Poland	can	hire	Pol-
ish	drivers	and	offer	them	lower	salaries.	Polish	drivers	are	not	allowed	to	freely	
transport	goods	to	rail	terminals	in	Western	Europe89.	Poland’s	share	in	the	
value	of	warehousing	services	and	additional	logistics	services	is	unimpres-
sive.	In	2015,	Polish	companies	rendered	services	of	this	type	worth	10.5	bil-
lion	euros90.	At	present,	Łódź	serves	as	a	logistics	centre	to	which	goods	are	
transported	from	the	remaining	part	of	the	EU,	intended	for	export	to	China.	
Around	25%	of	China-EU	trains	are	handled	there,	accounting	for	around	7%	
of	the	value	of	transported	goods.	
At present, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic, are also competing for 
the status of Central European ‘hub’.	So	far,	their	role	has	been	limited	due	
to	the	problems	affecting	transit	via	Ukraine.	However,	after	it	was	resumed	
to	some	extent	in	2017,	the	governments	of	Hungary	and	Slovakia	intensified	
their	efforts	to	attract	a	portion	of	trade	flows91.	The	attractiveness	of	Hungary	
may	increase	 in	the	context	of	 the	future	development	of	the	sea-land	con-
nection	through	which	goods	from	China	reach	Central	Europe	via	the	Greek	
port	of	Piraeus,	which	is	controlled	by	the	Chinese	company	COSCO.	So	far,	the	
strategic	importance	of	the	border	crossing	in	Terespol-Brest	has	been	Poland’s	
major	asset.	However,	due	to	its	limited	capacity,	Chinese	operators	may	opt	for	
alternative	routes.	Due	to	congestion	at	the	trains’	entry	point	to	Poland,	a	por-
tion	of	revenue	from	trans-shipment	services	is	earned	by	the	terminal	in	Brest	
89	 This	results	from	the	European	cabotage	regime	which	limits	the	activity	of	foreign	drivers	
in	a	specific	state	(for	example	in	Germany).	However,	Polish	drivers	are	allowed	to	trans-
port	goods	from	Germany	to	Poland.
90	 This	was	less	than	the	figure	for	Spain	(29	billion	euros),	the	Netherlands	(28	billion	euros),	
France	(75	billion	euros),	Germany	(74	billion	euros),	the	United	Kingdom	(79	billion	euros)	
and	Italy	(58	billion	euros).
91	 Bratislava	intends	to	handle	2,000	trains	annually	by	2020.
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in	Belarus,	where	goods	are	unloaded	from	wide	track	trains	onto	European	
standard	trains.	
Similarly, German cities are hoping to boost their revenue from handling 
the rail connections with China. At present, they are handling the biggest 
portion of EU-China rail trade in terms of value.	Duisburg	in	North-Rhine	
Westphalia	is	serving	as	a	logistics	centre	supporting	the	territory	of	Germany,	
Benelux	and	northern	France.	At	present,	EU-China	rail	connections	generate	
around	5.4%	of	rail	trans-shipment	operations	performed	there.	Due to the 
proximity of the main industrial bases that use the EU-China rail connec-
tions, around 25% of all the trains travelling between China and the EU 
accounting for around 75% of the value of goods are trans-shipped in Duis-
burg. Hamburg	would	also	like	to	offer	handling	services	intended	for	these	
connections.	In	recent	years,	the	city	has	recorded	a	gradual	drop	in	revenues	
from	the	trans-shipment	of	container	ships92.	It	is	worth	noting	that	for	some	
companies	the	service	of	unloading	the	trains	that	arrive	from	China	accounts	
for	10-15%	of	their	assignments93.
the competition between polish and german trans-shipment terminals
In the present situation regarding the structure of rail connections, trans-
shipment terminals in Germany and Poland frequently compete for indi-
vidual cargo flows. Numerous operators find it more cost-effective to trans-
port goods from China to Germany and then to send them on to Poland. For 
example, DB Schenker offers a service involving the transport of goods from 
central China to Leipzig (which is located near Poland’s western border) 
and on to Poland via Duisburg (which lies in western Germany), whereas 
the quicker option would be to unload the goods in central Poland and send 
them to Leipzig, so that they do not have to travel the same distance twice. 
For example, it seems that goods that have their end-point in Munich could 
be transported there via Łódź, rather than via Duisburg, which is a longer 
route. This logic of transportation reduces carriage efficiency and gener-
ates extra cost for Chinese intermodal operators.
92	 Chinesen	wollen	im	Hamburger	Hafen	landen,	14	July	2017,	http://www.handelsblatt.com/
unternehmen/logistik-spezial/zoff-um-neues-terminal-chinesen-wollen-im-hamburger-
hafen-landen/20057646.html
93	 TCO	setzt	auf	die	Schiene	–	Bahncontainer	von	Hamburg	nach	China,	https://www.hafen-
hamburg.de/de/news/tco-setzt-auf-die-schiene-bahncontainer-von-hamburg-nach-
china---35323
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One of the factors that reduce Poland’s competitive advantage is the present 
structure of price lists for intermodal transportation, which sometimes en-
courages clients to organise the unloading of their goods in Germany. Pos-
sible improvements on the part of infrastructure providers could involve 
the introduction of fees for using the infrastructure to encourage clients to 
use local rail terminals since, following trans-shipment, the goods would 
be transported further by rail anyway. 
The expansion of logistics centres that handle China-Europe rail connec-
tions is a development opportunity for those regions of Poland that are 
struggling with structural problems. These	include	the	Łódzkie,	Lubelskie	
and	Podlaskie	provinces.	The	development	of	the	rail	connection	may	be	an	
asset	when	looking	for	foreign	investments	to	be	carried	out	by	companies	that	
have	their	branch	offices	in	China.	Chinese	investors	that	have	their	assembly	
plants	in	Poland,	for	example	TCL,	a	producer	of	LCD	screens	with	a	manufac-
turing	plant	in	Żyrardów,	are	among	the	clients	that	use	the	rail	connections.	
The	expansion	of	the	rail	connection	network	may	help	include	Poland	and	Cen-
tral	Europe	in	new	supply	chains	created	under	the	model	of	‘creating	direct	
train	connections	between	factories’.	For	example,	the	duration	of	rail	trans-
portation	from	Zhengzhou	to	Europe	is	12-14	days	if	the	train	has	its	terminus	
in	Warsaw,	which	is	shorter	than	the	duration	of	a	train’s	journey	to	Milan,	
Prague	and	Paris	(16-18	days).
the development of the logistics centre in duisburg as a development 
opportunity for the region
Duisburg is a prime example of how a neglected region struggling with 
structural problems may be given a development boost in the form of stra-
tegic investments. Back in the 1990s, the city struggled with numerous 
problems caused by the collapse of several heavy industry plants. At pre-
sent, Duisburg is one of Europe’s most innovative logistics hubs hosting all 
the major companies involved in goods freight. The city views the rail con-
nection with China as an opportunity to strengthen its position as a major 
European logistics hub94. However, in Germany there is controversy over 
whether Chinese investors should be allowed to purchase a stake in the 
port’s operator company which also handles rail trade and is 66% controlled 
94	 J.	Kahl,	Duisburgs	Rettung	kommt	aus	dem	Fernen	Osten,	4	April	2017,	https://www.nzz.
ch/international/zugverbindung-china-deutschland-duisburgs-rettung-kommt-aus-
dem-fernen-osten-ld.155297
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by the districts of North-Rhine Westphalia and 33% controlled by the city 
of Duisburg95. There are voices suggesting that this is a method for China to 
increase its involvement in the region. So far, the port has signed a coopera-
tion agreement with China Merchants Group regarding the development of 
the rail connection between China and Europe. 
In	 recent	years,	German	 forwarding	 companies	have	offered	a	 service	which	
involves	shipping	goods	from	China	to	Duisburg	by	rail	and	then	dispatching	them	
on	to	Brazil	or	the	USA	by	air.	This	mode	of	transportation	takes	around	22	days	
door-to-door,	which	is	around	15	days	faster	than	maritime	freight	and	much	
cheaper	than	air	freight.	If	Polish	airports	were	able	to	compete	for	this	market,	
the	amount	of	possible	revenue	could	rise	considerably.	Perhaps	also	Poland’s	air-
ports,	in	particular	the	planned	Central	Transportation	Port,	could	compete	for	
a	portion	of	intermodal	transport	between	Asia	and	North	and	South	America.
4. the trade balance
The	debate	on	the	rail	connections	between	Europe	and	Asia	often	uses	the	
argument	that	they	will	trigger	an	increase	in	the	trade	balance	disproportion	
between	Europe	and	China.	This	disproportion	is	unquestionable	and	results	
mainly	from	structural	differences	between	the	two	regions.	However,	focus-
ing	too	much	on	this	aspect	alone	may	prove	to	be	too	simplified	an	approach.	
The trade balance statistics do not reflect reality as a whole.	In	numerous	
cases	they	categorise	internal	trade	carried	out	by	global	companies	as	trade	
between	specific	states.	For	example,	the	activity	of	a	German	company	that	has	
a	manufacturing	plant	in	China	and	delivers	components	used	in	the	produc-
tion	of	cars	to	Germany	will	be	categorised	as	export	from	China	to	Germany,	
regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	profit	from	the	production	of	components	is	earned	
by	the	German	company.	This	profit	can	be	transferred	to	Germany	in	the	form	
of	dividend	payments	or	another	form	of	financial	transfer.	Similarly,	the	export	
of	batteries	from	Samsung	manufacturing	plants	in	China	to	Europe	is	also	
viewed	as	China’s	export.	Therefore,	a	more	comprehensive	approach	is	needed	
to	analyse	not	only	the	flow	of	goods	but	also	the	flow	of	capital.	China’s ris-
ing export figures may be the result of increased investments carried out 
by Western countries in China, rather than a wave of Chinese products 
flooding the European market.	
95	 Ibid.
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From the point of view of Central Europe, one-sided analyses of its trade 
balance with China may be confusing.	The	deficit	partly	results	from	the	fact	
that	individual	countries	play	various	functions	in	the	supply	chains	operated	
by	global	companies.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that,	if	China	produces	components	
for	German	cars	that	are	assembled	in	Poland,	this	increases	Poland’s	imports.	
The	product,	made	from	Chinese	components,	is	later	sold	on	the	European	mar-
ket,	which	simultaneously	contributes	to	a	rise	in	Poland’s	exports.	This	portion	
of	import	from	China	is	de facto	beyond	the	control	of	individual	states	because	
it	is	carried	out	by	multinational	companies	present	in	Central	Europe	as	part	
of	their	operating	strategies.	From	this	perspective,	launching	a	competitive	
method	for	delivering	goods	from	China	by	rail	will	cause	an	increase	in	Central	
Europe’s	trade	deficit	with	China	while	simultaneously	boosting	the	region’s	
trade	surplus	with	states	which	are	end-product	recipients.	
It is interesting to analyse the trends recorded in China, which clearly 
indicate that China’s cost advantage over Central Europe is dwindling.	
In	the	difficult	years	following	the	global	financial	crisis,	the	Chinese	market	
has	become	a	major	driving	force	of	exports	for	numerous	highly	developed	
states.	The	demand	of	China’s	expanding	middle	class	for	high	value	goods,	
such	as	cars,	has	been	on	the	rise,	which	makes	the	Chinese	market	increas-
ingly	 attractive	 for	 the	 automotive	 industry96.	Consideration also needs 
to be given to whether the development of the rail connection could pos-
sibly trigger the process of production offshoring to reduce production 
cost.	China	should	not	be	viewed	as	a	homogeneous	entity.	In	recent	years,	sala-
ries	have	risen	in	particular	in	the	coastal	regions,	whereas	in	central	China,	
which	has	the	most	convenient	rail	connections	with	Europe,	salaries	are	still	
much	lower.	Rail	transport	may	also	help	to	boost	the	stability	of	supplies	from	
China	by	offering	relatively	fast	and	inexpensive	emergency	deliveries	of	goods	
on	special	order.	In	this	sense,	this	could	be	an	additional	argument	in	favour	
of	maintaining	factories	which	produce	goods	for	the	European	market	in	China	
instead	of	moving	them	to	Central	Europe.	On	the	one	hand,	the rail connec-
tions may be viewed as a method for supporting transport from those 
regions of China which hold a cost advantage over Central Europe.	On	the	
other	hand,	forecasts	published	by	various	research	centres	indicate	that,	in	the	
96	 In	2007-2014,	China’s	share	in	the	global	sale	of	new	cars	increased	from	10%	to	28%,	and	
in	2010	the	Chinese	market	became	the	world’s	 largest	automotive	market.	For	example,	
in	2009-2014	the	share	of	automotive	companies	from	Germany,	for	which	Central	Europe	
is	their	main	supplier,	in	the	Chinese	market	increased	from	18.6%	to	24.1%.	This	suggests	
that	the	Chinese	market	generated	demand	for	Polish-made	components	used	to	manufac-
ture	German	products.
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upcoming	years,	central	China	will	likely	be	developing	at	a	faster	pace	than	
the	coastal	areas;	this	is	one	of	the	goals	of	the	government	in	Beijing.	This,	
in	turn,	means	that	central	China’s	purchasing power will grow, triggering 
increased demand for European goods.	It	seems	that	the	global	trends	involv-
ing	multinational	companies	offshoring	their	operations,	in	this	case	to	China,	
have	been	on	the	wane	mainly	due	to	increasing	labour	costs97.	Aside	from	this,	
other	criteria	such	as	the	promptness	and	reliability	of	delivery	are	becom-
ing	increasingly	important	for	the	producers.	From	the	perspective	of	German	
companies	which	invest	in	both	China	and	Central	Europe,	the	two	regions	
do	not	compete	with	each	other	because	their	roles	are	different.	A	company’s	
involvement	in	manufacturing	operations	in	China	usually	serves	the	purpose	
of	supplying	goods	to	the	local	market,	whereas	Central	Europe	is	becoming	
a	location	in	which	to	manufacture	industrial	products	intended	for	the	EU	mar-
ket98.	Moreover,	due	to	China’s	population	ageing	so	rapidly,	its	labour	reserves	
will	also	dwindle	rapidly,	which	will	make	it	difficult	to	maintain	the	present	
foreign	expansion	model	based	on	a	low	labour	cost.
97	 J.	Donaubauer,	Ch.	Dreger,	The	End	of	Cheap	Labour:	Are	Foreign	Investors	Leaving	China?,	
Discussion	Papers,	Nr	159,	Published	by	the	German	Institute	for	Economic	Research,	Ber-
lin	2016.
98	 K.	Popławski,	The	role	of	Central	Europe	in	the	German	economy.	The	political	consequences,	
Centre	 for	 Eastern	 Studies,	 Warsaw	 2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
report/2016-05-16/role-central-europe-german-economy-political-consequences,	p.	38.
93
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
v. Models of bUsIness CooperatIon wIth ChIna 
based on raIl ConneCtIons
When	 analysing	 the	 models	 of	 using	 the	 China-Europe	 rail	 connections	
it	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	differences	between	individual	models	do	not	
prevent	companies	from	using	several	of	them	jointly	to	carry	out	their	busi-
ness	operations.	
1. direct connections between factories operated by global 
companies
Frequently, creating direct rail connections between manufacturing 
plants is a method for saving time and transportation costs.	This	model	
of	transportation	is	used	by	companies	operating	in	the	automotive	and	elec-
tronics	sectors,	in	which	being	able	to	adjust	the	production	to	changing	con-
sumer	preferences	is	an	important	determinant	of	success.	In	the	automotive	
industry,	the	efficient	coordination	of	manufacturing	plants	by	arranging	fast	
and	reliable	deliveries	 is	equally	 important.	This	method	is	used	under	the	
just-in-time	production	model,	in	which	the	number	of	stored	parts	and	sub-
assemblies	is	reduced	to	the	necessary	minimum.	In	these	sectors,	using	rail	
to	transport	goods	makes	it	possible	to	shorten	the	delivery	time	by	12-15	days,	
This	means	that	train	transportation	generates	savings	on	the	time	of	freez-
ing	the	capital	of	the	transported	goods.	To	ensure	the	secure	transportation	
of	components,	in	particular	in	the	electronics	industry,	the	use	of	containers	
offering	a	stable	temperature	is	necessary.	
The application of this model of using rail has been facilitated by the trans-
formation which China went through. In recent years this has resulted 
in developmental differences emerging between the central and the 
coastal regions.	 Initially,	global	companies	 located	their	production	in	the	
vicinity	of	ocean	harbours,	which	enabled	them	to	use	the	cheapest	method	for	
transporting	products	from	China	to	Europe,	i.e.	sea	freight.	However,	in	recent	
years,	the	coastal	provinces’	cost	advantage	has	fallen,	for	example	due	to:	the	
rise	in	salaries,	the	introduction	of	stricter	labour	laws,	increasingly	frequent	
congestion	 in	 the	harbours,	 and	 the	 incentives	 offered	by	 the	 government	
in	Beijing	to	invest	in	central	China.	As	a	consequence,	a	portion	of	companies	
decided	to	locate	their	manufacturing	plants	in	the	central	and	western	prov-
inces.	In	this	model	of	using	rail	transportation,	global	companies	often	try	
to	locate	their	manufacturing	plant	in	China	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	it	pos-
sible	to	dispatch	goods	from	there	by	rail	to	a	plant	located	in	Europe.	Provided	
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that	this	connection	is	well-organised	and	the	company	has	a	sufficient	turno-
ver,	it	is	possible	to	create	a	connection	which	will	have	a	cost	advantage	over	
maritime	transport,	taking	into	account	the	cost	of	the	capital	involved	and	the	
delivery	time.	In	such	a	case,	the	company	usually	hires	an	entire	train	which	
it	loads	with	its	goods.	A	train	service	of	this	kind	may	be	regular,	if	needed.	
This	makes	it	possible	to	improve	delivery	logistics	and	reduce	the	time	needed	
to	arrange	transportation	to	a	single	day	instead	of	the	usual	five	days	or	more.
Under the manufacturing plant connection scheme, companies hire entire 
trains to transport their goods.	This	is	favourable	for	them	both	in	terms	
of	cost	and	of	the	duration	of	transportation.	Firstly,	with	a	regular	train	ser-
vice	ordered	by	specific	companies,	it	is	possible	to	guarantee	relatively	sta-
ble	timetables	because	the	transported	goods	are	homogeneous	and	customs	
services	 in	 individual	 states	may	apply	simplified	procedures	so	 that	 there	
is	no	risk	that	a	given	batch	of	goods	may	be	stopped	or	returned	due	to	its	
non-compliance	with	local	laws	or	formal	mistakes.	Secondly,	when	goods	are	
transported	from	one	plant	to	another,	the	train	is	able	to	collect	them	directly	
from	a	factory,	in	which	a	suitable	rail	terminal	is	located	and	transport	the	
goods	to	the	nearest	terminal	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	destination	plant.	
This	is	why	the	duration	of	door-to-door	delivery	is	not	necessarily	different	
from	the	duration	of	delivery	from	one	terminal	to	another.	For	example,	the	
transportation	of	goods	manufactured	in	a	factory	in	Chengdu	in	central	China	
to	a	harbour	takes	around	3	days,	whereas	over	the	same	period	a	cargo	train	
hired	to	transport	these	goods	is	able	to	cover	a	quarter	of	its	total	distance	from	
China	to	Europe99.	
Due	to	the	fact	that	a	cargo	train	is	able	to	transport	considerably	fewer	contain-
ers	than	a	container	ship,	its	full	capacity	can	be	contracted	by	one	company,	
whereas	the	logistics	connected	with	the	loading	and	unloading	of	goods	onto	
large	container	ships	is	much	more	complex	and	less	flexible.	This	was	one	of	the	
causes	of	goods	congestions	in	Chinese	ports	in	recent	years.	Moreover,	the	
transportation	of	goods	by	ship	may	be	delayed	due	to	bad	weather100.
99	 M.	Kuntz,	Die	rollende	Seidenstraße,	27	April	2015,	http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/
von-westeuropa-nach-china-die-rollende-seidenstrasse-1.2454706
100	 Joint	Study	on	Developing	Euro-Asian	Transport	Linkages,	2008,	https://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/trans/main/eatl/in_house_study.pdf,	p.	85
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the significance of rail connections for the automotive industry 
German automotive companies, such as Audi, BMW and Volkswagen, use 
rail transport to dispatch car components from Germany to their factories 
in western and central China. For example, BMW sends 3-7 trains to China 
weekly. For the automotive industry, transporting car parts from the west 
to the east by rail is not a novelty. European companies used to send disas-
sembled vehicles to Russia by rail, where they were later assembled, to by-
pass Russian laws pursuant to which production can only be carried out in 
Russia. For example, Volkswagen has been sending disassembled cars from 
its factories in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to its plant in Kaluga since 
2002101. Due to the fact that the connection has been operational for several 
years, the company was able to work out its own tools to monitor the ef-
ficiency and security of delivery. The process of transporting car parts is 
supervised by a rail carrier which has built a custom-made IT system for 
VW to enable the clients to check the location of the containers carrying 
their car parts on an ongoing basis. In 2008 alone, 1,250 trains transported 
50,000 containers from the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Kaluga. From 
this point of view, transporting them to China would mean extending the 
present transportation route.
the significance of rail connections for the electronics industry
Hewlett-Packard was one of the first companies to transport its goods from 
China to Europe by rail. This mode of transportation has become even more 
attractive due to the global economic crisis causing global trade to decline 
and instability in the maritime freight sector. As a consequence, the dura-
tion of the delivery of goods from China to Europe increased from 26 days 
to 34-36 days102. Pursuant to a decision by the governments of China, Ka-
zakhstan and Russia, HP manufacturing plants were included in a special 
customs zone, as a result of which the duration of transportation has short-
ened, because the trains did not have to stop for customs clearance. Cur-
rently, HP is sending 2-3 trains to China weekly and the transportation of 
goods in the door-to-door system takes 16-18 days. 
101	 Ibid.,	p.	82
102	 M.	Bolle,	A.	Kortsari,	Europe	–	Asia	Railway	Transport:	 Issues	&	Prospects,	http://www.
near2-project.eu/Portals/0/NEAR%202.DRAFT%2097_final.pdf,	p.	53
96
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
18
2. high value goods
At present, mainly electronic devices, electrical machines, pharmaceuti-
cal and chemical products are transported from China to Europe by rail.	
In	the	case	of	these	products,	delivery	time	is	important	and	companies	are	
ready	to	pay	more	in	order	for	them	to	be	transported	faster.	Unlike	in	the	
model	of	connecting	manufacturing	plants,	to	have	high	value	goods	trans-
ported	by	rail,	companies	can	hire	only	a	portion	of	the	train’s	capacity	and	
dispatch	even	small	amounts	of	cargo.	However,	this	is	a	logistics	challenge	
as	it	requires	proper	organisation	of	the	train’s	cargo,	so	that	the	train’s	capacity	
is	met	and	border	clearance	procedures	are	more	efficient.	
Currently, delivering high-value goods is the main motivation for using 
rail connections. According to estimates, around 65-67% of rail deliver-
ies are the delivery of goods with a relatively high value103.	For	this	type	
of	goods,	the	advantage	of	rail	transport	over	other	modes	of	transport	is	the	
relatively	small	share	of	the	transportation	cost	in	the	price	of	the	end	product.	
This	means	that	the	producer	has	a	sufficiently	high	profit	margin	to	enable	
it	to	earmark	a	portion	of	it	to	pay	for	the	faster	transportation	of	its	goods.	For	
producers	of	high	value	goods,	being	able	to	offer	faster	delivery	can	be	their	
competitive	advantage.	It	is	also	worth	emphasising	that	a	shorter	duration	
of	 transportation	 of	 high	 value	 goods	 is	 beneficial	 not	 only	 for	 the	 clients	
(because	it	shortens	the	time	they	spend	waiting	for	their	order)	but	also	for	
the	producers	who	are	able	to	make	savings	on	lower	costs	of	insurance,	goods	
warehousing	and	a	reduced	time	of	capital	freezing.
According	to	DB	Schenker’s	calculations,	the	price	of	capital	which	cannot	be	used	
during	the	period	over	which	the	goods	are	being	transported	increases	the	price	
of	sea	freight	by	two	thirds,	whereas	the	corresponding	proportion	for	rail	trans-
port	is	one	third,	which	makes	the	two	modes	of	transportation	increasingly	com-
petitive.	In	the	present	situation,	it	should	be	taken	into	account	that,	due	to	low	
interest	rates	maintained	by	central	banks	across	the	world,	this	issue	may	not	
be	of	primary	importance	to	the	clients.	However,	it	seems	that	in	the	upcoming	
years	the	cost	of	capital	will	rise	due	to	the	fact	that	central	banks	are	abandon-
ing	the	policy	of	quantitative	easing,	which	will	boost	the	importance	of	the	cost	
of	capital	as	a	factor	to	be	taken	into	account	when	deciding	on	the	mode	of	trans-
portation	of	goods	from	China	to	Europe	and	vice versa.
103	 Ibid.,	p.	57.
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3. products with a short life cycle
The rail connection is popular with manufacturers of seasonal goods, 
in particular clothes.	Due	to	specific	deadlines	for	launching	new	clothing	
collections,	the	producers	often	wish	to	save	time	and	do	not	want	to	pay	exces-
sive	transportation	costs.	When	launching	new	technological	solutions	or	new	
electronic	devices,	companies	often	choose	rail	transport	to	be	sure	that	the	
goods	reach	their	destination	on	time.	
Emergency	deliveries	of	goods	are	a	slightly	different	category	of	using	rail	
transport.	It	sometimes	happens	that	the	client	receives	an	order	that	does	not	
meet	all	the	criteria	and	standards	specified	in	the	order.	If	this	is	the	case,	
sending	additional	batches	of	products	is	necessary,	for	example	due	to	a	strict	
merchandising	deadline.	In	this	situation,	many	clients	choose	delivery	by	rail,	
because	they	do	not	have	a	sufficient	profit	margin	to	afford	to	deliver	their	
goods	by	air.	Similarly,	in	those	periods	in	which	customer	demand	is	difficult	
to	estimate,	for	example	before	and	after	Christmas,	companies	choose	to	have	
extra	deliveries	dispatched	by	rail.	It	is	also	worth	considering	whether	reduc-
ing	the	risk	of	problems	with	delivery	from	China	to	Europe	can	be	an	additional	
argument	 in	favour	of	relocating	production	to	China.	European	producers	
may	also	draw	certain	benefits	from	the	opportunity	to	transport	their	goods	
to	China	in	a	fast	and	relatively	cheap	manner	by	rail.	One	interesting	exam-
ple	is	provided	by	the	scandals	over	contaminated	food	in	China,	in	particular	
powdered	milk,	which	contributed	to	a	rapid	increase	in	demand	for	imported	
powdered	milk.	
promotional campaigns and extra deliveries 
Many hyper- and supermarket chains plan their promotional campaigns at 
least a few months in advance. This means that promotional materials such 
as leaflets showing products available at special price need to be printed in 
advance. It may happen that delivery of these goods is late due to problems 
with sea freight or that the delivered goods do not meet the prearranged 
quality standards. If this is the case, many companies decide to have anoth-
er batch of goods delivered by rail. Many clients are regularly confronted 
with the problem of faulty goods and book train capacity on a permanent 
basis to be able to order an emergency delivery if needed. 
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4. Mail/e-commerce
Until	2013,	 it	had	seemed	that,	due	to	the	level	of	complexity	of	the	process	
of	dispatching	goods	by	rail,	it	would	mainly	be	possible	to	transport	such	vol-
umes	of	goods	that	would	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	full	capacity	of	a	container104.	
In 2014-2015, carriers managed to improve the efficiency of the connec-
tion’s logistics so that now it is possible to dispatch a volume of goods that 
is smaller than the volume of one container.	This	is	possible	because	com-
panies	may	rent	smaller	portions	of	container	volume	(expressed	in	m3).	For	
example,	it	is	worth	noting	that	transporting	one	carriage	of	goods	is	twice	
as	expensive	and	takes	at	least	a	few	days	longer	than	transporting	an	entire	
train105.	The	difference	results	from	the	fact	that	no	simplified	customs	proce-
dures	are	possible,	so	the	process	gets	extended	on	each	of	the	borders	the	train	
needs	to	cross106.	Moreover,	before	the	train	departs	there	is	the	need	to	carry	
out	a	more	complex	and	time-consuming	goods	consolidation	and	preparation	
of	customs	procedures.	There	is	a	growing	risk	that	an	entire	container	may	
be	stopped	due	to	mistakes	in	customs	documentation.	The	cost	of	transporting	
a	volume	of	goods	that	is	smaller	than	the	entire	container	volume	is	higher,	and	
this	is	true	for	all	modes	of	transportation.	For	example,	transporting	less	than	
one	containerful	of	goods	by	sea	is	30-40%	more	expensive	than	transporting	
one	full	container	of	goods107.	
Despite	these	limitations,	numerous	logistics	experts	claim	that,	alongside	the	
automotive	and	electronics	sectors,	the	e-commerce	industry	will	also	benefit	
the	most	from	the	development	of	the	rail	connection.	Opening the rail con-
nection to e-commerce is an opportunity to transport at least a portion 
of the market of parcels sent from Europe to China and vice versa. Accord-
ing to estimates, this market accounts for more than half of the parcels 
104	 C.	Rastogi,	J.	F.	Arvis,	The	Eurasian	Connection	Supply-Chain	Efficiency	along	the	Modern	
Silk	Route	through	Central	Asia,	World	Bank,	Washington	2014,	p.	46.
105	 Ibid.,	p.	66.
106	 For	example,	on	the	route	via	Mongolia	the	train	spends	30%	of	its	journey	time	on	customs	
procedures	and	two	thirds	of	these	excessively	long	procedures	are	the	result	of	incorrect	
customs	declarations.	See	http://fiata.com/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/recent_views/
Working_Group_UIC_FIATA/2_UIC-FIATA_Vienna_23-24_April_2015_Presentation_
Zhang_Zhao.pdf
107	 F.	Gronkvist,	 Shipping	Costs	When	 Importing	 from	China	 –	A	Complete	Guide,	 3.4.2017,	
http://www.chinaimportal.com/blog/shipping-costs-when-importing-from-china-a-com-
plete-guide/
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sent from Europe to the rest of the world108.	Research	shows	that	the	fastest	
growing	categories	of	goods	sold	in	e-commerce	between	China	and	Europe	are:	
sports	equipment,	clothes,	jewellery,	household	goods	and	electronic	devices109.	
These	products	may	potentially	be	transported	by	rail.	A	report	by	the	Chinese	
company	AliResearch	contains	similar	findings	–	there	is	growing	customer	
demand	for	express	 international	parcels	containing	goods	such	as	fashion	
items,	jewellery	and	powdered	milk,	which	are	usually	dispatched	to	customers	
by	air110.	According	to	our	interviewees	involved	in	doing	business	in	China,	the	
main	advantage	of	e-commerce	is	the	fact	that	it	is	subject	to	less	strict	regula-
tions	than	traditional	sale.	In	some	sectors,	companies	find	it	easier	to	enter	
a	market	by	offering	online	sale	than	by	opening	brick-and-mortar	outlets.	
The	development	of	e-commerce	may	trigger	certain	fears	because	it	offers	
Chinese	producers	an	opportunity	to	sell	goods	in	the	European	market	at	con-
siderably	 lower	prices	and	 to	dispatch	 their	goods	 from	 low-cost	 locations	
in	China.	According	to	media	reports,	Alibaba,	China’s	major	online	selling	
platform,	is	planning	to	use	rail	to	expand	its	reach	onto	the	European	market	
and	to	build	a	logistics	centre	in	Bulgaria111.	Until	recently,	various	middle-
men	had	been	using	local	online	selling	platforms	to	sell	products	imported	
directly	from	China	and	ordered	by	a	specific	retailer.	However,	many	clients	
were	discouraged	by	the	five-week	delivery	time.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	worth	
considering	whether	in	the	mid-term	perspective	Chinese	producers	might	
be	interested	in	using	online	platforms	to	buy	European	goods	such	as	food-
stuffs	and	luxury	items.	
Rail transport may help boost the competitiveness of European producers 
on the Chinese e-commerce market.	It	should	be	emphasised	that	at	present	
many	online	selling	platforms	operate	based	on	one	of	two	major	models112.	
108	 E-commerce	 to	 benefit	 from	 rail-post	 relations,	 Union	 Postale,	 Nr	 1/2016,	 http://www.
ub.unibas.ch/digi/a125/sachdok/2016/BAU_1_147716_1_2016.pdf,	p.	9.
109	 2016	China	Cross-Border	E-Commerce	(Export	B2B)	Report,	http://download.dhgate.com/
files/White%20Paper.pdf,	p.	17.
110	 Trends	in	the	air-freight	business,	14	April	2017,	https://www.economist.com/news/busi-
ness-and-finance/21720901-fewer-electronics-are-being-flown-instead-planes-are-full-
fresh-produce-trends
111	 E.	 Jiang,	What	China's	$1	Trillion	New	Silk	Road	Spells	for	Fashion,	23	June	2017,	https://
www.businessoffashion.com/articles/global-currents/one-belt-one-road-optimistic-fan-
tasy-or-chinas-biggest-fashion-opportunity-yet
112	 China	Cross-Border	E-Commerce	Guidebook,	https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2017/03/
Cross-Border%20E-Commere%20Guidebook%20FINAL%20FINAL.PDF,	p.	17.
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In	the	first	model,	goods	are	stored	in	customs	warehouses	in	China	and	are	
dispatched	to	the	client	when	they	are	ordered.	One	advantage	of	this	approach	
is	the	fast	delivery	of	products	to	the	client,	whereas	the	high	cost	of	ware-
housing	the	goods	is	the	drawback.	In	the	second	model,	goods	are	dispatched	
from	Europe	when	they	are	ordered	by	a	Chinese	client,	which	extends	the	
duration	and	increases	the	cost	of	their	transportation.	However,	it	reduces	the	
cost	of	warehousing	the	goods	and	capital	freezing.	The rail connection is an 
opportunity to reduce the duration of direct deliveries.	Logistics	compa-
nies	also	emphasise	that,	unlike	other	modes	of	transportation,	rail	transport	
does	not	generate	higher	costs	of	transporting	goods	to	customs	zones,	which	
makes	it	an	attractive	solution	for	those	companies	that	intend	to	keep	less	stock	
in	customs	warehouses	across	China,	i.e.	closer	to	the	customer,	and	which	
want	to	be	able	to	replenish	their	stock	faster.	
5. the export of foodstuffs
Due	to	the	fact	that	the	trains	are	equipped	with	diesel	locomotives,	it	is	pos-
sible	to	transport	goods	in	wagons	that	have	a	temperature	control	system113.	
Since	2014,	some	forwarding	companies	have	offered	an	all-year-round	service	
involving	the	dispatch	of	goods	in	wagons	of	this	type.	This	could	facilitate	the	
rail	transport	of	foodstuffs	in	the	future.	However,	for	this	to	be	possible,	Rus-
sia	would	have	to	lift	its	embargo	on	the	import	of	foodstuffs,	which	in	practice	
would	also	cover	rail	transit.
the export of foodstuffs and the russian embargo 
Russia introduced an embargo on the import of foodstuffs from the Europe-
an Union in response to the sanctions Brussels imposed on it in connection 
with the Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, it should be emphasised 
that the sanctions introduced a ban on the import of foodstuffs from the 
EU, which Russian customs services have interpreted as also being a ban on 
transit. This is the reason behind the current problems with transporting 
foodstuffs from Europe by rail.
The rail transport of foodstuffs needs to be prompt and requires more effi-
cient customs procedures. In	some	cases,	customs	officers	stop	the	trains,	
especially	on	the	Kazakh-Chinese	border;	this	is	a	major	barrier	to	transporting	
113	 M.	Bolle,	A.	Kortsari,	Europe	–	Asia	Railway	Transport:	 Issues	&	Prospects,	http://www.
near2-project.eu/Portals/0/NEAR%202.DRAFT%2097_final.pdf,	p.	51.
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fresh	and	frozen	foodstuffs	in	particular.	The	prices	on	the	Chinese	internal	
market	are	attractive	enough	to	cover	the	higher	cost	of	transporting	prod-
ucts	by	rail.	According	to	industry	reports,	the	rail	connection	may	help	boost	
Europe’s	exports	to	China,	in	particular	berries,	veal	and	powdered	milk114.
rail transport as a business opportunity for european foodstuffs 
producers operating on the Chinese market 
In the case of foodstuffs, their country of origin should be perceived as 
a strong brand. This is of key importance for achieving success on the 
Chinese market. This brand should be associated with high quality and 
safety. If companies wish to use this market opportunity, it would be ad-
visable to boost the recognisability of foodstuffs from Central Europe and 
to improve their marketing and design. For many Chinese consumers for-
eign fruit is a luxury product and its packaging design resembles that of 
chocolate boxes available in Europe. It is also necessary to create instru-
ments to encourage foodstuffs producers to establish different forms of 
cooperation as part of their expansion in China. One characteristic of the 
Chinese market is the fact that retail chains often require the producers 
to be able to deliver very large amounts of goods which individual com-
panies are unable to offer and this may hinder the process of concluding 
business contracts. 
Recent	market	analyses	suggest	that,	due to the rising living standards of Chi-
na’s population and the country’s ongoing urbanisation, the demand for 
imported foodstuffs is expected to grow dynamically115.	At	present,	China’s	
import	of	foodstuffs	is	estimated	at	US$	7	billion.	22%	of	this	import	comes	from	
Europe,	20%	from	North	America	and	20%	from	South-East	Asia.	The rail con-
nection may be an opportunity for European foodstuffs producers to gain 
a competitive advantage over their major global competitors.	The	duration	
of	the	rail	transport	of	foodstuffs	from	Europe	to	China,	which	is	around	two	
114	 P.	Bosch,	X.	Zhang,	From	Freight	Trains	to	Cold	Chains:	Building	China’s	New	Supply	Chains	
for	Fresh	Food,	Rabobank,	2015.
115	 Forecasts	by	the	Chinese	statistics	office	suggest	that	by	2025	the	consumption	of	beef	per	
capita	will	increase	by	40%	to	7	kg,	of	dairy	products	by	35%	to	13	kg,	of	fish	by	20%	to	50	kg,	
of	 chicken	by	 22%	 to	 11	 kg,	 of	 fruit	 and	 vegetables	 by	 16%	 to	 384	kg	 and	 of	 pork	 by	 10%	
to	46	kg.	This	is	why	by	2020	China’s	import	of	beef	is	expected	to	increase	by	20%,	of	pork	
by	9%,	of	poultry	meat	by	23%,	of	fresh	dairy	products	by	81%	and	of	fruit	by	19%.	P.	Bosch,	
X.	 Zhang,	 From	 Freight	 Trains	 to	 Cold	 Chains:	 Building	 China’s	New	 Supply	 Chains	 for	
Fresh	Food,	Rabobank,	2015,	p.	19.
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weeks,	would	be	comparable	with	the	duration	of	the	sea	freight	of	goods	from	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	(which	is	12-14	days,	although	sometimes	delivery	
from	this	region	is	performed	by	air)	and	much	shorter	than	the	duration	of	sea	
transport	from	North	America	(5-6	weeks)	and	South	America	(5	weeks).	It	
is	also	worth	noting	that	fruit	and	vegetables	from	Europe	may	complement	Chi-
na’s	imports	from	the	states	of	the	southern	hemisphere	due	to	the	differences	
in	the	vegetation	cycle.	Further	proof	of	the	rising	importance	China	places	
on	the	importation	of	foodstuffs	is	its	increasing	investment	in	the	logistics	
of	chilled	products.	Until	recently,	the	Chinese	market’s	distribution	network	
was	unprepared	for	this	challenge.	At	present,	even	rail	terminals	are	becom-
ing	prepared	to	handle	imports	of	foodstuffs	and	to	invest	in	proper	warehous-
ing	facilities.	The	Chinese	government	is	planning	to	increase	its	investment	
in	foodstuffs	logistics116,	because	it	is	aware	that	there	is	demand	on	the	part	
of	society	for	high	quality	safe	food.	This	is	a	result	of	a	recent	series	of	scan-
dals	over	contaminated	food.	The	changing	eating	habits	of	the	Chinese	popula-
tion	will	trigger	increased	online	sales.	In	2012-2015,	the	share	of	online	sales	
of	fresh	food	in	the	total	volume	of	sold	produce	increased	from	0.4%	to	3.4%	and	
at	present	is	estimated	at	around	6%117.	
The popularity of rail as a method for transporting foodstuffs will impact 
the pace of development of rail connections.	Global	air	 transport	 trends	
suggest	that	recent	years	have	seen	a	downward	trend	when	it	comes	to	the	
weight	of	goods	transported	by	air.	One	reason	for	this	is	the	fact	that	elec-
tronic	devices	are	increasingly	more	compact	and	that	manufacturing	plants	
are	being	relocated	to	the	vicinity	of	the	markets	in	which	the	products	are	
sold118.	The	air	transportation	of	high	quality	foodstuffs	is	contributing	to	an	
increase	in	cargo	air	traffic119.	When	foodstuffs	are	transported	by	rail,	the	use	
of	refrigerated	containers	is	necessary	due	to	major	temperature	fluctuations,	
which	may	increase	the	transportation	cost	compared	with	standard	carriage.	
Some	producers	have	tested	the	option	of	transporting	products	that	do	not	
require	refrigeration,	such	as	wine	and	olive	oil,	in	dry	containers;	however,	
116	 China	aims	to	improve	its	logistics	system	to	protect	food	safety,	22.04.2017,	http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-04/22/content_29040394.htm
117	 E.	Li,	Fresh	Food	E-Commerce	in	China,	2016,	http://www.fedefruta.cl/2016/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/1430-1600_Li.pdf
118	 Trends	in	the	air-freight	business,	14	April	2017,	https://www.economist.com/news/busi-
ness-and-finance/21720901-fewer-electronics-are-being-flown-instead-planes-are-full-
fresh-produce-trends
119	 Ibid.
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this	option	did	not	turn	out	to	be	feasible120.	Improving	the	efficiency	of	the	rail	
connection	and	enabling	the	more	intensive	transportation	of	foodstuffs	is	not	
only	an	opportunity	but	also	a	threat,	as	it	may	trigger	increased	import	from	
South-East	Asia	and	Australia	to	Europe.
JAKUB JAKóBOWSKI, KOnRAD POPłAWSKI, MARCIn KACZMARSKI 
120	 B.B.	Munoz,	It	costs	twice	as	much	to	export	olive	oil	from	Spain	using	China’s	“One	Belt,	
One	 Road”	 railway,	 18.05.2016,	 https://qz.com/686816/the-view-from-spain-chinas-one-
belt-oneroad-railway-is-an-unnecessary-folly/
